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Abstract 
This thesis examines the influence of the Boer War 1899 – 1902 upon tactics and training in the 
regular British Army 1902 – 1914.  The work argues that several key lessons drawn from South 
Africa became the tactical cornerstones for infantry, artillery and cavalry throughout the pre-First 
World War period and shaped the performance of the B.E.F. during the early battles of 1914.  The 
experience of combat against well armed opposition in the Boer War prompted the British Army to 
develop improved tactics in each of the three major service arms.  For example, infantry placed new 
emphasis on dispersion and marksmanship; cavalry improved their dismounted work and 
reconnaissance skills; and artillery adopted methods of concealment and strove to improve accuracy 
and co-ordination.  Across the army as a whole, the experience of combat lead to an overall 
downgrading of the importance of drill and obedience, replacing it instead with tactical skill and 
individual initiative.  In addition, the thesis also examines the impact of the Boer War upon overall 
British Army doctrine and ethos.   
The process of reform prior to the First World War was marked by wide ranging debates upon the 
value of the South African experience, and not all lessons drawn from the conflict endured, with 
tactical restructuring being further complicated by changes of government and financial restrictions.  
Nevertheless, key lessons such as dispersion, marksmanship, concealment and firepower were 
ultimately retained and proved to be of great value during initial clashes against the Germans in 1914.  
Additionally, the Boer War caused the British to place new emphasis upon overall training of the 
individual, allowing advanced tactical skills to be inculcated more easily than had been possible in 
earlier years.   
However, the short duration of the conventional period of the Boer War meant that there was less 
opportunity to derive operational lessons for future employment.  Furthermore, the colonial policing 
role of the British Army and the likelihood of small scale deployments meant that developing an 
operational doctrine was of less immediate value than ensuring flexibility and tactical skill.   This 
meant that the British Army took a somewhat skewed developmental path in the 1902 – 1914.  The 
process of reform ultimately produced a highly adaptable force that was tactically skilled, but which 
was ill-prepared for the operational complications posed by large scale deployment.   
While the Boer War was the principal factor in driving reform during the 1902 – 1914 period, there 
were additional influences at work, including examples from the Russo-Japanese War 1904 – 1905 
and various ideas drawn from the armies of the continent.  However, this thesis argues that while 
these outside influences contributed to ongoing debate, they did not offer any particular fresh ideas 
and were therefore of less importance than the Boer War in shaping British Army development.   
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Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The 1902 – 1914 period was one of the most critical in the history of the development of the British 
Army to that date.  In the twelve years between the end of the Boer War and the outbreak of the First 
World War, the army underwent vast and important organisational and tactical reforms that ultimately 
produced, in the words of historian John Dunlop, “...incomparably the best trained, best organised, 
and best equipped British Army which ever went forth to war.”1  The Boer War 1899 – 1902 played 
an important part in creating this elite force.  The shock of battlefield defeat dispelled the aura of 
complacency that had settled over the British Army during the years of easy victories against crudely 
armed foes during the Victorian era.  Faced with determined and well armed opponents in unusual 
climatic conditions, the British were forced to confront the key tactical problem of how to cross the 
fire swept zone in an age of smokeless ammunition and magazine rifles.  The shock of new conditions 
led to a series of disturbing defeats in the early part of the war.  Although the army was ultimately 
able to adapt and overcome the Boers, the duration and cost of the war led to public outcry and 
searching introspection within the military.  Furthermore, the hostile attitude of continental powers 
such as France, Germany and Russia during the war left Britain feeling especially vulnerable.  In this 
respect, the conflict in South Africa provided the key impetus to undertake a thorough overhaul of the 
British Army in the years following the end of the conflict.   
However, while many historians have identified the Boer War as being a catalyst for change and 
reform in the British Army, this has tended to focus upon organisational level reform, as characterised 
by the creation of the Territorial Army and the General Staff.2  Other writers have commented upon 
the tactical skill demonstrated by the British in 1914, but have neglected or referred only in passing to 
the role of the Boer War in developing the army to this level.3  Some historians have even seen the 
South Africa experience as a negative influence.4   The comparative lack of detailed study of the 
influence of the Boer War upon tactics in the 1902 – 1914 period represents a gap in the 
historiography.  This in turn has led to recent historical studies of the B.E.F. of 1914 offering only 
vague assertions that the Boer War had played a role in tactical reform.5  Therefore, it is the aim of 
this thesis to analyse the extent to which the bitter conflict in South Africa shaped the tactical and 
operational development of the British Army 1902 - 1914.  
                                                     
1
 Dunlop, John, The Development of the British Army 1899-1914 (Methuen, London, 1938) p.305 
2
 Teagarden, Ernest, Haldane at the War Office: A Study in Organization and Management, (New York, Gordon 
Press, 1976); Tyler, J.E., The British Army and the Continent 1904-1914 (London, Edward Arnold & Co, 1938); 
Bryce Poe II, “British Army Reforms 1902 – 1914” in Military Affairs 31(3), 1967, pp.131 - 138 
3
 For example, Terraine, John, Mons: The Retreat to Victory (Ware, Wordsworth Editions, 2000 reprint) 
4
 Searle, G.R, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought 1899-1914 
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1971) p.50 
5
 Neillands, Robin, The Old Contemptibles: The British Expeditionary, 1914, (London, John Murray, 2004) 
pp.100, 136, 138 
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The terms doctrine, strategy, operations and tactics will be used throughout this thesis and it is 
important to define their meaning.  The meaning of these phrases has altered subtly since they were 
first introduced, and thus modern definitions will be used to avoid confusion.  Military doctrine, in the 
words of Stephen Badsey, “...means the prescriptive setting out of the courses of action the armed 
forces should follow”.6  In the 21st century the definition of military doctrine has come to mean 
centralised, written guidelines for the conduct of military operations and tactics, and it is this 
definition that will be used throughout this work.  Military strategy is the question of how to fight 
wars and win campaigns using the military forces available to an army.  Operations relate to the 
handling of armies and larger formations such as corps and divisions during campaigns and in battle.  
Tactics refer to the manner in which lower level formations, typically brigade level and below, 
actually fight in battle.  Unless otherwise stated, these definitions will be used throughout this work. 
While the Boer War was a key element in the development of tactics in the 1902 – 1914 period, there 
were additional factors which shaped the tactical reform of the British Army.  The Russo-Japanese 
War 1904-1905 distracted attention away from the South Africa experience and instead towards a 
conflict between two modern, regular armies equipped in the European style.  Observers from 
Europe’s armies flocked to study the war in Manchuria, their reports and observations sparking 
considerable debate within the British Army.  Both the reformists and the more traditionally minded 
within the British Army used the conflict in the Far East to provide evidence to support their 
respective cases.  However, as with South Africa, the apparent lessons from the war were not as clear-
cut as some writers at first believed, and debate continued.7  The ambiguous nature of the lessons 
from the Russo-Japanese War meant that European militaries tended to use the examples to confirm 
existing ideas rather than change their thinking.  In the case of the British Army, this meant that while 
the Manchurian conflict had relatively little direct impact upon tactics, it served as a prism through 
which many of the earlier Boer War lessons were viewed.    Furthermore, as the period drew on and 
Britain became linked more closely through alliance to France, a third influence began to emerge 
upon the army, particularly the artillery, as French thinking filtered through into the British military.  
As war with Germany became ever more likely the example of the French, also preparing for a war 
with the Germans, drew attention from the Royal Artillery who began to wonder whether their tactical 
and operational ideas were suitable for continental warfare.  French infatuation with the offensive also 
filtered into elements of the British Army, lending credence to arguments from traditional thinkers 
who rejected the arguments of the revisionist firepower school.   
Thus in addition to the combat experience of the Boer War, several other influences were contributing 
to British tactical and operational thought in the years preceding the First World War.  However, 
                                                     
6
 Badsey, Stephen, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008) p.3 
7
 Keith Neilson, “That Dangerous and Difficult Enterprise: British Military Thinking and the Russo-Japanese 
War” in War and Society, 9(2), 1991, p.31 
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historical analysis of this vitally important period for the British Army has largely focused upon the 
strategic and larger organisational reforms that were underway at the same time.  Studies of the 
reforms of Haldane and the creation of the British Expeditionary Force have shed light upon the 
organisation of the army without examining the tactical changes that were also being debated.8  While 
some aspects of tactical reform have received attention from historians, notably within the cavalry and 
at operational level, wider analysis of tactics in the British Army has been lacking, with only a 
handful of studies touching on this large and important issue.  Although the British Expeditionary 
Force of 1914 has often been praised by historians for its high levels of training and impressive 
marksmanship, the process by which it grew and developed tactically from the Victorian army which 
had received repeated defeats at the hands of the Boers is a comparatively neglected field of study.  It 
is the intention of this thesis to help fill this gap in the historiography of the British Army. 
While the Boer War 1899 – 1902 ultimately provided a huge shock for the British Army, at the outset 
of war there appeared to be little cause for concern.  Indeed, the conflict appeared, on paper, to be a 
mismatched struggle.  On one side stood the two small Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free 
State, principally agrarian nations, with armies composed almost entirely of irregular militia called out 
by the government in times of crisis.  Opposing them was the might of imperial Britain, commanding 
the greatest empire on earth, able to deploy regular troops from stations around the globe as well as 
able to draw upon volunteers from her white dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  Yet 
the war would prove to be by far the largest and most costly of all the colonial campaigns fought by 
Victorian Britain.  Victory over the two Boer Republics only came after a long and bitter struggle that 
left substantial parts of South Africa devastated.    Over the course of the war the forces of the British 
Empire suffered some 22,000 casualties suppressing the resistance of the Boers in a conflict that 
lasted almost three years.   
The cost and duration of the war were all the more shocking given the string of virtually unbroken 
successes that the British Army had hitherto enjoyed in earlier colonial wars.  The Victorian era was 
marked by a staggering number of these “small wars”.  For example, from 1838 to 1868, Britain was 
involved in at least one war every year except 1862, when it came close to hostilities with the United 
States over the Trent affair.9  In fact, the Boer War of 1899 – 1902 marked the 226th out of 230 
imperial conflicts that would be fought during Victoria’s reign.10   These wars were fought in an 
enormous variety of geographical and climatic conditions, from the deserts of Egypt and the Sudan, to 
the jungles of Burma or the forests of New Zealand.   The variety of terrain was matched by the varied 
                                                     
8
 For example, Teagarden, Haldane at the War Office; Tyler, The British Army and the Continent; Gooch, John, 
The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c.1900 – 1914 (London, Routledge, 1974) 
9
 Amery, Leo (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa, (London, Sampson Low, Marston and 
Company, 1905), Vol.2, p.9 
10
 Wessels, Andre (ed.), Lord Roberts and the War in South Africa 1899-1902 (Stroud, Army Records Society, 
2000) p.xiii 
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nature of Britain’s enemies, from the Egyptian and Sikh armies, trained and organised on European 
lines, to the primitively armed but highly disciplined Zulus, to the fanatical and reckless Dervishes.  
However, in general the quality of military opposition faced in these campaigns was not up to the 
standard of the British army, although its opponents were capable of forcing hard fighting and even 
inflicting the occasional defeat.  Nevertheless, the technological and organisational advantage 
possessed by the British Army typically proved decisive, and in wars from 1857 onwards, British 
forces only lost 100 men killed in a single action twice prior to the Boer War, whereas their foes often 
suffered severe casualties.11   
The wide variety of colonial experience was well illustrated by two campaigns that took place in 
different corners of the empire in 1898, a year before the outbreak of the Boer War.  In the Sudan, a 
British force aiming to re-establish control of the volatile region fought the Battle of Omdurman, in 
which an Anglo-Egyptian army of around 25,000 men faced a Mahdist army of over 40,000.  The 
Mahdists attacked in close formation across open ground and were met by a well formed British line, 
which initially fired by volley.  Despite their courage and fanaticism, the Dervishes were simply 
annihilated by superior firepower.  By the end of the battle the Mahdist army had suffered over 20,000 
casualties, with almost 10,000 killed, compared to just over 100 men killed suffered by the British.12  
Conversely, from 1897-98, thousands of miles away on the notorious North West Frontier of India, 
British and Indian troops fought the Tirah campaign, considered at the time to be the most trying since 
the Mutiny.13  As in the Sudan, tribal attacks in the open were devastated by magazine fire, but the 
Afridi tribesmen soon began to employ skirmishing tactics using modern breech loading weapons, 
and were able to inflict a number of casualties at long range, while suffering few in return.14  Volley 
fire, devastating in the Sudan, was of little use against fleeting targets, and close order formations 
were dangerous and impractical.  Instead, one officer who fought in the campaign stated, “In hill-
fighting, cover must be taken advantage of”.15  The local difficulties of the fighting necessitated a 
rough guide to tactics being circulated to troops in the field while the operations continued.16  
Ultimately, although both campaigns ended in British victory, the methods necessary to achieve 
success were strikingly different and illustrate the tremendous difficulties of formulating a doctrine 
that would be appropriate for all possible eventualities. 
                                                     
11
 Ian Beckett, “The South African War and the Late Victorian Army” in Davis & Grey (eds.) The Boer War: 
Army, Nation and Empire (Canberra, Army History Unit, 2000) p.33 
12
 Cyril Falls, “The Reconquest of the Sudan, 1896-1898” in Bond, Brian (ed.) Victorian Military Campaigns, 
(London, Tom Donovan, 1967) pp.299-301 
13
 Tim Moreman, “The British and Indian Armies and North West Frontier Warfare 1849-1914” in Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 20(1), 1992, p.49  
14
 Captain H.R Mead, “Notes on Musketry Training of Troops” in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 
42 (1899) p.235 
15
 Major General Sir W.F. Gatacre, “A Few Notes on the Characteristics of Hill Fighting in India” in Journal of 
the Royal United Services Institute 43 (1899) p.1072 
16
 Moreman, “Northwest Frontier Warfare”, JICH 20(1), 1992, p.52 
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The Sudan and Tirah campaigns were particularly significant for the British in that they demonstrated 
the potential problems posed by the latest improvements in firepower.  Omdurman demonstrated the 
risks entailed in attack across open ground against a foe armed with modern weaponry, while Tirah 
showed the difficulty of engaging a well armed foe who refused to fight in the open.  The lessons of 
Tirah could have been of particular use for the British in the early part of the Boer War, but despite 
being involved in more combat than any other European army throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the 
variety of campaigns and their small scale meant that unless a disaster occurred they tended to leave 
little mark on the army as a whole.  In addition, lack of a general staff or any real doctrinal guidance 
from the top down meant that any learning from these experiences was limited.  Although faced with 
a profusion of wars from which to draw examples, there was no formal system for disseminating 
tactical lessons drawn from combat to the wider army.  While prior combat experience could have a 
positive effect on individual units, it generally had little influence outside the regiments and officers 
that had fought in the action.   
With no real system of disseminating tactical knowledge outside of unit and theatre, the majority of 
the army was forced to rely upon the drill books and standard training to prepare it for war.  
Unfortunately, training throughout this period varied greatly in quality and practicality.  Despite the 
profusion of wars which the army had been called upon to fight during the Victorian period, attitudes 
towards field training were slow to catch up.  An 1883 official work, Life in the Ranks of the English 
Army, described drilling and guard work as “by far the most important (duties) that the private soldier 
has to do”, while including no mention whatsoever of shooting or field craft.17  Victorian drill 
manuals varied in quality and provided little overall guidance for regimental officers, and indeed 
frequently contradicted one another on fundamental principles.18 
Training and tactics were further limited by a lack of ground over which to conduct manoeuvres and 
the constant need to supply drafts for India, reducing the number of men available for company 
training.  Under such circumstances, individual training of the men focused upon gymnastics to 
improve the soldier physically and drill to inculcate a strong sense of discipline.19  This produced 
sturdy soldiers who were noted for their quiet endurance of hardship and pluck in the face of 
adversity, but left serious gaps, particularly with regard to field craft and musketry.  Marksmanship 
was a notable problem, with miserly allowances of practice ammunition preventing the development 
of individual accuracy in most regiments.  Instead, rigid fire control tactics were endorsed and volley 
fire was employed in most circumstances, despite the fact that these methods had been proved 
inadequate in Tirah and in earlier conflicts against the Boers.  
                                                     
17
 Quoted in Dunlop, The Development of the British Army 1899-1914, p.37 
18
 Gooch, The Plans of War, pp.27-28 
19
 Grierson, J.M., Scarlet into Khaki, (London, Greenhill, 1988 reprint) p.173 
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Although the British Army was forced to prepare to fight a variety of opponents, it found itself ill-
equipped for the unusual style of combat thrust upon it in the Boer War.  The depressingly flat nature 
of much South African terrain gave excellent fields of fire for the latest rifles, while smokeless 
powder and exceptionally long ranges made the Boers a virtually invisible foe.  However, years of 
North West Frontier fighting and the recent Tirah campaign had highlighted a number of the problems 
that would be faced in South Africa, particularly regarding the inadequacy of volley fire and the need 
for greater fieldcraft and individual skill.  While the unusual conditions found in South Africa were 
undoubtedly contributory factors, the early defeats suffered by the British Army during the Boer War 
were also due to faulty tactics, the inadequate training of much of the army, and the inability to 
disseminate useful tactical lessons drawn from colonial experience.20   
The opening moves of the Boer War saw the Boers invade Natal, defeating British forces stationed 
there and laying siege to them in Ladysmith, while simultaneously besieging the western towns of 
Mafeking and Kimberly.  Forces despatched from Britain to South Africa under the overall command 
of Sir Redvers Buller moved against the besieging Boers in December, only to meet a trio of separate 
defeats in offensive battles over the course of five days, a period dubbed ‘Black Week’ by the British 
press.  These humiliating reverses prompted a reshuffle of command of British forces in South Africa, 
with the venerable but highly respected Lord Roberts despatched to take supreme command of the 
armies in South Africa.  Roberts was able to lead an invasion of first the Orange Free State and then 
Transvaal, occupying their respective capitals and seeming to scatter the Boer armies before him. 
With the Boer Republics overrun, the war appeared to be effectively over by mid-1900.  Lord Roberts 
returned to England and command passed to his Chief of Staff, Lord Kitchener.  However, although 
the conventional war was over, the Boers refused to acknowledge defeat and instead turned to a 
guerrilla campaign that was to continue without abatement for another two years.  Frustrated by the 
duration of the war and the elusive nature of the Boer commandos, the British resorted to increasingly 
brutal methods to suppress the insurgency.  The policy of burning farms believed to be supporting 
commandos had been originally been implemented under Lord Roberts, but it was widely extended 
under Kitchener to deny supplies to the Boer guerrillas.  The scorched earth policy displaced large 
numbers of Boer civilians who were herded into concentration camps, where poor conditions and high 
mortality rates caused public outrage in Britain and left a lasting legacy of bitterness.21  Allied to these 
controversial policies, the British Army conducted a number of drives across the country, aiming to 
catch the small Boer commandos amongst converging forces.  However, the vast geography of South 
Africa meant that these operations only became truly effective after the ‘Blockhouse’ system was 
                                                     
20
 For criticism of pre-Boer War training, see Major A.W.A Pollock, “The Battle Drill of Infantry”, in Journal of 
the Royal United Services Institute 42(1), 1898, pp.540, 554.  For the impact of faulty tactics in the Boer War, 
see ‘A British Officer’, An Absent Minded War, (London, John Milne, 1900), pp.8-9. 
21
 Hall, Darrell, The Hall Handbook of the Anglo-Boer War 1899 – 1902  (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal 
Press, 1999) p.152 
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introduced.  The construction of large blockhouse lines deprived the Boers of mobility and allowed 
the British to pin them against fixed fortifications.  Ultimately, the relentless pressure imposed by 
these policies finally forced the remaining bittereinder Boers to the conference table in May 1902.  
Although the war proved to be long and costly, the British Army showed its capacity for in-theatre 
learning throughout the conflict.  The clashes of “Black Week” were particularly poorly handled, with 
the battles of Colenso and Magersfontein offering examples of the flawed British tactical approach in 
the early part of the war.22     In both cases, lack of mounted troops deprived the British of the ability 
to outflank the Boers, and instead they were forced into frontal attacks.  The unexpected conditions 
created by smokeless powder made reconnaissance difficult, making effective artillery preparation 
problematical.  In both battles, the failure to identify the main Boer position led to the artillery 
wasting time and ammunition shelling empty areas, inflicting minimal casualties and merely alerting 
the Boers to the impending assault.  Once the attacks began, the British infantry were first stopped and 
then pinned down by the volume of rifle fire from concealed Boers.  Nevertheless, the British 
gradually learned from their defeats and changed their approach.  Lord Roberts favoured using widely 
extended infantry to pin down the Boers with frontal attacks, while British mounted forces turned the 
flanks.23  The Boers had little inclination towards close combat, and typically chose to withdraw once 
they became aware they had been outflanked.  This won victories at a low cost, but also allowed the 
Boers to escape relatively intact, allowing them to adopt guerrilla tactics from the latter part of 1900 
onwards.  In Natal, the rugged terrain made such flanking attacks more difficult, and Buller’s army 
was forced to fight through Boer positions step by step.  Although the army suffered stinging defeats 
at Colenso, Spion Kop and Vaal Krantz, it learned from its experiences and devised a new tactical 
approach based upon close co-operation between infantry and artillery.  This culminated in the series 
of battles for control of Tulega Heights in Feburary 1900 that ultimately broke the Boer siege of 
Ladysmith.24  British artillery fire plans were carefully organised, and in contrast to the preparatory 
bombardments of 1899, the guns continued to fire in support of the advancing infantry to the very last 
minute, suppressing the Boer riflemen and allowing the infantry advance to storm the enemy position. 
Although the British were able to adapt tactically and ultimately defeat the Boers, the length and 
difficulty of the struggle laid bare numerous strategical and tactical weaknesses, as well as serious 
organisational flaws.  The immense difficulty the professional British Army experienced in trying to 
defeat an enemy composed almost entirely of untrained militia raised grave doubts over its ability to 
perform against a formally organised and trained European foe.  The exposure of tactical and 
                                                     
22
 For a particularly damning critique of these two battles, see Amery, L.S. (ed.) The Times History of the War in 
South Africa, Volume 2. (London, Sampson Low, Marston and Company 1902), pp.386-415 and pp.433 – 458 
respectively.   
23
 TNA WO 105/40 – “The Boer War Through German Glasses” (no pagination) 
24
 Gillings, Ken, The Battle of the Thukela Heights: 12 – 28 February 1900 (Randburg, Ravan Press, 1999) p.34 
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operational shortcomings within all three service branches of the British Army led to a great deal of 
introspection in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.  Equipment, training and tactical thought all 
underwent revision based upon the experience of the war in South Africa.  Many preconceived ideas, 
often based upon the study of the earlier Franco-Prussian War, did not survive the test of combat upon 
the veldt.  Equipment was revised and improved and the nature of combat in an age of smokeless 
powder and magazine rifles received debate and consideration from within the service.  The war did 
not pass unnoticed by armies on the continent, and foreign writers, particularly in Germany, also 
weighed in with their opinions on the perceived lessons of the war.25  However, the varied nature of 
the fighting, encompassing siege operations, set piece battles and a protracted guerrilla campaign, all 
taking place across a vast geographical area, made analysis difficult.  A consensus upon clear-cut 
lessons did not immediately emerge, while inter-service rivalry, social snobbery and the continuing 
struggle between cliques within the officer corps confused the issues still further.  A further limitation 
was the fact that the British Army lagged far behind the prestigious Royal Navy in allocation of funds 
and resources.  Reforms were set in motion, but discussion and debate on the lessons to be learned 
continued and some of the changes were not carried through to their full potential, or were neglected 
entirely.  Indeed the 1902-1914 period was consistently characterised by a struggle between the 
reformists and the traditionalists, not only within the British Army but also within Edwardian society 
as a whole.26  A disturbing sense of overall British decline resulted in an impulse towards the idea of 
‘national efficiency’ within the country to maintain Britain’s place amongst rival continental and 
world powers, with the poor performance in the Boer War serving to drive this feeling home within 
the British Army. 
In terms of existing literature on the subject, the historiography of the Boer War and the period of 
development within the British Army that followed can be seen as having two distinct phases.  The 
earliest views upon the war emerged during and immediately after the conflict, providing the basis for 
orthodox interpretations of the war that would endure for over fifty years.  In later years, the First 
World War inevitably came to overshadow the Boer War and writing on the earlier conflict declined 
as a result.  Compared to the colossal bloodletting of 1914-18, the struggle in South Africa seemed 
trifling, and, in military terms, largely irrelevant.  The cultural legacy of the war, especially in South 
Africa, ensured its remembrance but amongst historians the conflict merited little work of note until a 
growth in interest in the study of the late Victorian army began in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The 
era marked the passing of the last few veterans of the wars of the 19th century, including survivors of 
                                                     
25
 For example;  Captain R. Trimmel, “South African Campaign” in Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institute 45(1) 1901, pp.182 - 190;  Field Marshal Gustavus Retzenhoffer, “A Retrospect of the War in South 
Africa” in Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 45(1) 1901, pp.40 - 50; General Baron Colmar von 
der Goltz, “What Can We Learn From the Boer War?” in Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 46(2) 
1902, pp.1533 - 1539; Lieutenant Colonel von Lindeau, “What Has the Boer War to Teach us as Regards 
Infantry Attack?” in Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 47(1) 1903, pp.48 - 56   
26
 For a comprehensive study of this issue, see Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency 
13 
 
the Boer War, prompting a resurgence in studies of the period.  This second phase of interest saw a 
number of searching academic analyses which challenged the orthodox views that had emerged in the 
immediate aftermath of the conflict, offering a more positive analysis of the Victorian army and its 
performance in South Africa.  Debate between orthodox and revisionist historians continues, but in 
more recent years studies have tended to focus on previously neglected aspects of the war, such as the 
combat experience of the Boers and the role of colonial contingents.27  Furthermore, the recent 
centenary of the Boer War has produced a flood of fresh work on the subject, showing that the topic 
still holds considerable interest for both historians and the public.28  Additionally, it is important to 
note that the study of the Boer War has assumed some political aspect in post-apartheid South Africa.  
Transvaal ceased to exist and the Orange Free State lost its distinctive Dutch ‘Orange’ in 1994, while 
other Boer towns have received new post-colonial African names in the last ten years.   The desire to 
preserve Afrikaner identity through remembrance and commemoration of the war has produced 
substantial writing in South Africa, work that at times sits uneasily with the new political agendas of 
the ‘Rainbow Nation’.  In the 21st century the example of this war as a struggle for Afrikaner freedom 
from the oppressive British government carries connotations that have allowed certain radical white 
groups in the country to use it as a rallying cry against black rule. 
The first, orthodox interpretation of the Boer War emerged while the conflict was still in progress.  
The struggle produced voluminous literature, with the war proving immensely controversial and 
prompting numerous authors and journalists to weigh in with their opinions.  An explosion of 
literature emerged both during and after the war, with well over 100 books on various aspects of the 
conflict being produced in 1903 alone.29  Britain printed two multi-volume histories soon after the 
conflict, namely the seven-volume Times History of the War in South Africa (hereafter Times History) 
principally edited by Leo Amery, and the eight-volume History of the War in South Africa (hereafter 
Official History) edited by General Fredrick Maurice and others.30  The German General Staff also 
chose to produce a history of the conflict, devoted almost entirely to the early, conventional stage of 
the war, with the guerrilla phase meriting just a single paragraph in a two-volume work.31  In addition 
to these official works, numerous other books and articles appeared on the causes of the war, its 
                                                     
27
 For example; Pretorius, Fransjohan, Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902, (Cape Town, 
Human & Rosseau, 1999);  Miller, Carman, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War 1899-
1902 (Natal, University of Natal Press, 1998) 
28
 For an overview of centenary publishing, see Bill Nasson, “Waging Total War in South Africa: Some 
Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899 – 1902” in The Journal of Military History, 66(2) 2002, 
pp.813-828 
29
 Stephen Badsey, “Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War” in Sandhurst Journal of Military Studies 1(2) 
(1992) p.11 
30
 Amery, L.S. (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa, 7 vols. (London, Sampson Low, Marston 
and Company 1900-1909) 
Maurice, Frederick, (ed.), History of the War in South Africa 8 volumes (London, Hurst & Blackett, 1906-1910) 
31
 Walter, W.H.H (translator), The German Official Account of the War in South Africa 2 vols. (London, 
J.Murray, 1904-1906) 
14 
 
course and particularly on the perceived failures of the British Army in its immediate aftermath.  It 
was not until the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 that army and public attention was drawn from 
the experience of battle on the veldt. 
The two key printed sources for study of the military aspects of the Boer War are the Times History 
and the Official History.  The Times History was initially planned to cash in upon the surge in interest 
in the Boer War amongst the British public and as such was written for popular consumption.  
However, by the time of the second volume the emphasis had changed to a desire to produce a 
standard work that was academically rigorous, but it remains a lively and engaging read compared to 
the more formal Official History.  For this reason the Times History has proved more enduring and 
popular, but it must be used with certain reservations.    Leo Amery was the principal editor of the 
Times History and was an ardent proponent of the need for tactical reform within the British Army.  
The work savages the pre-war Victorian army as being ineffective in combat against anyone other 
than the most primitive foes, while commanders who came to grief on the veldt, especially Redvers 
Buller, Charles Warren and Lord Methuen, are the subject of severe and remorseless criticism.  
Amery singled out the early parts of Buller’s Natal campaign for particular attention, casting the 
general as little more than a bumbling incompetent representing all that was wrong with pre-war army 
thinking.  Conversely, Lord Roberts, an army reformer who had Amery’s support, received 
considerable praise for his largely successful invasion of the Boer Republics, standing in contrast to 
the slow progress and repeated defeats of Buller’s army in Natal.  One of Amery’s long-term goals in 
producing the work was to promote wide-ranging strategic and tactical reform of the British Army.  
This was best served by championing the abilities of the reformist Lord Roberts, portraying him as a 
great general and indeed as the saviour of British fortunes in South Africa following Buller’s debacle.  
The influence of Amery’s work in shaping views of the Boer War should not be underestimated.  The 
harsh criticisms levelled by Amery toward the British Army and its combat performance essentially 
set the tone for academic study of the war for decades.   
Amery’s work may have been less influential had the British Official History provided a useful 
counterpoint.  This work was edited by the military and provides a far dryer account of the war than 
the popular Times History.  Original editor and forward thinker G.F.R Henderson died with the work 
at an early stage and it was passed on to Major General Frederick Maurice.  Numerous problems 
emerged during production of the work, including repeated delays imposed by the parsimonious 
allocations of funds and staff by the Treasury.  Originally planned as a searching and unbiased work 
on the war, official interference and censorship stripped the teeth from the writers.32  For example, in 
the interests of reconciliation with South Africa, political aspects of the war were to be avoided where 
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possible.  Furthermore, the work suffers from being produced by men reluctant to criticise their fellow 
officers or the army as a whole.  As such, the account is flat and offers little in the way of judgement 
or analysis, instead presenting bald facts and typically steering well away from criticism or comment 
upon the actual of the conduct of the war.  Crippled by censorship and delayed through lack of 
resources, the work was far from the in-depth analysis of the conflict that had been planned when it 
was originally commissioned. Lack of comment combined with lifeless prose caused the Official 
History to become neglected in preference to the more readable Times History.   
Another major history to be written on the Boer War bearing the ‘official’ title was the two-volume 
work produced by the German General Staff, translated versions being published in Britain in 1904 
and 1906.  In contrast to the British works, it is concise and relatively sympathetic with regard to 
Britain’s military performance.  However, as previously mentioned it is almost entirely focussed upon 
the conventional stage of the war, the main narrative concluding with the capture of Bloemfontein 
with the subsequent events dealt with only in the briefest terms.  Regarding the Boer War as little 
more than an interesting colonial struggle and no real guide for future conflicts, the work argues that 
there was little that had occurred in the struggle that altered the essence of modern combat.33  The 
authors were unimpressed with the idea that smokeless powder and magazine rifles had shifted the 
balance in favour of defence, noting that British casualties suffered during their defeats in the opening 
stages of the war were relatively small compared to the level of loss experienced in continental 
conflicts such as the Franco-Prussian War. Indeed, the work suggests that British reluctance to accept 
casualties as a necessity in any vigorous attack was more to blame for their defeats than any 
improvement in defensive firepower.  In a similar vein, Lord Roberts’s invasion of the Boer Republics 
is criticised for avoidance of direct combat and over reliance upon outflanking Boer positions.  As an 
example of European impressions of the nature of the fighting in South Africa it retains value, but its 
abrupt end, virtually ignoring the later phase of the war, means it is less valuable overall than the 
British produced histories. 
In the immediate aftermath, and even sometimes while the war was still in progress, several histories 
charting the course of the conflict were published to take advantage of widespread public interest in 
the struggle.  Several notable figures, including Arthur Conan Doyle, Alfred Thayer Mahan and 
Winston Churchill published their own accounts of the war.  The quality of these works varies 
enormously, from picture book histories to more academic studies, although a weakness common to 
many of them is their date of publication.  Public interest and enthusiasm for the war surged in the 
aftermath of British reverses during “Black Week” in December 1899, reaching a peak with the 
invasion of the Boer Republics in 1900.  Many works were published to take advantage of this interest 
and were written on the assumption that the fall of the Transvaal and Orange Free State capitals 
                                                     
33
 Ibid, Vol.2, p.380 
16 
 
marked the end of the war.  With the Boxer Rebellion in China capturing the public imagination in 
late 1900, interest in the Boer War waned.  Additionally, the subsequent guerrilla phase of the war 
lacked the grand sweep or glamour of the conventional phase and thus was largely neglected in works 
intended for popular consumption.  Conan Doyle’s work The Great Boer War stands as perhaps the 
best of the early narratives of the conflict.34  Conan Doyle had served as a volunteer physician in 
South Africa for several months in 1900 and used some of the time to gather accounts from the war’s 
participants.  His work remains readable and largely accurate, although it must be kept in mind that 
Conan Doyle was a supporter of the British war effort and his writing reflects this fact.  Nevertheless 
it does tackle some issues of military reform such as the need for heavier artillery and rifles rather 
than swords for cavalry, although the focus remains on providing a narrative rather than analysis. 
As distinct from narrative histories, in the aftermath of the Boer War a profusion of books and articles 
emerged professing to disseminate the military lessons of the conflict.  The quality and academic 
standard of these works varied widely, but several merit greater study.  For example, Leo Amery did 
not content himself with his work on the Times History, and in 1903 published The Problem of the 
Army, based upon an edited and revised collection of articles that had first appeared in The Times.35  
Amery pushes his agenda of army reform throughout the work, making regular reference to tactical 
and strategic failures in the recent Boer War.  Amery’s writing reflects many of the common ideas for 
reform that emerged in the aftermath of the war, namely the need for improved depot facilities, better 
marksmanship and, especially, improvements in training to emphasise a greater degree of initiative in 
individual soldiers.  The work is also keen to emphasise that a European war was not expected, and 
that, with the possible exception of a war against Russia over control of India, future conflicts would 
be colonial in nature and thus best served by a small, well trained army rather than a mass army on 
continental lines.  Several other volumes discussing the lessons of the conflict were published in the 
years following the Boer War, often written by army officers rather than civilians.  Notable works 
include the scathing An Absent Minded War which lambasted pre-war training and attitudes, and the 
more moderate War in Practice, which praised British adaptability in South Africa and urged that the 
lessons be incorporated into future tactics.36  Perhaps the most famous of all the tactical treatises that 
were inspired by the Boer War is The Defence of Duffer’s Drift by Ernest Swinton.  Written in the 
style of a novel, the work tells the story of an unfortunate British lieutenant called upon to defend 
‘Duffer’s Drift’ with  his platoon.  The officer tries several different approaches to the task, only to 
suffer repeated defeats at the hands of the Boers.  However, in the process, new lessons and tactical 
points are revealed, ultimately allowing the officer to achieve victory in the final chapter.  The work 
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remains in print and is still listed as recommended reading in both the British and American 
militaries.37   
Another prolific author immediately before and after the war was Colonel F.N. Maude of the Royal 
Engineers.  A theorist and historian of the Napoleonic Wars, Maude took a keen interest in military 
developments in the 1890s and held views that were largely traditional in their belief in the power of 
close assault and strict discipline to maintain formations while under rifle fire.38  His views modified 
somewhat following the Boer War, but even then he retained the belief that after the initial shock of 
receiving rifle fire and reacting by seeking cover, the British army proved victorious through a 
willingness to charge with cold steel.  Maude also wrote on the fiercely contested topic of cavalry in 
the aftermath of the war.39  His views on this arm were largely traditional.  While not entirely 
rejecting the use of dismounted action, Maude emphasised the value of mobility, speed and the 
opportunities for a decisive charge which a mounted cavalry unit retained.  The concept of mounted 
infantry was rejected as an inefficient half measure.  Maude’s views are an interesting example of 
traditionalist thinking during an era of large-scale tactical reform. 
In addition to books released for popular consumption, the years after the Boer War saw a vast 
number of articles in the journals of the armed forces, particularly the Royal United Service Institute 
Journal and United Service Magazine.  Pertinent published works were reviewed and criticised and a 
considerable interchange of ideas occurred across the pages of these volumes, although as the Boer 
War faded from memory and the Russo-Japanese War took centre stage, articles dealing specifically 
with South Africa became rare.  Nevertheless the journals of this era are an invaluable source of 
information regarding mid and low level officer opinion on organisation and tactics.  In addition to 
comment by British officers and observers on the Boer War, several articles by continental authors 
were translated and published within the journals, giving a European view of the conflict.40  
As well as books and articles published at the time, a number of prominent officers published 
memoirs after the First World War which sometimes offer insights into the nature of the pre-1914 
army.  The weakness with many of these memoirs is that they are naturally concerned with the First 
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World War, with memories and interest in the earlier period fading.  The memoirs of several 
prominent military men such as Ian Hamilton, William Robertson and Horace Smith-Dorrien all 
suffer to a greater or lesser extent from this, although some useful information on certain aspects of 
the pre-1914 army can still be gleaned from them.   
A more detailed account of the era is given in General Neville Lyttleton’s memoir, Eighty Years of 
Soldiering, Politics and Games.41  Although written after the First World War, Lyttleton had been 
retired during the conflict and the memoir finishes with the end of his army career before the outbreak 
of the 1914 conflict.  Lyttleton fought with some success under Buller in the Boer War and became 
the first ever Chief of General Staff during the post-war reforms.  Lyttleton’s book rambles through a 
number of topics but includes some interesting observations on training and education in the 1890s 
and some of the tactical problems encountered in Natal during the war.  However with regard to his 
service as Chief of General Staff the work is disappointing.  Interestingly, Lyttleton never refers to his 
position by its formal title, instead simply passing it off as War Office work, which perhaps reveals 
some of his distaste for the job or its perceived status within the army at the time.  The chapter on his 
work in this capacity is brief and indeed more time is devoted to the discussion of his cricketing 
career than his role as the first ever British Chief of General Staff. 
After the initial surge of publishing in the immediate aftermath of the Boer War, the topic faded from 
public interest and received little fresh historical analysis.  Historians still periodically returned to 
explore the subject in the decades that followed, but the influence of Leo Amery remained paramount 
in these early studies; historians did little to challenge his interpretations and in some cases saw no 
reason to do so.  For example, Buller’s Campaign by Julian Symons openly acknowledged the 
influence of Amery, arguing that the analysis of Redvers Buller offered by the Times History was 
essentially correct and in no need of revision.42  The work ends with Ladysmith relieved, but devotes 
the majority of its prose to the defeats at Colenso and Spion Kop, offering little analysis of the 
victories on the Tulega Heights that ultimately broke the siege.   
Indeed, it was not until the 1970s that Amery’s interpretation of the war was subject to serious 
academic challenge.  As previously mentioned, interest in the Boer War and the late Victorian army 
enjoyed resurgence during this period and the considerable number of works produced during this era 
reflects this change.  A critical work of this period is Thomas Pakenham’s major revisionist study The 
Boer War.43  Pakenham’s work consciously attempted to break free from the influence of Amery’s 
Times History and instead offered a reinterpretation of the combat performance of Redvers Buller, 
arguing that during early defeats Buller was a victim of circumstances beyond his control, concluding 
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that after the initial setbacks, it was Buller’s army which developed new, modern tactics that allowed 
the British to achieve final victory.  Conversely, Lord Roberts is criticised for his neglect of logistics, 
failure to deal the Boers a crushing blow in battle, and mistaken belief the war would end with the 
capture of the Boer capitals.44  Although a bestselling success, Pakenham’s work has been criticised 
by some South African historians for promising much but delivering relatively little, particularly with 
regard to his assertion to tell the neglected story of the suffering of the black population during the 
war.  Additionally, Pakenham’s attempt to rehabilitate Redvers Buller is not always entirely 
convincing.  While some of the criticism levelled at Buller in the aftermath of the war may have been 
unfair and ignored the difficulty of the situation he found himself in, his feeble performance as a 
strategist during the Natal campaign and as battlefield commander at Colenso, Spion Kop and Vaal 
Krantz are hard to excuse.  Furthermore, in attempting to improve Buller’s reputation, Pakenham is 
sometimes overly critical of other officers such as Lord Roberts, John French and Ian Hamilton.  Yet 
despite these flaws, Pakenham’s work challenged the existing historiography of the Boer War, forcing 
future historians to go beyond Leo Amery’s early interpretation.  Subsequent works have continued 
the efforts to rehabilitate commanders castigated by Amery, including revisionist studies of Buller by 
Geoffrey Powell and Lord Methuen by Stephen Miller.45 
Allied to the reinterpretation of British combat performance in South Africa, the army in the Victorian 
era has also received greater academic study since the 1970s.  Brian Bond’s The Victorian Army and 
the Staff College 1854-1914 was the first of these works and remains one of the most important for 
exploring the course and nature of staff officer training during the 19th and early 20th centuries.46  The 
work was ground-breaking when first published and remains a key component for understanding 
attitudes towards training and leadership within the officer class throughout this era.  Bond touches on 
numerous tactical issues and illustrates how a gradual move towards professionalism from the 1890s 
onwards began to reshape the nature of the British Army.  However, the work also argues that this 
process remained painfully slow and that tradition and obstinacy hampered reform work right up until 
the First World War.  Complementing Bond’s work is Edward Spiers’s The Late Victorian Army 
1868-1902, offering an overview of the history of the armed forces in this period.47  The work is wide 
ranging, covering the War Office and civil-military relations as well as the nature of the fighting 
forces themselves.  Spiers argues that the army, although often criticised for being hidebound and 
retrograde in its thinking, was in fact effective at the roles it was expected to play within the navy 
dominated Victorian military.  Reforms were gradually introduced over the period as the army gained 
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prominence but Spiers acknowledges that they were rather limited in their impact.  Concluding the era 
in question, the Boer War shook the army and illustrated that it still had much to learn, but its ability 
to expand to eventually win the war demonstrated a certain degree of flexibility.   
Building on these ideas, Howard Bailes has suggested that the British Army in the years prior to the 
Boer War was not the hidebound and antiquated institution that some of the more vociferous critics of 
its combat performance tried to suggest.  He identifies several schools of thoughts within the late 
Victorian army that were both highly educated and fully aware of continental and technological 
developments.48  More recently he has argued that British tactical thought in the era was moving 
towards flexibility throughout the 1890s and that early defeats were due to a failure to act in line with 
accepted British doctrine, although he does acknowledge that these ideas were at an early stage.49  
Building upon the idea that tactical thought within the British Army prior to the war was more 
advanced than commonly believed is the work of Tim Moreman on fighting in the North West 
Frontier region of India.50  Decades of combat against local tribes, often well armed, in difficult 
terrain had taught the British a number of valuable lessons.  However, Moreman argues that a failure 
to disseminate these important ideas outside of a small number of regiments regularly deployed on the 
frontier meant that other regiments were forced to learn through bitter experience.  Although offering 
interesting arguments the work of both historians in this field seems to suggest that while there were 
strands of advanced tactical thinking within the army, they had not achieved large scale acceptance by 
the time of the Boer War.  More recently, D.M. Leeson has rejected the positive assessments of the 
pre-Boer War army, using the example of the 1898 manoeuvres to argue that the army was 
operationally and tactically backward.51  While Leeson uses a rather narrow range of sources to argue 
his case, the work shows that the debate around the quality of the pre-Boer War army is by no means 
over. 
The centenary of the Boer War produced a number of new studies of the conflict, further building 
upon the revisionist trend that had begun in the 1970s.  For the topic of this thesis, perhaps the most 
important publication is conference papers from the Australian War Memorial Military History 
Conference under the title The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire.52 This collection of stimulating 
essays mainly focuses on Australian involvement in the Boer War but contains a number of excellent 
essays on tactical and operational issues within the conflict as well as the political and social impact 
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on Australia.  The work includes analysis of cavalry performance in South Africa, as well as more 
general studies of British combat performance on the veldt that offer far more rounded interpretations 
than those found in the Times History.  A second collection produced to mark the centenary of the war 
is The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image edited by John Gooch.53 Taking a somewhat wider 
approach than Army, Nation and Empire this work breaks down its study into three broad fields; 
British strategic problems, the experience of war for the various ethnic groups involved within it and 
the portrayal of the conflict by the British media.  Although as a consequence it does not deal with 
tactics or operational art on a detailed level, it does put forward some interesting arguments in the 
essays dealing with the strategic direction of the war.  Ian Beckett’s essay on the ‘Politics of 
Command’ is particularly interesting in illustrating the confusion of experience, background and 
personality that hampered officer relations particularly in the early stages of the Boer War.  As a pair 
of works Army, Nation and Empire and Direction, Experience and Image complement each other well 
and provide an illustration of some of the most recent historical thinking on the subject of the Boer 
War, demonstrating how analysis is now revising the early criticisms levelled by Leo Amery. 
However, while the Boer War itself and the Victorian era army have benefitted from greater historical 
study and revisionism in recent years, the pre-First World War army has received less attention.  
Study of the pre-1914 army has focussed almost entirely upon the strategic and organisational reforms 
that had created the General Staff, the B.E.F. and the Territorial Army.  The classic account of this 
reorganisation and reformation is The Development of the British Army 1899-1914 by Colonel John 
Dunlop.54  The book provides a wide ranging and detailed study of the work of various Defence 
Secretaries to reform the British Army as the risk of war on the continent loomed, with a natural 
emphasis on the critical Haldane years when the 1914 army took on its final shape.  As an account of 
the reorganisation of this era the work has yet to be superseded, but it does not delve into the realms 
of tactics or post-Boer War army doctrine except in the briefest terms, preferring instead to focus 
upon the reforms at the highest levels of the army structure.  Another work produced during the 
1930s, The British Army and the Continent 1904-1914 complements Dunlop’s account.55  This work 
again focuses on reorganisation at higher levels although the main thrust of the book is in discussion 
of British strategy with regard to continental commitments in the years preceding the First World 
War.  While useful in charting the change in British Army thinking away from another colonial war 
towards fighting against Germany, the work lacks any discussion of alterations in tactics or 
operational thinking that accompanied the overall change in strategic direction.  Although subsequent 
work on the origins of the First World War has shown the surprising extent to which British planning 
was based on assumption and reaction to events, these two works remain an important overview of 
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events taking place in the higher reaches of the British Army structure and the effect this would have 
on the army by the time it was committed to war in 1914.  
While a number of studies have analysed the impact of organisational changes on the B.E.F., the 
tactical development of the army in the pre-First World War years has remained comparatively 
neglected.  Edward Spiers offered an early analysis of infantry, cavalry and artillery tactics in the 
years before the First World War in a series of articles.56    Offering a relatively brief overview of the 
vital tactical reforms in this period, Spiers is generally positive in his analysis of Edwardian infantry 
and artillery reorganisation, concluding that in particular the infantry had reached a peak in their 
training that made them the best in Europe.  Conversely, the cavalry are singled out for much 
criticism.  Spiers argues that an initial impulse towards tactical reform after the Boer War was lost and 
that in contrast to infantry and artillery, cavalry was tactically regressing throughout much of the pre-
1914 period.  Although acknowledging that some improvements were being made from 1912 
onwards, Spiers damningly concludes that the British cavalry in 1914 was no more tactically 
advanced than it had been on the eve of the Boer War in 1899.  While providing a useful starting point 
for study of the question, the articles are relatively short and thus inevitably offer only a general 
overview of the progress of tactical reform. 
Treading similar ground to Edward Spiers is The Boer War and Military Reforms by Jay Stone and 
Erwin A. Schmidl.57  Split into two separate parts, the book deals with responses from British and 
Austro-Hungarian armies to the Boer War.  Much of the study of the British Army in this regard deals 
with military reforms and reorganisation that was undertaken while the war was still in progress and 
which were introduced as immediate measures to counter Boer tactics.  Stone argues the ability of the 
British to reform in the midst of active operations was crucial in winning the eventual victory over the 
Boer Republics, but while this convincingly demonstrates the ability of the British Army to learn in-
theatre, there is relatively little analysis given to whether these new tactical ideas endured beyond the 
end of the conflict.  Post-war organisational reforms are discussed at some length, but tactical reforms 
are dealt with only in general terms and there is no real analysis given to the extent which the B.E.F. 
of 1914 benefitted from the Boer War experience.  The second half of the book studies the reports of 
the Austro-Hungarian military attaché and his attempts to convince his army that the Boer War 
indicated the need for tactical reform.  This work offers a unique study of how the military of a major 
continental power regarded this far flung colonial war, and the different way in which British and 
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Austro-Hungarian armies regarded the war provides an interesting contrast.  However, the long term 
influence of the Boer War on both the nations in question is given comparatively little attention. 
Of the three combat arms, cavalry has received the most attention from historians across the crucial 
1902 - 1914 time frame.  The role and future tactics of cavalry were in considerable dispute during 
this period as evidenced by works such as those of Douglas Haig and Erskine Childers, and more 
recent historians have examined the debate in considerable detail, examples including the work of 
Stephen Badsey, Gerard De Groot, Gervase Phillips and Jean Bou.58  A historical consensus on the 
quality of British cavalry in this period has yet to emerge, although even critical writers such as 
Edward Spiers conclude that in comparison to continental cavalry forces the British were tactically 
advanced, especially in terms of the ability to fight dismounted.  The Marquess of Anglesey, whose 
multi volume work treats the subject with unmatched detail, has produced the most comprehensive 
study of British cavalry in this era.59  This work traces the complex factors influencing the cavalry 
during this period and argues that although the cavalry retrenched with determination immediately 
after the Boer War, as the years advanced even hard liners gradually reformed their views.  
Nevertheless, the nature of British cavalry tactics in these crucial years continues to divide historical 
opinion. 
As the most technical and least glamorous of the three arms, British artillery in this era has received 
little attention.  The standard work for the arm in this period remains the three volume History of the 
Royal Artillery 1860-1914, originally written in the 1930s.60  The first two volumes cover the 
organisation, tactical and technical development of the artillery while the third details the numerous 
‘small wars’ that the gunners fought in during the period in question.  As a technical history the works 
retain a great deal of value and chart a period in which the artillery was assuming an unprecedented 
level of importance.  A second work that relates to the role of artillery in the British Army in this 
period and later is Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham’s Firepower: The British Army Weapons 
and Theories of War 1904-1945.61  Widely regarded as a classic study of British artillery in World 
War 1 and World War 2, it also devotes some time to examining the development of the arm in the 
1904-1914 period when major tactical and technical redevelopment was taking place.  The work 
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argues that on the eve of the First World War the British artillery was caught between the technical 
capacity to deliver indirect fire and the tactical impulse, following French methods, to scorn such 
techniques and instead to fight in a traditional, old fashioned direct fire role.  In this respect it would 
seem that the British Army had forgotten some of the apparent lessons of the Boer War, particularly 
the fate of Colonel Long’s guns at the Battle of Colenso.  Although there were officers within the 
Royal Artillery who were in favour of a more technical approach towards artillery fighting, their 
views were undermined by budget restrictions and the concerns of many traditional thinkers that the 
only true way to support infantry was with medium range direct fire.  Jonathan Bailey, Sanders 
Marble, Edward Spiers and R.H. Scales have carried out some further work on this subject, but in 
general this important arm remains comparatively neglected.62  
While low level tactics in the British Army have received relatively little analysis, there have been 
several important works on operational level thinking in the 1902 – 1918 period. Tim Travers has 
written several pieces on this subject, most notably The Killing Ground: The British Army, the 
Western Front and the Emergence of Modern War 1900-1918.63  Although mainly concerned with 
combat in the First World War, Travers discusses the continuity of ideas that ran through the 
Edwardian army and the cult of the offensive that apparently gripped much of the senior leadership.  
The book is generally critical of Douglas Haig, identifying his pre-war training at the Staff College as 
creating an erroneous and inflexible idea of strategy that was to cost the British Army at the Somme.  
Although Travers acknowledges that there were strands of advanced thought within the army, he 
concludes that in the face of anti-intellectual bias and Victorian attitudes, they were unable to make 
much impact on operational level thinking.  A work that covers similar ground is Martin Samuels’s 
Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies 1888-
1918.64  Despite the title the majority of the work deals with combat in the First World War, and 
although some interesting points are raised, the work suffers from an overdue emphasis on German 
tactical and operational brilliance contrasted against bumbling British incompetence, illustrated 
through the highly selective case studies of the first day of the Battle of the Somme 1916 and the 
opening of the German spring 1918 offensive.  Samuels touches on some of the points raised by 
Travers’s earlier work, particularly regarding concepts of structured battles within the British high 
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command, and offers a damning assessment of British operational thought in the Edwardian period 
and the First World War itself.   
A challenge to Travers has been provided by M.A. Ramsay in his work Command and Cohesion: The 
Citizen Soldier and Minor Tactics in the British Army, 1870 – 1918.65  Ramsay argues that Travers’s 
interpretation is overly narrow, suggesting that tactics at low levels were realistic and advanced.  
While acknowledging that the British Army was struggling with growing problems presented by mass 
warfare and modern firepower, Ramsay suggests that it made steady progress prior to and during the 
First World War in adapting to these issues.  The work is particularly concerned with morale and 
motivation in a citizen army and provides an interesting counterpoint to the negative assessments of 
Travers and Samuels.  However Ramsay has been criticised for offering a general interpretation of the 
British Army that lacks the depth of more specialised works.66 
Despite the wide variety of literature published on the Boer War and the era that followed it, gaps in 
the historiography still remain and the wide range of interpretation of events reveal that much of the 
history remains contested.  The gaps in the historiography regarding the influence of the Boer War 
upon the tactical development of the B.E.F. become particularly apparent when studying works 
focussing on British combat experience in 1914.  Standard works on this topic include studies by John 
Terraine, David Ascoli and Robin Neillands.67  These works offer praise for the British Army in the 
opening weeks of the First World War, particularly its training and professionalism.  However, in all 
cases the links between the skill of the B.E.F. in 1914 and the lessons derived from the Boer War are 
either ignored or casually asserted.   
Thus it can be demonstrated that there are a number of crucial gaps in the understanding of the tactical 
development of the British Army 1902 – 1914.  It is therefore the central aim of this thesis to fill the 
gap in the historiography of the British Army by analysing the extent to which deductions derived 
from the Boer War became the cornerstones of tactics and training in the 1902 – 1914 period.  In 
analysing this issue, the thesis will address several key questions.  Firstly, what were the key tactical 
lessons derived from the Boer War; secondly, how were these ideas implemented into tactical and 
training reforms; and finally to what extent the fate of B.E.F. of 1914 was ultimately shaped by the 
tactical and operational lessons derived from the Boer War.  The focus of this thesis will thus be on 
the tactical ideas, resulting reform and the attendant changes in training that made improvement 
possible.   
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In addressing the first question, the thesis will analyse the development of key tactical ideas that 
emerged during combat in the Boer War itself.  As previously discussed, the conflict in South Africa 
was unusual for a variety of reasons and posed a serious challenge to pre-conceived ideas in the 
British Army.  Facing unanticipated tactical problems such as smokeless powder, heavy artillery and a 
supremely mobile opponent, the British were forced to adapt in the field, suffering several stinging 
defeats before finally devising battle winning tactics that brought the conventional stage of the war to 
a close.  British tactics in South Africa varied by commander and by region, with the geography of the 
country imposing its own limitations.  For example, the campaign in Natal revolved around attritional 
struggles for control of important positions, while the more open terrain of the Orange Free State 
produced a mobile campaign in which large numbers of cavalry and mounted infantry were key.  
Faced with diverse experiences, the problem that confronted the British military following the end of 
hostilities was determining which of these ideas had enduring value and which were theatre specific.  
The ability of the British Army to adapt in South Africa has been discussed in several works, 
including those by Stephen Miller, Jay Stone and Thomas Pakenham.  However, the lasting influence 
of the ideas drawn from the Boer War has received comparatively little analysis.  This thesis will 
attempt to fill this gap, arguing that several crucial ideas emerged in each of the three main service as 
a result of South African experience, providing a foundation for the tactical development of the 
British Army throughout the 1902-1914 period.   
How these ideas were adopted into training and tactics will form the focus of the second research 
question.  The embarrassments of the Boer War provided a great impetus towards military reform, and 
the experience of the conflict provided an initial direction.  In the immediate aftermath of the war, 
ideas drawn from combat against the Boers were dominant in informing training and tactics, but some 
officers felt that the unique aspect of the struggle made drawing specific tactical lessons difficult and 
potentially dangerous.  Furthermore, the need for the British Army to remain flexible to fight a wide 
range of opponents further complicated developments.  In this environment, tactical concepts drawn 
from South Africa were subjected to considerable debate, with some officers lauding their value while 
others dismissed them as irrelevant.  The thesis will analyse how ideas drawn from the Boer War were 
modified and adapted during the 1902 – 1914 era, demonstrating to what extent they were integrated 
into training and tactics over time.  The relative absence of formal, codified doctrine within the British 
Army of this period poses problems for identifying how diverse ideas became firm tactical concepts.  
Previous studies, such as the work of Martin Samuels, have made substantial use of the minutes of 
General Staff meetings to build a picture of British tactics.  However, this only demonstrates thinking 
at the highest strata of the army, and does not reflect the reality of training at lower levels.  Instead, by 
consulting sources such as Army Council minutes, Inspector General of Forces reports and training 
memorandums from various commands, particularly Aldershot, this thesis will attempt to determine 
to what extent the tactical ideas of the Boer War prevailed at brigade level and below.   
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A key element in answering the second research question is the impact of outside influences on 
tactical development.  While the emphasis of the thesis is on the role of the Boer War in shaping 
British tactics, there were other influences that emerged during the Edwardian period, particularly the 
impact of the Russo-Japanese War, and these cannot be ignored.  However, the thesis will explore the 
idea that while the examples of the Manchurian conflict contributed to ongoing debates, they rarely 
provided entirely fresh ideas.  Historians of the Russo-Japanese War have argued that continental 
European militaries tended to use the example of the war in the Far East to confirm existing lines of 
thought.68  This was largely true of the British Army, which drew upon Manchurian observations to 
contribute to ongoing debates on the value of ideas developed from the Boer War, but did not use 
them to create entirely new tactics.  Where appropriate, the thesis will discuss the impact of the 
Russo-Japanese War upon tactical discussion, demonstrating how it could provoke controversy but 
ultimately tended to confirm existing lines of thought developed from South African experience.   
The final issue to be addressed by the thesis is the extent to which the B.E.F. of 1914 had been shaped 
by the lessons of the Boer War, and how relevant they proved for combat in the opening months of 
the First World War.  The outbreak of war in 1914 placed the small, colonial orientated British Army 
directly in the path of the German offensive through Belgium.  Vastly outnumbered and outgunned, 
the B.E.F. was forced to fight pitched battles against an enemy regarded as the finest army on the 
continent.  The experience of the Boer War provided few operational lessons, while the need to 
handle multiple divisions in the field had been neglected in pre-war training in favour of achieving 
excellence at brigade level and below.  The unique nature of the British Army and its focus on small 
scale deployments meant that it was not ideally suited to a vast continental struggle, and a number of 
operational flaws became apparent in these early battles, with higher command fragmenting under the 
pressure of campaigning.69  However, despite these problems, the B.E.F. acquitted itself 
commendably in combat, where its high tactical quality meant that it was able to perform well in 
battles such as Mons and Le Cateau, checking the German advance before retreating in good order.  
The tactical performance of the B.E.F. has drawn praise, and this thesis will analyse the extent to 
which tactics drawn from the Boer War proved useful in 1914, and demonstrate that, although specific 
ideas were not always appropriate, the fundamental principles developed in the 1902 – 1914 period 
remained valuable and relevant in the opening months of the First World War.  
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The focus of this thesis centres upon the extent to which the combat experiences of the Boer War 
developed British operational and tactical thought in the 1902 – 1914 period, and the work will use 
various official and semi-official sources to trace the development of the British Army.  Reports from 
the front and the evidence presented to the post-Boer War Elgin Commission identified a number of 
key tactical problems that had emerged in South Africa.  From this point, solutions and responses 
were widely debated in the service journals, and also in various training papers produced for 
individual commands such as Aldershot.  Ultimately, some of the proposed solutions were accepted, 
with evidence of their usage in training appearing in the reports of the Inspector General of Forces and 
in annual training memorandums issued by local commands.  Therefore, by using this range of 
sources, it is possible to triangulate evidence from the era to trace the progression of tactical ideas 
from their roots in the Boer War to the point of official acceptance.  The private papers of various 
high ranking officers who fought in the Boer War and First World War will only be referred to 
sparingly. Due to the high rank of many of the officers in question, much of the material within the 
private paper collections refers to strategic and organisational thought, rather than tactical 
development, and are thus of less immediate use in addressing the key research questions. 
The thesis will be divided into four separate chapters, detailing separate aspects of the British Army.  
These chapters will comprise Doctrine and Ethos, Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry.  Although the 
British aspired towards close co-operation in battle, individual arms tended to absorb and assess the 
tactical lessons of the Boer War in isolation.  Therefore, an arm by arm structure facilitates closer 
analysis of the key tactical questions which drove reform in the 1902 – 1914.  The Doctrine and Ethos 
chapter will discuss the difficulties of creating formal doctrine in an army which needed to remain 
sufficiently flexible to undertake imperial policing duties, and analyse the ethos of flexibility and 
initiative that served as a substitute for formal written guidelines.  Taken as a whole, the four chapters 
will argue that while not all the lessons of the Boer War endured, key ideas in each service arm 
remained in place, encouraged by an overall ethos that emphasised skill in minor tactics.  While the 
British Army of 1914 possessed certain flaws, the reforms that were developed from the Boer War 
created an army that performed well in the confused battles that marked the opening weeks of the 
First World War.   
Throughout the thesis, the focus will be upon tactics and training, principally at brigade level and 
below. Therefore, the wider organisational changes underway in this period, such as the Haldane 
reforms, the creation of the Territorial Army and the implementation of the General Staff will be 
referred to only in passing.  As the focus is on low level tactics, large scale strategic issues such as 
plans to deploy the B.E.F. to the continent will not be discussed.  Additionally, while British auxiliary 
forces such as the volunteers, militia, yeomanry and colonial contingents played a vital role in the 
Boer War, the focus of this thesis remains upon the development of the regular B.E.F. and as such the 
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experiences of second line forces will not be specifically detailed.  The regular army was the driving 
force in developing training and tactics, and the second line forces tended to follow its lead rather than 
contribute fresh ideas.  As such the influence of the auxiliary forces in the ongoing tactical debates of 
the 1902 – 1914 period was negligible.  
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Chapter One 
Doctrine and Ethos 
 
Throughout the Victorian era, the British Army was distinctly averse to committing itself to any 
formal, written doctrine.  Proposals to create a General Staff similar to those that existed in France 
and Germany had been rejected by the Hartington Commission in the 1890s, preventing the 
development of a higher organisation within the army that could have imposed a common doctrine 
from the top down. 1  Instead, a profusion of tactical ideas existed, meaning that tactics and training 
often varied considerably from battalion to battalion and new ideas and methods were localised.  
Tactics were influenced by a multitude of factors, including local combat experience in colonial 
actions, the quality of the commanding officers and the availability of suitable ground upon which to 
train.  Drill manuals contained some useful ideas, but the lack of an overall doctrine in training meant 
that adherence to faulty, outdated concepts often continued unchecked.  Training was principally 
focussed on simple drill, with financial stringency and restrictions on manoeuvres meaning that 
training at brigade level and above was a rare occurrence.  Indeed, of the formations despatched to 
South Africa, only the battalions of Hildyard’s 2nd Brigade had been formed together and had the 
chance to train as a unit in peace time.2 
The early defeats in the opening months of the Boer War revealed the flaws in some of the pre-war 
ideas, especially when confronted by the challenge of crossing a fire swept zone in the face of a 
virtually invisible enemy.  In this new form of warfare, the close control and tight formations that had 
been victorious in conflicts against primitively armed colonial foes proved to be sources of weakness.  
Furthermore, cherished concepts such as strict discipline and unthinking obedience to orders were of 
limited value in a conflict where officers and men were often widely separated, and forced to rely 
upon their own initiative to an unprecedented degree.  Additionally, the stress of modern combat, 
particularly the disturbing experience of being under rapid fire from invisible foes, placed great 
demands upon the morale of the troops.  The number of British regulars who surrendered in combat 
revealed that even hard drilled and well disciplined long-service soldiers were not immune to cracking 
under the pressures imposed by modern firepower.   
Ultimately, the flexibility of the British Army and its ability to learn ‘in-theatre’ made it successful in 
adapting to the peculiar conditions of the Boer War, but in the aftermath of the conflict the British 
grappled with a wide variety of new ideas, often leading to acrimonious debates within the individual 
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combat arms.  Arching above this was the acknowledgement that modern firepower required an 
overhaul of training attitudes, particularly regarding improving the quality of the individual soldier 
and the overall initiative of the army.  While rigid control and close formations could be of value in 
‘savage’ warfare, against foes with modern weapons it was necessary for the army to develop a new 
training ethos that was based upon skill and initiative as much as drill and obedience.  These ideas 
contributed to the ongoing debate, common to all European armies of the era, regarding potential 
solutions to the problem of crossing the fire swept zone and delivering an assault.  The doctrinal 
responses to this issue in the pre-First World War period have been a popular subject for historians.  
Whereas the German Army has drawn considerable praise for its operational doctrine, the British 
Army has often been castigated for advancing little from its Victorian ethos, ultimately leading to 
defeats and heavy casualties in the battles of the First World War.3  The Boer War has sometimes 
been seen as a negative influence in this regard, trapping the army in a ‘small war’ mentality that 
proved inappropriate when faced by the vast scale of 1914.4  However, more recently it has been 
suggested that while the British struggled to create a workable operational doctrine, at brigade level 
and below the B.E.F. was tactically advanced in understanding the problems posed by modern fire.5  
Furthermore, the opening clashes between the British and the Germans in 1914 have been 
characterised as ‘soldiers’ battles’, in which the influence of higher command was limited or even 
non-existent.6  Given the relative success of the B.E.F. in holding off far larger numbers of the enemy, 
this lends support to the idea that the British Army emerged as a tactically skilful force in the 
aftermath of the Boer War, although weaknesses undoubtedly existed at an operational level.  
Additionally, the unique imperial role of the British Army meant that copying German or French 
operational methods would have been inappropriate for the type of campaigns that the army was 
likely to fight, limiting the flexibility and adaptability that was a requirement in colonial campaigns.  
It is the purpose of this chapter to add to the ongoing debate on the nature of British Army doctrine in 
the pre-First World War period by demonstrating how the experience of the Boer War contributed to a 
new ethos based around skill, intelligence and initiative, thus contributing to overall tactical 
effectiveness.  However, the slow and hesitant process of instituting a General Staff and the unique 
demands of policing the empire meant that creating a formal, written doctrine proved largely 
impossible.  This created peculiar training difficulties for the British Army in the Edwardian period 
and limited the development of an operational doctrine that could match that of the Germans.  The 
analysis of the British Army in this period will centre on three aspects:  first, the change in training 
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ethos to encourage high levels of initiative; second, the difficulties that prevented the development of 
a formal doctrine; and finally the willpower versus firepower debate that encouraged a belief in the 
offensive, arguably to excessive levels.  Although flaws remained, this chapter will argue that the 
emphasis on skill and initiative that developed from the South African conflict was an appropriate 
tactical response to the challenges posed by modern weapons.  The focus on individual skill 
developed principally as a response to the difficulties of maintaining command and control in widely 
dispersed infantry formations, but this developed further in the 1902 – 1914 period, ultimately 
forming a cornerstone of training for the entire British Army.  Indeed, the combination of individual 
skill and thorough training allowed the B.E.F. to perform well in battle against the Germans in 1914.  
However, the failure to develop a formal doctrine meant that once the old regular army was destroyed 
much knowledge was lost, forcing the ‘New Armies’ to endure a steep learning curve on the Western 
Front. 
Initiative 
The idea of improving the initiative and skill of the individual British soldier was not a new concept 
on the eve of the Boer War.  Indeed, as early as 1803, Sir John Moore had introduced innovative 
skirmish training that led to the creation the regular army’s first permanently constituted light infantry 
regiments.  However, while certain elite formations benefitted from such enlightened ideas, the 
majority of the army continued to train on lines of discipline, obedience and close control throughout 
the Victorian era.  While these concepts served the British Army well in wars against poorly armed 
foes such as the Zulus and the Dervishes, by the 1890s there was a growing concern that these rigid 
tactics were potentially vulnerable against rifle equipped opposition such as the tribes of the North 
West Frontier.7  The 1896 edition of Infantry Drill picked up on this point, stating “The conditions of 
modern warfare render it imperative that all ranks should be taught to think, and, subject to general 
instructions and accepted principles, to act for themselves.”8  However, this single sentence apparently 
had limited influence on training in the British Army prior to the Boer War.   For example, William 
Gatacre was highly critical of the lack of intelligence shown by the ordinary soldier during the Tirah 
campaign of 1898, while other officers were scathing about the stultifying and outdated drill that 
made up the majority of recruit training in the late 1890s.9  Furthermore, the benefits of improved 
initiative were considered doubtful by some officers.  Even the forward thinking G.F.R Henderson 
had concerns about the concept, attributing Prussian setbacks in 1870 to “...the impetuosity of all 
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ranks and the excessive independence of the subordinate leaders” and feeling that too much initiative 
would cause basic drill book principles to be “cast to the winds”.10 
However, the war in South Africa provided stark evidence of the need to improve the intelligence and 
initiative of the individual soldier.  As will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, the 
range and effectiveness of Boer firepower caused the abandonment of close order formations in 
favour of widely extended lines, making it harder for officers to keep their men ‘in hand’ and under 
control.  Furthermore, the accuracy of modern rifles and the lack of smoke on the battlefield meant 
officers who shunned cover and tried to set an example for their troops became prime targets for Boer 
marksmen.  Lord Methuen noted that at Modder River “...the truth is that when no-one can get on a 
horse with any safety within 2,000 yards of the enemy, orders cannot be conveyed...”, and officer 
attrition soon became so severe that badges of rank and swords were abandoned to avoid drawing 
undue fire.11  In these circumstances, handling larger formations became extremely difficult.  Passing 
orders to front line officers who were virtually indistinguishable from their men was a challenge for 
messengers, especially as they were forced to advance “from boulder to boulder” on their way to the 
front to avoid Boer snipers.12  Even in the firing line itself, wide extensions made the conveyance of 
vocal commands difficult, with men at the fringes of the formation often unable to identify their 
commanding officer due to his plain uniform, or hear his shouts over the sounds of combat.  Whistle 
calls and identification badges worn on the collar or back of the uniform were suggested to remedy 
these issues, but these were improvised solutions that were far from ideal.13  These command 
problems were so acute that one veteran officer considered that handling a single battalion under Boer 
War conditions was harder than handling an entire brigade in earlier years.14 
This loss of control created a series of related problems that cascaded down the command structure of 
the British Army in South Africa, revealing the weakness of pre-war instruction.  Deprived of orders 
from higher ranks, junior officers such as captains and subalterns suddenly found themselves facing 
far more responsibility than had been anticipated in peace time training.15  Inexperienced officers 
often struggled to cope with these unexpected demands, and Major-General A.H. Paget felt that in the 
case of many junior commanders “...it was perfectly obvious that they dreaded responsibility.”16  
Inevitably, these officers typically looked to their NCOs for support in such circumstances, in some 
cases to excessive levels.  Colonel Forbes MacBean noted that inexperienced officers “...would almost 
                                                     
10
 Henderson, Science of War, pp.138-139 
11
 TNA WO 108/237 Lord Methuen’s Despatch on the Battle of Modder River, 1st December 1899; Pakenham, 
Thomas, The Boer War (London, Abacus, 1992) p.312:  Symons, Julian Buller’s Campaign (London, Crescent 
Press, 1963) p.222 
12
 TNA WO 108/237 Lord Methuen’s Despatch on the Battle of Belmont, 30th December 1899 
13
 TNA WO 105/40 – Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare, 5th February 1900 
14
 Elgin Commission, Vol.1, Q10447, p.441 
15
 Elgin Commission, Vol.2, Q13247, p.66 
16
 Ibid, Q16481, p.260 
34 
 
rather take an old colour sergeant’s opinion than develop one of their own.”17  Unfortunately, NCOs 
lacked any real schooling in command duties, and although the rate of attrition often forced them to 
take the place of officer casualties in combat, this was not a job for which they had been prepared in 
peace time training.18  The difficulties of command and control experienced by junior officers and 
NCOs filtered down to the men themselves, who had often been trained to look towards their officers 
for all instructions and therefore were not expected to act upon their own initiative.19  While the 
dependence of men on officers could vary from battalion to battalion, at its worst it risked leaving the 
soldiers utterly paralysed in the absence of direct orders.20  One anonymous officer described NCOs 
and men as being “like a flock of sheep” when deprived of their officers, feeling that defeats and lost 
opportunities throughout the conflict could often be traced to this key problem.21    This was 
especially noticeable in combat firing, as pre-war musketry training had largely been based on the 
assumption that in action it would always be possible for an officer to point out the target and 
announce the range.22  When battlefield confusion or officer casualties meant that such orders were 
not forthcoming, the shooting of the men could sometimes prove exceptionally poor.23 
Such issues were not necessarily universal throughout the army during the Boer War, with certain 
formations benefitting from strong leadership and training which reduced confusion.   For example, 
when the 1st Battalion Sherwood Foresters arrived in South Africa in December 1899, it was put 
through rapid and rigorous training to prepare it for “the class of warfare” it was expected to face, 
reducing battlefield confusion when it went into action.24  Nevertheless, the problems of command 
and control in the Boer War were widespread and attracted a great deal of attention within the army.  
A critical issue for many junior officers in the war was a system of peace time training that had left 
them with little work to do and granted limited opportunities to exercise command.  The eight 
company battalion system, the need to provide drafts for India, and related manpower shortages meant 
that officers rarely possessed a command worth the name.  This caused them to interfere in the work 
of subordinates, enforcing conformity at the expense of responsibility.  A.W.A Pollock summed this 
attitude up as “Zeal amongst us is displayed chiefly in worrying those below us in rank, and scheming 
to avoid being ourselves worried by those above us.”25   This culture of interference bore bitter fruit in 
the Boer War.  Schooled in a system where a superior officer was always close at hand to criticise 
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mistakes, junior officers were often left crippled by the fear that any fault might earn them a 
reprimand or even lead to them being “Stellenbosched”.26  Howard Vincent bemoaned that peace time 
training attitudes were carried over into the war itself, with errors made in action being “mercilessly” 
seized on by “officer desk critics”, causing some leaders in the field to prefer passive inaction rather 
than risking punishment for failure in combat.27  Horace Smith-Dorrien gave voice to similar 
sentiments in a diary entry for 5th March 1901, writing, “I wish this war would end, as so far I have 
not been found out in any glorious mistakes, and should like to “stand” as one says at cards when one 
has a fair hand and doesn’t care to risk taking more for fear of losing everything.”28   
In the aftermath of the conflict, evidence presented before the Elgin Commission was virtually 
unanimous in calling for officers and men to be trained to accept greater responsibility and 
demonstrate more individual initiative.29  In addition to offsetting command paralysis in the absence 
of orders, it was felt that cultivating intelligence and initiative would prove crucial in allowing troops 
to attack across fire swept areas.  In the face of modern rifle fire, density of formation and sheer 
weight of assault could no longer be relied upon to succeed without the risk of prohibitive casualties.  
Avoiding such severe losses was particularly important for Britain, which relied upon a small 
volunteer army that could not absorb casualties as easily as the mass forces of the continent.  
However, this in turn raised the issue of how to maintain morale during an assault.  Dense formations 
and close officer control had traditionally been the solution to keeping morale high and preventing 
routs, with the troops drawing confidence from the presence of comrades and fearing the shame of 
being seen to panic.  Conversely, extended formations, invisible foes and potential isolation from 
officers placed far greater strain on the men than ever before.30  Faced with these related issues, 
officers such as Ian Hamilton felt that the solution lay in the development of a small but elite army, 
based around highly trained soldiers who could be relied upon to press forward individually or in 
groups, laying covering fire for comrades and seizing advantages presented by local cover.31  Instead 
of dense formations bolstering morale, superior training would give the men confidence in their own 
weapons and abilities.  Officers such as Lieutenant General William Gatacre agreed, and believed 
such a spirit had been developing by the latter stages of the Boer War.  Gatacre argued that successful 
attacks now depended less on the actions of nearby officers, and more “...on the initiative of the best 
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non-commission officers and men who become local leaders.”32  G.F.R Henderson seized upon the 
idea of NCOs being at the heart of attack tactics, with sergeants handling small squads of men in the 
absence of local officers, a forward thinking concept which has been described as “superb” by one 
modern historian.33  Colonel J.H.A MacDonald also endorsed the idea, noticing that intermingling of 
units during combat further limited the influence of officers, and instead suggesting the training of 
infantry companies should emphasis the formation of small groups under leaders specially drawn 
from the best NCOs and men.34  Indeed, the role of NCOs had been paramount in both infantry and 
cavalry in the latter stages of the Boer War, with officer shortages meaning that it was estimated 
around 70% of cavalry squadrons were led by NCOs.35 
In the aftermath of the Boer War the British Army was seized by a spirit of reform that promised 
improvements to the key command difficulties experienced in combat.  Extended battlefronts meant 
that the company was now considered the largest formation that could be controlled by a single 
officer, and although manpower problems still remained, there was a conscious effort to give captains 
and subalterns more responsibilities and encourage them to exercise their leadership skills in 
peacetime.36  While the 1896 Drill Book had first suggested the need for greater intelligence amongst 
all ranks, Combined Training 1905 placed new emphasis upon the issue, including how it was to be 
achieved: 
...success in war cannot be expected unless all ranks have been trained in peace to use their 
wits.  Generals and commanding officers are, therefore, not only to encourage their 
subordinates in so doing by affording them constant opportunities of acting on their own 
responsibility but, they will also check all practices which interfere with the free exercise of 
their judgement, and will break down, by every means in their power, the paralyzing habit of 
an unreasoning and mechanical adherence to the letter of orders and to routine, when acting 
under service conditions.37 
Officers of both infantry companies and cavalry squadrons were given more tactical responsibilities 
and were expected to take a personal interest in improving training of their own formations.38  For 
example, for most of the 19th century the training of subalterns had been a role traditionally managed 
by the battalion colonel, but to foster closer company level co-operation this was now incorporated 
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into a captain’s duties.39  The increased role of junior officers and emphasis on initiative also 
encouraged a practical attitude towards training.  Whereas, prior to the Boer War, it had been noted 
that the British regimental officer was “...expected to make himself acquainted with the most absurdly 
unimportant details...there was but little necessity for him to be a soldier”, in 1905 John French 
summed up the new attitude when he stated that junior officer training should make a clear distinction 
between “...the ‘cram’ which aims at success in examination, and the inculcation of instinctive 
knowledge which aims at success in the field.”40  After an inspection of Field Artillery on Salisbury 
Plain, the camp commandant echoed similar sentiments, ruminating that “Nothing in my experience is 
more conducive to failure than a contentment with being word perfect in the Drill Book.”41  Although 
this change in ethos took time to produce results, there was much praise for the eagerness to learn 
amongst junior officers.  Keenness and a growing sense of professionalism were noted as becoming 
apparent amongst officers in the years following the Boer War, leading to improved instruction for the 
men and greater initiative at all levels.42  While the process was not without its flaws, there was a 
steady process of improvement.  By the middle years of the Edwardian period there were discernable 
improvements in overall leadership quality, described as a “great step” by the Inspector General of 
Forces in 1907.43 
Matching the reform of the role of junior officers, in the years following the Boer War there was a 
concerted effort to improve the quality of NCOs and men.  Leo Amery summed up the intention of the 
reforms in 1903, noting that “The passive, automatic discipline of the ear must give place to the 
active, conscious discipline of the mind and of the will.”44  Company officers were expected to 
become instructors rather than simple drill masters, encouraging the troops to show initiative and skill 
rather than mechanical obedience.45  For example, musketry training placed new emphasis on 
individual accuracy and ability to estimate ranges, moving away from volleys and iron fire discipline 
that had been common prior to the Boer War.  Innovative training exercises were introduced that 
meant that men were given the chance to demonstrate their initiative in situations approximating 
service conditions, and although some flaws remained in these manoeuvres, particularly their small 
scale, they represented a considerable advance in overall training ethos.  The quality of the regular 
British soldier steadily improved over the period, and by 1912, the Inspector General of Forces was 
pleased to report that he considered that for “individual efficiency” the British infantryman was the 
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best in the world, attracting admiration from foreign observers.46  In the same year, Lieutenant 
Colonel Campbell warned his fellow officers not to underestimate the ability of the average private, 
who he felt was now capable of winning a fire fight even in the absence of direct orders, marking a 
clear improvement from the problems of the Boer War.47  NCOs were also singled out for 
development.  As previously discussed, several prominent officers saw NCOs as being a key element 
in future tactics, and the idea of a “staff college for non-commissioned officers” had been suggested to 
the Elgin Commission.48  Acting on this proposal, a NCO school based in Salisbury Command was 
founded in 1904, with a mixed syllabus that encouraged greater command and combat responsibilities 
for sergeants.49   
The reform of individual training was an essential component in creating the famously elite infantry 
of the B.E.F., but the process was not without difficulties or tensions.  Whereas the encouragement of 
greater standards of skill amidst junior officers was largely a question of training reform, to improve 
the NCOs and men was a more complex matter that touched upon the raw nerve of social prejudice.  
There was a widespread fear of social degeneration created by urbanisation during the Edwardian 
period, a concern that was worsened by the fact the British Army did much of its recruiting from the 
lowest strata of society, often drawing upon poorly fed and ill-educated men.  During the Boer War , 
physical standards had been lowered to help recruitment, with the result that the British Army in 
South Africa was the smallest in physical terms that the country deployed during the 19th and 20th 
centuries.50  Boers were amazed by the difference in height between officers and men, and were 
distinctly unimpressed by the physical standard of the some of the British soldiers, one burgher 
considering that “They had neither the accent nor the gait of Christians.”51  Later drafts of recruits and 
volunteers to South Africa often proved to be both physically and tactically poor, notably the second 
contingent of Imperial Yeomanry, raising further prejudices about the capability of urbanised British 
citizens to make useful soldiers.52   
The contradictory factors of lingering mistrust of the social class from which much of the army was 
drawn and a desire to encourage skill and initiative amongst the men caused the British Army to 
undergo what M.A Ramsay terms “a paradigmatic crisis” as it searched for tactical solutions to the 
problems of modern warfare.53  Even during the Boer War, there had been concerns that the degree of 
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individuality allowed to men had become excessive.  For example, J.M Grierson worried that officers 
and men had become too casual in tolerating non-regulation clothing in the field, while one 
anonymous officer felt that traditional ideas of drill, steadiness and discipline had ultimately been the 
key in overcoming the skilful but ill-disciplined Boers.54  In the aftermath of the conflict, some 
officers, such as Ian Hamilton, actually saw the army as an instrument of social regeneration, taking 
the lowest members of society and turning them into healthy, intelligent and patriotic soldiers.55  
However, others had little faith in the working class, and considered the new spirit of initiative to be 
positively dangerous.  An anonymous officer complained in 1903; “The soldier has no more right to 
perpetual individuality than the operative, the mechanic or the domestic servant.  What factory 
manager, engineer or housekeeper would allow independence of action to either of these classes?”56   
This mistrust of the lower classes placed limitations on some of the reforms, particularly with regard 
to the role of NCOs.  For example, the training given at the NCO School at Salisbury Plain was 
heralded as a great success, but by 1906 the school had been abolished, even though the Army 
Council admitted it had carried out “good and useful work” and the Inspector General considered it 
“excellent”.57  Lack of funding was cited as the principal reason for its closure, but the Army Council 
made further justifications including that the syllabus could be taught within regiments and that the 
attendance of NCOs at the school placed a burden upon the companies from which they were drawn.58  
However, M.A. Ramsay has suggested that the desire to maintain command in the hands of the officer 
class and avoid any dilution of power to NCOs of a lower social status was the fundamental reason 
that the tactical development of non-commissioned officers became marginalised in the pre-First 
World War period.59  Promotion from the ranks actually declined during the Edwardian era, and the 
role of NCOs was not developed to the same extent that was apparent amongst junior officers and 
men.60  Social status remained an important aspect to command, with one prize winning essay 
published in 1914 arguing, “The ‘habit to command’ is largely hereditary”, while another officer felt 
that it would be impossible to expect NCOs to be capable of same intellectual standards expected 
from officers unless they were drawn from the same social class.61  
Edwardian society was greatly defined by the class structure, and it was highly unlikely that a 
conservative, hierarchical institution such as the army would adopt egalitarian methods in peacetime.  
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However, while modern historians have sometimes attributed military failures in 1914 to the existence 
of an anachronistic and elitist officer class, this is an overly narrow interpretation that ignores the 
considerable improvement in British Army tactics prior to the First World War.62  Although social 
prejudice created certain tensions and limited the development of the tactical role of NCOs, it did not 
stop overall improvements taking place in training for all ranks during the 1902 – 1914 period.  The 
shock of the Boer War caused a fundamental shift in attitudes towards training.  The tactical 
improvements that will be discussed in later chapters were ultimately dependent upon the new 
training ethos that emerged in the aftermath of the South African conflict.  Junior officers of all arms 
took a keener interest in the profession and were expected to show greater initiative and skill, while 
the men benefited from more advanced training that made them the best marksmen in Europe and a 
genuinely elite force.  A testament to the quality of overall training lies in the fact that the B.E.F. was 
made up of around 60% reservists in August 1914, some of whom had not served with the colours for 
several years.63  Yet despite these apparent limitations, the force was considered extremely well 
trained compared to its continental rivals.64 
The Absence of Formal Doctrine 
While there was a significant development in individual officer and soldier quality from 1899 to 1914, 
some major issues remained unresolved.  Perhaps the most serious of these was the thorny issue of 
devising and implementing a formal operational doctrine.  The Boer War had broken down a number 
of barriers that had prevented the creation of a doctrine in the Victorian era.  For much of the 19th 
century the army had fought ‘small wars’ around the globe, with lessons learned in action having little 
impact outside of the immediate participants.   The potential problems created by this absence of 
doctrine were highlighted by Redvers Buller, who observed that inexperienced officers were often left 
bewildered in action: 
There is scarcely one officer in a hundred who has been taught any rule which would guide 
him in deciding how to act when confronted by the problem so frequent in war: ‘I have my 
orders, but ought I to do?65 
The Boer War offered an opportunity to correct this flaw.  In contrast to the ‘small wars’ of previous 
years, the conflict in South Africa ultimately involved the majority of the British Army, giving the 
advantage of a shared combat experience upon which to base future development.  Furthermore, the 
dismal planning, organisation and intelligence work that had been undertaken prior to the Boer War 
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prompted the revival of the debate upon the desirability of instituting a General Staff system. 66  This 
ultimately bore fruit in 1904, when the reforms recommended by the Esher Committee swept away 
the post of Commander-in-Chief and replaced it with Britain’s first General Staff, headed by 
successful Boer War commander Neville Gerald Lyttelton. 
Shared combat experience and the creation of the General Staff laid valuable groundwork for 
developing key principles that would carry the British Army into the 20th century, but there were 
several crucial difficulties that delayed and ultimately prevented the creation of a formal doctrine 
prior to the First World War.  The greatest of these problems was the unique military responsibilities 
imposed by the need to police the world’s largest empire.  Potential enemies and theatres of 
operations varied enormously, with the army as likely to face crudely armed tribal foes as they were 
opposition equipped with modern rifles.  Dealing with these imperial conflicts remained the principal 
duty of the British Army in the immediate aftermath of the Boer War. A struggle against European 
opposition was considered highly unlikely, with the possible exception of a clash with Russia if the 
latter chose to invade India.67  Contemporaries recognised that while the tactical lessons learned in 
South Africa were certainly valuable, the sheer variety of foes presented unique problems for the 
formation of a formal doctrine based on the example of a single conflict.  One Boer War veteran 
officer complained of the dangers of being “tied down to hard and fast rules”, while Major General 
J.F. Maurice summed the problems up: 68    
I venture to think that there is a danger in our assuming that we can, from this one war [the 
Boer War], deduce all the lessons which will be applicable to the work of the British Army... I 
maintain that the British Army is under a condition of difficulty... that exists for no other 
Army in the world, and we must face and recognise the fact that we cannot attempt to 
stereotype our tactics.69 
Training manuals of the Edwardian period reflected the reluctance to create a formal doctrine, 
highlighting general principles but leaving considerable leeway for interpretation amongst officers.  
This ensured tactical flexibility for facing a wide variety of enemies, but it created a certain degree of 
confusion and inconsistency in training.  As discussed in earlier chapters, these problems manifested 
themselves in the differing methods used by various commands regarding fundamental tactics such as 
the width of infantry extensions, and the deployment of artillery in covered or open positions.  While 
such difficulties were of limited importance in small colonial actions where relatively low numbers of 
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troops would be deployed, the growing threat from Germany and the risk of a large scale European 
war suggested the need for more operational doctrine within the British Army.   
However, the creation of any central doctrine was constrained, not only by the need to remain flexible 
for a huge variety of potential foes, but also by concerns that it could potentially stifle officer 
initiative and cause a recurrence of the problems that had bedevilled the British Army in South 
Africa.70  Indeed, the desire to improve the independence of junior officers and men in the years 
following the Boer War was so strong that it sometimes became counterproductive.  In 1905, Sir John 
French praised the spirit evident in company training, but cautioned that in giving captains the 
opportunity to exercise their initiative meant that bad habits and “manifestly wrong” methods could 
develop.  However, mindful of the need to encourage individual command skills amongst junior 
officers, battalion colonels were reluctant to point out errors, causing French to highlight the fact that 
“...some ‘guidance’ (rather than ‘interference’) is imperatively called for.”71  This problem was 
common in the British Army throughout the period, with local methods being tolerated and leading to 
the development of subtly different tactics in separate commands and divisions.  In 1907, the Duke of 
Connaught expressed concerns that there was a “go as you please” attitude towards tactics, and that 
the lack of central doctrine created a “...tendency to (form) cliques around particular Generals, from 
which the Army has suffered in the past.”72  This problem remained largely unresolved, arguably 
growing worse as the Boer War faded from memory.  John French noted in 1911 that: 
The South African War and the lessons learnt from it had the effect of starting a new school 
of thought, which for some years gave a great impetus to training, and revived interest and 
initiative among officers.  This seems to have died away into theory.  We have a superfluity 
of literature on training, and a mass of theory is thrown at the heads of officers which they do 
their best to assimilate, but which has little visible effect.73 
Other officers agreed with this assessment, noting that despite the amount of literature produced, it 
provided little central direction and thus tended to confuse rather than clarify.  Brigadier General F.C. 
Carter bemoaned the disease of “cacoethes scribendi”,74 complaining that “Every spring and autumn 
lengthy and verbose paraphrases of our Field Service Regulations are issued from several of the 
Command, Divisional, and Brigade Headquarters.  These only tend to confuse and exasperate 
commanding and other officers...I have seen no less than 14 of these paraphrases, called ‘Hints on 
Training’, mostly of two printed foolscap pages, all issued in one year from a Divisional General Staff 
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Officer.”75  This mass of often contradictory literature did not serve to create a uniform doctrine, and 
diversity of method remained.  Official training manuals offered sound guiding principles but rejected 
formal doctrine.  Infantry Training 1905 was particularly stringent upon the issue, stating: 
“It is impossible to lay down a fixed and unvarying system of attack or defence.  Although 
such system might appear capable of modification to meet different conditions, yet constant 
practice in a stereotypical formation inevitably leads to want of elasticity, accustoms all ranks 
to work by rule rather than by the exercise of their wits, and cramps both initiative and 
intelligence...It is therefore strictly forbidden either to formulate or to practise a normal form 
of either attack or defence.”76 
Despite the caution about fixed methods of attack, one clear principle that was emphasised in official 
manuals throughout the era was the need for close co-operation of all arms.  This had been the key to 
victory in the Boer War, particularly in Natal where co-operation between infantry and artillery had 
eventually allowed the British to break through the Boer lines.  Equally, in the more open terrain of 
the Orange Free State, Lord Roberts’s combination of frontal infantry attacks and turning movements 
with cavalry and mounted forces had driven the Boers back at relatively low cost.  Combined Training 
1905 embodied these concepts in a particularly clear paragraph that had echoes of the experience of 
South Africa. 
...mounted troops and infantry compel the enemy to disclose his position and thereby afford a 
target to the artillery, whilst the latter by their fire enable infantry to approach the hostile 
position.  Infantry, unaccompanied by mounted troops, is hampered by ignorance of the 
enemy’s movements, cannot move in security, and is unable to reap the fruits of victory; 
unaccompanied by artillery, it is unable to reply to fire beyond rifle range, and is generally 
powerless against entrenchments.  On the other hand, without artillery or machine guns, even 
the most mobile cavalry, unless they possess a marked numerical superiority, cannot be relied 
upon to drive back the hostile horsemen; while artillery, left to itself, is helpless.77 
Combined Training went on to urge that all officers should gain some knowledge of the principles of 
employment of other arms.78  The theme was continued in Field Service Regulations 1909, with the 
paragraph on combined arms being repeated almost verbatim.79  However, while urging closer co-
operation, little was done to suggest a systematic manner in which it could be achieved.  For example, 
Infantry Training 1905 devoted three paragraphs to co-operation with artillery, emphasising its 
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importance but offering no real advice on how it could be developed.80  The failure to create a 
doctrinal framework for all arms co-operation was a serious weakness for the British Army.  Without 
systematic guidance, the individual arms tended to learn within their own framework, and developing 
closer links took time and effort to bear fruit.  This was particularly true of infantry and artillery, and 
will be discussed in greater depth in subsequent chapters. 
Some historians have praised the issue of Field Service Regulations 1909, with Jay Luvaas feeling 
that it effectively created a uniform doctrine and Corelli Barnett arguing that without it, the enormous 
expansion of the British Army in the First World War would have resulted in utter chaos.81  Even 
John Dunlop considered the work to be “...of the greatest value for the inculcation of one central 
doctrine...”82  In fact, while Field Service Regulations was an important advance in British military 
thinking, it did not represent the creation of a formal written doctrine, and continued the trend of 
rejecting the concept.  The opening chapter of F.S.R stated “The fundamental principles of war are 
neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult and 
cannot be made subject to rules.”83  F.S.R continued to place great emphasis on co-operation between 
the arms, noting “The full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts act in close 
combination” (emphasis in original) but while encouraging close links, the manual did little to ensure 
unity of method amongst arms or divisions.84  For example, in 1912 the Inspector General of Forces 
praised the quality of Field Service Regulations and its accompanying service manuals, but identified 
four critical tactical problems that were still open to substantial interpretation, noting that these meant 
there was still “...opportunity [for] individuals to put their own views into practice.”85  Furthermore, 
during a 1912 inspection, it was found that 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Division each had their own preferred 
method of attack that differed considerably from one another, causing the Inspector General to 
complain that while junior officers and men were at a peak of efficiency, the army as a whole had not 
achieved “...anything approaching uniformity of practice, which is so divergent in different divisions 
that it would be difficult for them to combine into an army that acts with full effect.”86  However, the 
Army Council expressed little concern at the criticism, noting that Field Service Regulations clearly 
started that methods should vary according to circumstances, and that therefore such variation in 
training was in fact to be considered “essential”.87  It was somewhat blithely assumed that in the event 
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of a combined operation between the formations, the divisions would be acting under the orders of a 
higher authority and thus be able to regulate their methods to achieve their directed objectives.88 
While official manuals continued to emphasise the attributes of flexibility and a rejection of formal 
rules, the British General Staff offered an opportunity to create a ‘school of thought’ amongst the 
intellectual elite of the officer class that could ultimately emerge into a doctrine.  On the continent, the 
presence of a General Staff system encouraged the development of operational doctrine, providing 
leadership from above that filtered down throughout the army.  However, in Britain the newly formed 
General Staff experienced a number of teething troubles that slowed its development and limited its 
ability to create doctrine.  For example, as the first ever Chief of General Staff, Neville Gerald 
Lyttelton proved to be a great disappointment.  While he had done well as a commander in Natal 
during the Boer War, he was promoted beyond his abilities and offered no real leadership for the 
General Staff.  Charles Repington was scathing about Lyttelton, writing in 1906, “...old N.G.’s idea of 
happiness is to have no questions asked, and that he rated men according to their capacity for leaving 
him alone... he and many of his officers are the laughing stock of the Army and a fraud upon the 
public.”89  In addition to the weak leadership of Lyttelton, the General Staff was initially plagued by 
organisational problems and petty squabbles, delaying its true development.90  Indeed, historians 
Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham have argued that the General Staff did not constitute a true 
corps of elite, intellectual soldiers until at least 1908, when Lyttelton was replaced by William 
Nicholson.91   
While the General Staff played an important role in developing training manuals and held regular 
conferences discussing tactical problems, this did little to solve the lack of doctrine and the diversity 
of method noticeable in the smaller formations of the British Army.  Part of the problem lay in the 
fact that the General Staff was somewhat disconnected from the lower ranking officers of the British 
Army.  In 1907, the Duke of Connaught had complained that the General Staff did not provide 
leadership that filtered down , arguing that the body was “out of touch” with the army as a whole and 
in danger of being viewed as “just another War Office organisation.”92  Historian Martin Samuels has 
argued the entire army in this period was in the grip of a ‘cult of rank’ that limited debate between 
senior commanders and junior officers, a factor that seriously impaired the ability of the General Staff 
to devise a doctrine that would be accepted and implemented at lower levels.93  For example, in 1905, 
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a proposal to publish the reports on Staff Tours for the benefit of junior officers was rejected on the 
grounds that they would “...probably be too difficult for the Regimental officer.”94  At the first 
General Staff conference in January 1908, officers below the rank of Colonel were not allowed to 
participate in the debate, even though out of the 54 attending officers, 20 were Lieutenant-Colonel or 
lower.95  The result of this dislocation was that General Staff ideas sometimes ran counter to the 
prevailing ethos at lower levels.  For example, while initiative and flexibility were emphasised at 
battalion level throughout the Edwardian period, in 1910 Douglas Haig expressed concern at ideas put 
forward at the staff conference of that year, writing “I already see from your discussion at the Staff 
Coll. Confer. a tendency to split hairs, and a desire for precise rules to guide officers in every 
conceivable situation in war.  This wants watching.”96   
Faced with the need to remain flexible to face a variety of enemies around the globe and lacking 
strong direction from the fledgling General Staff, the British Army was neither willing nor able to 
develop a formal operational doctrine prior to the First World War.  Instead any ideas of doctrine 
were couched in loose and general terms, with wide room for interpretation.  For example, M.F. 
Rimington described a doctrine that permeated all ranks as “...essential to success in war”, going on to 
echo Field Service Regulations in stating “The doctrine is ‘THE UNION OF ARMS AND THE 
RESOLUTE OFFENSIVE.”97  While the British Army was undoubtedly moving towards closer co-
operation between arms, particularly infantry and artillery, the considerable variance of tactical 
methods in each of the six B.E.F. divisions placed limits on how much could be achieved prior to the 
First World War.  The problems of this approach were revealed in actions such the Battle of Le 
Cateau 26th August 1914, where contradictory ideas of artillery deployment resulted in the gunners of 
each division deploying in a different manner to achieve the same goal, as will be discussed in greater 
detail in later chapters.  Martin Samuels and Tim Travers have been critical of the failure to develop a 
formal doctrine, arguing it allowed backward ideas to flourish, contrasting it with the success of the 
German General Staff.98  However, Travers also acknowledges that in 1914 the B.E.F. as a whole 
emphasised a “sensible and flexible” approach to war that avoided stereotypical tactics, with the main 
problems lying in implementation rather than theory.99  More recently it has been suggested that while 
the British Army undoubtedly suffered command problems at higher levels in 1914, at a tactical level 
it was considerably more advanced.100   
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This dichotomy between tactical skill and operational weakness was influenced by the experience of 
the Boer War.  The struggle in South Africa had highlighted numerous weaknesses in the training of 
officers and men, as well as clearly demonstrating the tactical command problems that existed on a 
modern battlefield.  However, the unusual nature of the Boers and relative brevity of the conventional 
stage of the war meant that there was little opportunity to learn operational level lessons that could 
prove useful in the scale of conflict that a European war would entail.  Furthermore, the Boer War did 
not fundamentally alter the duties of the British Army, which remained a small force designed to 
police the empire rather than engage in mass scale warfare.  The doctrinal lessons learned in South 
Africa were principally aimed to ensure success in the next major colonial war, rather than in a vast 
European struggle.101  This fact has caused some historians to be critical of the tactical approach that 
emerged as a result of the Boer War, with G.R. Searle arguing that it meant reformers “...often 
became convinced of the merits of measures that later proved to be irrelevant, if not positively 
harmful... British soldiers had engaged in a mobile, open war, in which small groups of men were 
obliged to assume a large amount of responsibility for their own actions... in short, South Africa did 
not provide the best possible preparation for the battlefields of northern France and Flanders.”102  
However, this opinion has been criticised by M.A. Ramsay, who argues that the need for skill, 
intelligence and initiative amongst lower ranks highlighted in the Boer War proved to be a crucial 
component in achieving victory in the First World War, and that tactical disasters on the Western 
Front were often due to the incomplete implementation of such concepts, particularly amongst the 
‘New Armies’, which lacked the benefits of long term, advanced training.103   
Furthermore, in 1914, the high tactical quality of the regular B.E.F. was of critical importance in 
surviving and ultimately blunting the onslaught of the Germans through Belgium and France.  While 
the operational handling of the British Army during this period has drawn criticism, the skill and 
professionalism of the army has attracted widespread praise.104  Although the ethos of the British 
Army in this period had been geared towards colonial policing duties, at a tactical level it 
demonstrated considerable flexibility and performed well in the opening months of the First World 
War.  The elite nature of the B.E.F. was a direct result of the new training ethos that emerged as a 
result of the Boer War, replacing unthinking obedience, dread of responsibility and strict discipline 
with individual initiative and skill at arms.  In the opening months of the First World War, such 
attributes were vital in allowing the outnumbered British Army to perform so well against their 
German opposites.  John Bourne has described the battles of 1914 as “soldiers’ battles” with critical 
decision making taking place “...at the ‘sharp end’ among formations of company level or even 
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below”, and it was here that the tactical skill of the B.E.F. was at its most prominent.105  However, the 
small size of the army and the absence of any formal doctrine meant that once the regular army had 
effectively been destroyed at the end of 1914, much knowledge was lost, meaning the new volunteer 
divisions were forced to learn painful and bloody lessons afresh.  Many talented young officers of the 
B.E.F. were killed in the fighting of 1914 and the surviving regular training cadre was too small to 
provide a useful base for the massive expansion that followed.106  Early training of the ‘New Armies’ 
was particularly poor, with many of the problems that had been identified by the Elgin Commission 
re-emerging, particularly lack of initiative in the absence of direct orders.107  It would take the bitter 
experience of combat in 1916 and 1917 before an effective doctrine was crafted that was suitable for 
the mass warfare of the Western Front.  Many of the skills necessary for victory in the First World 
War, particularly improved squad level tactics and closer co-operation of infantry and artillery, had 
been identified in the Boer War.  However, while many improvements had been made in the 1902 – 
1914 period, the failure to codify the concepts into a formal doctrine seriously hampered the training 
of the massively expanded British Army and forced them to endure a bloody learning curve until final 
victory in 1918. 
The Primacy of the Offensive 
In addition to prompting a wide-ranging reform of the training ethos of the British Army, the Boer 
War also played a key role in the debate around the viability of frontal assault tactics in the face of 
modern firepower.  The discussion regarding how to press an attack succesfully in the face of 
smokeless magazine rifles, machine guns, entrenchments and QF artillery was a common one to all 
major armies of the period.  While advocates of both offensive and defensive methods enjoyed 
periods of ascendency, by 1914 a surprising consensus on the issue had emerged across Europe, 
which ultimately marked a retrograde step for the British Army from the lessons learned in the Boer 
War.   
Concern over the effectiveness of the latest weapons had been growing within military circles 
throughout the later part of the 19th century.  Battles in the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian 
War and the Russo-Turkish War had all shown the difficulties of pressing the attack against well-
armed and entrenched defenders, with even successful assaults suffering heavy causalities.  However, 
the colonial duties of the British Army meant that encountering foes armed with modern weapons was 
relatively rare and thus devising solutions to the problems of attack was a lower priority than it was 
for continental armies.  D.M. Leeson has accused the British Army of being backward and ignorant of 
the dangers posed by firepower prior to the Boer War, but others such as Michael Howard and M.A. 
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Ramsay argue that the difficulties of attacking against modern rifles were well recognised.108  Indeed, 
while the British had little experience in facing modern firepower, the effectiveness of their own 
weapons against tribal foes had been proved throughout the Victorian era.  For example, Frederick 
Maurice cited Omdurman as a counter point to continental thinkers, who argued that numbers and 
determination could overcome fire, noting “If any accumulation of numbers or any supreme readiness 
to sacrifice life could enable a body of attacking troops to advance in front against modern infantry 
and artillery fire, beyond doubt the Dervishes would have broken our line at Omdurman.  Therefore 
that battle gives, under this aspect, food for much reflection.”109  However, while there were concerns 
over the effectiveness of modern weapons, there was little consensus on how serious a problem this 
might pose.  Even the forward thinking G.F.R. Henderson considered that “Shrapnel, Maxims and the 
small bore do not seem to increase the butcher’s bill to the extent some would have us believe...”, 
although he acknowledged that the effect of fire on troops in the open would be “very great”.110 
The experience of the Boer War starkly revealed that the more cautious analysts of the Victorian army 
had been correct.  Lacking mobile forces that could outflank the enemy in the early stage of the war, 
the British were forced to make frontal assaults against prepared positions, suffering heavy casualties 
and ultimately being stopped in the triple defeats of ‘Black Week’.  At Magersfontein, the Highland 
Brigade was left pinned down on an open plain for hours, with small groups at various ranges 
between 200 and 600 yards from the Boer line, unable to advance or retreat.  Leo Amery wrote after 
the war “...efforts to rush the trenches were still made from time to time, but gallantry was powerless 
in the face of the overwhelming advantage of position...Rarely have troops gone through so severe an 
ordeal.”111  At the Battle of Paardeberg, Horace Smith-Dorrien witnessed a succession of attacks 
across open ground against the entrenched Boer laager come to grief, recalling one attempt in the 
following terms:  “It was a gallant charge, gallantly led, but the fact that not one of them got within 
300 yards of the enemy is sufficient proof of its futility.”112  These early defeats, particularly in Natal, 
showed clearly that frontal attacks against well positioned Boers could only succeed with strong 
artillery support, wide infantry extensions and skilful tactics. 
Upon assuming command in South Africa, Lord Roberts adopted a different strategy for dealing with 
the Boers.  Whereas Buller and Methuen had been forced by geography, limited supply lines and lack 
of mobile troops into making frontal assaults, Roberts possessed far larger numbers of cavalry and 
aimed to manoeuvre the Boers from strong positions rather than batter his way through them.  Frontal 
attacks were made by widely extended lines and aimed to hold the Boers in place, while flanking 
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forces turned them out of their positions.113  The strategy repeatedly forced the Boers back, allowing 
Roberts to relieve Kimberley and seize his objectives in the form of the cities of Bloemfontein and 
Pretoria, without suffering the kind of defeats suffered by Buller in Natal.  However, with the 
exception of the capture of Cronje’s laager at Paardeberg, it also allowed the Boer forces to escape 
from battle relatively intact, allowing many of them to continue the fight in the guerrilla war.  
Continental writers, particularly in Germany, were contemptuous of this approach.  The German 
official history of the war complained that “...Lord Roberts’s system throughout the whole campaign 
was to manoeuvre rather than to fight....” and lambasted the British for being unwilling to risk heavy 
casualties.114  Lord Roberts responded, arguing “I manoeuvred in order to be able to fight the Boers on 
my own and not their terms”, noting that the Boers would have been delighted to face British attacks 
in prepared positions as at Magersfontein.115  Although continental critics remained unimpressed, it 
was respect for firepower that came to encapsulate British offensive thinking in the years immediately 
following the Boer War.  The experience of fighting in South Africa caused G.F.R Henderson to 
revise his earlier opinions on modern weapons, writing in 1900 “A direct (or frontal) attack against 
good troops well posted, always a desperate undertaking, has now become suicidal.”116  Ian Hamilton 
echoed similar sentiments, feeling that old fashioned, European style attacks relying on mass were 
likely to fail, and instead advocating the use of flanking movements and enfilade fire in the assault.117  
Some officers such as C.E. Callwell and B.F.S Baden-Powell118 went further, feeling that weapon 
quality now placed a distinct advantage in the hands of the defender, although such opinions were at 
the fringes of the argument.119  Although there was an acknowledgement within the army that 
offensives would be harder under modern conditions, it was felt that while offering a passive defence 
might win local victories, it would ultimately lead to defeat through failure to capitalise upon them.  
The Boers were cited as an example of this tendency.  While they had won a string of tactical 
victories against the British in the early part of the war, their failure to follow up their success was 
seen by some as being fatal.120  As one British officer summed up, to remain purely on the defensive 
was “...to suffer war, not make it.”121 
Therefore the ethos that emerged from the Boer War continued to place emphasis on the offensive as 
the path to ultimate victory, but the methods to be employed were influenced by the bitter experiences 
fighting in the Tulega and Modder River campaigns.  Rejecting simple brute force, official manuals 
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suggested manoeuvre in the style of Lord Roberts combined with the close artillery co-operation 
pioneered in Natal.  Infantry Training 1902 was sceptical about the use of frontal attacks across open 
ground, suggesting turning movements would yield better results for far fewer casualties.122  Well 
trained, skilful troops and extended formations were to reduce casualties during the advance, with 
great attention paid to the use of cover.  As one officer commented in 1903, “If the old attack 
formations resembled the advancing tide, the new one will recall a number of parallel or converging 
streams rushing forward, as the surface of the ground permits.”123  If the enemy was particularly well 
entrenched and had secure flanks, direct assault was rejected and instead an approach by sap was 
advocated, such as that employed at Paardeberg.124  Indeed, the use of saps to close with an 
entrenched enemy formed the main focus for the 1906 manoeuvres in India.125  
However, a number of factors meant that the new found respect for firepower gradually became 
eroded as the Edwardian era continued.  The popularity of aggressive tactics remained high 
throughout European armies during this period, creating a virtual ‘cult of the offensive’ in the French 
army and becoming a major influence for both the British and the Germans.  This development has 
been widely analysed by historians including John Ellis, Michael Howard, M.A. Ramsay and Tim 
Travers.126  While points of difference remain, a general consensus exists on the idea that military 
leaders saw the offensive as granting moral superiority, allowing courageous men to overcome well 
armed but passive opponents through strength of will.  Britain never became as devoted to the spirit of 
the offensive as the French, but a variety of influences in the years prior to the First World War meant 
that the British Army gradually began to lose sight of the lessons learned in South Africa. 
One of the key influences throughout this period related to the new spirit of tactical initiative.  Since 
the American Civil War, there had been concerns that once troops were given the chance to seek their 
own cover, getting them to move again would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.   These issues 
were of particular concern to the British Army as it moved away from close control towards extended 
formations and local initiative.  Doubts remained about the ability of the British lower classes to live 
up to the new tactical standards expected of the post-Boer War army, particularly how to maintain 
morale and ensure an advance when officers were not close at hand.  While thorough training, strong 
low level leadership and espirit de corps were seen as important factors, it was also considered 
essential that the men should be highly motivated.127  High levels of individual motivation were seen 
as a form of discipline in themselves.  Douglas Haig extolled the virtues of “...courage, energy, 
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determination, endurance, perseverance, and unselfishness”, noting that “Without these qualities, 
which mean discipline, no combination will be possible.”128  To this end, the belief in the offensive 
and the exultation of moral strength became complementary ideas.  To physically press a frontal 
attack in the face of modern weapons required great courage, while the determination to assume the 
offensive was held to give the attacker a distinct moral advantage over the enemy.129   
Nevertheless, the bitter experience of the Boer War had shown that even courageous and highly 
disciplined regular soldiers could be stopped by the fire of magazine rifles.  Such a view may have 
continued to pre-dominate in the British Army had it not been for the events of the Russo-Japanese 
War.  During the conflict in Manchuria, Russian forces had assumed a generally defensive posture, 
fighting from behind earthworks and attempting to weather a string of Japanese attacks.  The fire 
swept zone in this conflict was even deadlier than it had been in the Boer War, with machine guns and 
large amounts of artillery adding substantial strength to the defender.  The Japanese were typically 
forced to approach via sap, moving under cover of darkness to within assault range of the Russian 
trenches.130  Even with such preparations, attacks against Russian positions tended to be bloody 
affairs, but despite suffering heavy casualties, they were often successful.  Jack Snyder has argued 
that this led European observers to create a two level analysis.  On one hand, the tactical lessons 
emphasised the increase of firepower, the requirement for invisibility and the high cost of assaults, but 
at a strategic level it was seen to demonstrate the power of the offensive to overcome the passive 
defensive, even if the defenders held a numerical advantage and the benefit of field works.131  Indeed, 
the tactical observations seemed to confirm many of the lessons of the Boer War regarding firepower, 
entrenchment and concealment.  British observers were generally cautious about the success of 
Japanese assault tactics.  One officer concluded that the tactics of both armies “...consisted chiefly of 
hard pounding, and the Japanese pounded hardest.”132  Ian Hamilton admired the speed of Japanese 
infantry rushes, but attributed much of their success to the abysmal marksmanship of the Russians, 
feeling that against well trained British troops “... I do not see how the Japanese could hope to sprint 
across the last 300 yards...”133  Officers from the Royal Engineers noted that even successful attacks 
had taken several days of hard fighting, with particularly heavy losses in the initial assault waves.134  
One Royal Engineer commented that future attack tactics “...will involve an appalling amount of 
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spade work” but felt that this was the only way it would be possible to close with an entrenched 
enemy without prohibitive casualties.135 
Yet, while the majority of tactical observations stressed the difficulty of assault and the heavy 
casualties it would entail, the fact the Japanese had won the war with offensive strategy was seen as 
the ultimate vindication of the power of the attack.136  Tactical observers had placed importance on the 
use of entrenchment and close artillery support on the offensive, but these key factors were sometimes 
neglected by analysts, who often saw them as being of secondary importance to willpower and 
morale.137  For example, the Japanese suffered 48,000 casualties in assaults against the defences of 
Port Arthur, compared to 28,200 casualties suffered by the Russians, but the eventual success of the 
Japanese attacks was held up as proof that morale could overcome the material advantages enjoyed by 
the defenders of the Russian fortifications.138   Even the commander of the Russian forces in 
Manchura, General Kuropatkin, supported this idea, writing after the war “...our moral strength was 
less than that of the Japanese...This lack of martial spirit, of moral exaltation, and of heroic impulse, 
affected particularly our stubbornness in battle.  In many cases we did not have sufficient resolution to 
conquer such antagonists as the Japanese.”139  The Japanese warrior spirit of Bushido was admired by 
European observers, and their willingness to take severe casualties in frontal attacks was contrasted 
favourably against the British preference for flanking moves in the Boer War.  German critic Major 
Balck felt that the Japanese had succeeded precisely because they had rejected British tactics, and had 
instead “...pushed doggedly forward like angry bull dogs, never halting, until, bleeding and exhausted, 
they had fastened themselves on the enemy and won the victory.”140  In the aftermath of the Russo-
Japanese War such views became popular throughout Europe, particularly in France.  While the Boer 
War had seemed to demonstrate the power of modern weapons, the lessons of that conflict had never 
been widely accepted in France or Germany, and historians have suggested that this resurgence in the 
belief that willpower and morale could overcome fixed defences represented the existence of pre-
conceived ideas that had not been modified by the South Africa war.141   
The situation was somewhat different for the British Army, which had the benefit of having practical 
experience in the Boer War.  Although assessments drawn from the Russo-Japanese War regarding 
the offensive were more cautious than those that developed on the continent, they had the unfortunate 
                                                     
135
 Captain J.E.E. Craster, “The Attack of Entrenched Positions”, in Royal Engineer’s Journal 3, 1906, p.342 
136
 Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, p.78 
137
 Yigal Sheffy, “A Model Not to Follow: The European Armies and the Lessons of the War” in Kowner, 
Rotem (ed.) The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War (London, Routledge, 2007) pp.263-264 
138
 Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, p.80 
139
 Kuropatkin, G.N., The Russian Army and the Japanese War (London, John Murray, 1909), Vol.2, p.80 
140
 Quoted in Captain Ashley Barret, “Lessons to be learned by Regimental Officers from the Russo-Japanese 
War”, in The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 51(1), 1907, p.813 
141
 Rotem Kowner, “Between a Colonial Clash and World War Zero: The impact of the Russo-Japanese War in 
a global perspective” in Kowner, Rotem (ed.) The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War (London, Routledge, 
2007) pp.12-13 
54 
 
effect of stifling the trend of thinking that had emerged from the South African conflict.142   As in the 
French army, willpower was emphasised over firepower by some officers.  Even Ian Hamilton argued 
that “Blindness to moral forces and worship of material forces inevitably lead in war to 
destruction.”143  Field Service Regulations echoed similar sentiments, stating “Success in war depends 
more on moral than physical qualities.  Skill cannot compensate for want of courage, energy and 
determination....” although it also sounded a note of caution for those who might take such ideas to 
extremes, adding “...but even high moral qualities may not avail without careful preparation and 
skilful direction.”144  The belief that sheer courage could force men across fire swept ground 
encouraged some officers to express greater confidence about the success of the attack in the face of 
modern weapons, rejecting the pessimistic appraisal that had emerged in 1902.  These related factors 
contributed to a subtle change of wording from Combined Training 1905 to Field Service Regulations 
1909, placing new emphasis on the final ‘assault’ rather than the development of superior 
firepower.145  Similarly, the emphasis on flank attacks that had featured in earlier manuals was 
changed to finding the weak spot in the enemy line and delivering a decisive assault at that point.146  
The rejection of the South African experience seemed to reach a peak at a 1910 General Staff 
conference, when Brigadier General Lancelot Kiggell offered an opinion that dismissed the Boer War 
at a stroke: 
After the Boer War the general opinion was that the result of the battle would for the future 
depend on fire-arms alone, and that the sword and the bayonet were played out.  But this idea 
is erroneous and was proved so in the late war in Manchuria.  Everyone admits that.  Victory 
is won actually by the bayonet, or by fear of it, which amounts to the same thing so far as the 
conduct of the attack is concerned. 
This fact was proved beyond doubt in the late war.  I think the whole question rather hangs on 
that; and if we accept the view that victory is actually won by the bayonet, it settles the 
point.147 
Martin Samuels has used such opinions expressed by high ranking officers to offer a condemnation of 
the British Army methods as a whole.148  However, M.A. Ramsay has argued that the thinking did not 
permeate much below brigade level, where a belief in ‘fire and movement’ and a respect for modern 
firepower remained central tactical principles.149  As previously discussed, the General Staff had only 
limited influence at lower levels, while the failure to devise an overall doctrine meant that individual 
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commanders still had great latitude with regard to their tactics.  This meant that the ‘cult of the 
offensive’ that gripped the French never emerged in the British Army, although individual officers 
could sometimes favour such ideas.150  Furthermore, there were contrary voices within the army who 
criticised the dedication to aggressive tactics.  Major General May bemoaned that determination to 
attack “...threatens to become a stereotypical phrase...This is so everywhere, although there are not 
wanting signs that the vogue is less unquestioned than it was...”151  The belief that courage alone carry 
men forward also received criticism.  Major Rooke discussed the issue in early 1914, echoing 
sentiments expressed by Maurice’s earlier appraisal of Omdurman: 
It is clear that however much the attacking troops may be ‘trained above the fear of death’, 
this itself will not prevent their being struck by the enemy’s bullets, and may not improbably 
even increase their losses since such troops are likely to expose themselves unduly.152 
Attitudes towards the offensive were malleable throughout the period.  In the aftermath of the Boer 
War, there was pessimism and caution regarding attacks against modern weapons, but the attitude was 
reversed following the apparent success of the Japanese in Manchuria.  However, from 1912 onwards, 
Tim Travers has argued that the trend once again began to turn against dedication to moral forces and 
the offensive at all costs, even suggesting that had the First World War broken out in 1916, the British 
Army would have been in possession of highly “realistic and imaginative” tactics.153  Equally, it 
remains questionable to what extent such ideas became popular at the tactical level of the British 
Army, with M.A. Ramsay arguing that they had limited influence in brigade and battalion work.154   
Nevertheless, views from the continent, doubts about the courage of lower class troops and the 
misinterpretation of examples from the Manchurian war had the negative effect of causing the British 
Army to forget some of its own South African experiences.  The cautious assessment that had 
emerged in 1902 was gradually eroded, downgrading the importance of firepower and movement and 
replacing it with a belief in moral supremacy and willpower.  While the British were more cautious 
about the implications of firepower than some of the continental nations, the belief that willpower 
could triumph over modern weapons was a dangerous line of thought.  In expressing belief in the 
bayonet and moral forces, officers such as Lancelot Kiggell were in danger of forgetting the 
experiences of the Boer War, where courageous and hard drilled regulars had often been unable to 
make any progress against untrained farmers armed with modern rifles.  Fortunately for the British 
Army, such views did not go unchallenged and did not develop into a firm doctrine as they did for the 
French.  However, their growing popularity following the Russo-Japanese War represented a clear 
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regression in thought from the cautious but intelligent assessment of the offensive that had developed 
in the aftermath of the Boer War.  While the regular B.E.F. fought on the defensive for virtually all its 
major battles, in the later years of the First World War the failure to ally commensurate tactical and 
operational skill to courage in the offensive often lead to tragic consequences.  The root of such 
thinking lay in the pre-1914 era, and thus the rejection of the lessons regarding firepower and 
willpower that emerged from the Boer War must count as a serious error for the British Army. 
Conclusion   
The British Army of 1914 was unique in many ways.  Despite the growing threat from Germany in 
the latter part of the Edwardian era, the army remained a colonial police force that faced potential 
deployment to locations all across the empire.  Confronted with this challenging role, the British 
Army developed along quite different lines to the mass armies of the continent, emphasising skill in 
low level tactics and encouraging diversity of method amongst its divisions but lacking an operational 
doctrine.  Training manuals for individual service arms and the army as a whole followed this trend, 
emphasising adaptability and flexibility rather than providing a written doctrine.  In organisational 
and operational terms, the army remained wedded to ‘small war’ principles, but its professionalism, 
training and tactical flexibility meant that it performed well in 1914, despite being heavily 
outnumbered.   
The Boer War had played a key role in shaping the army’s development along these lines.  In terms of 
operational lessons, the Boer War provided limited guidance. The conventional stage of the war had 
lasted less than a year, turning into a mobile guerrilla conflict following the fall of the Boer capitals.   
The hard lessons learned by the British in the early battles showed the need for skill and initiative at 
all levels, as well as demonstrating the terrific difficulties associated with frontal attacks against 
modern firepower.  These ideas came to form the linchpin of the British Army’s tactical development 
in the years immediately following the war, encouraging a new dedication to training that allowed the 
army to develop many of the new tactical ideas discussed in earlier chapters.  By 1914, this change in 
training ethos had produced elite infantrymen, capable of an unprecedented rate of aimed fire, skilful 
in the use of the ground and capable of operating in extended formations.  However, while the British 
Army had many strengths in 1914, it also had weaknesses.  In remaining a colonial army that 
emphasised flexibility, it ensured it could perform a wide number of roles, including successfully 
engaging the German army in 1914.  However, the focus on flexibility combined with a lack of 
operational doctrine to create considerable diversity of method amongst the various divisions.  The 
tactical skill and professionalism of the B.E.F. masked many of these problems, but they became 
particularly acute once the old regular army had been replaced by fresh volunteer divisions.  Without 
the benefits of a long period of training and lacking a formal written doctrine from which to draw, 
these new formations were forced to learn from scratch.  This meant that the British Army repeated 
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tactical mistakes that had been identified by the Elgin Commission a decade earlier, and was forced to 
endure a long, painful process of in-theatre learning that took several years before it finally bore fruit.   
The British Army of the First World War has sometimes been criticised in comparison with the 
German army, most notably by Martin Samuels, who contrasts German operational brilliance against 
British incompetence.155  However, in 1914, the British and German armies represented curious 
opposites.  As previously discussed, the colonial duties of the British Army emphasised small scale 
tactical principles and lacked formal operational doctrine.  Conversely, the German army had virtually 
no colonial duties and had long anticipated a vast European conflict against France and Russia.  The 
focus on this coming continental struggle encouraged the German army to develop detailed 
operational plans for the defeat of her future enemies.  However, this focus on operational level 
planning had become something of a fetish in the latter part of the Edwardian period, virtually to the 
exclusion of all other considerations.156  Bruce Gudmundsson has argued that by 1914, this narrow 
focus on operations meant that tactics had been relegated to a mere “subsidiary art” in the German 
army, while Steven D. Jackman has highlighted the fact that old fashioned thinking and conservative 
attitudes predominated at a tactical level, encouraging close control, mass formations and rigid drill.157  
The tactical backwardness of the German army in this respect became apparent in the early battles of 
1914, when British soldiers expressed their amazement at the use of close order columns on a modern 
battlefield.158  The striking contrast in infantry tactics adopted by the two armies is illustrative of the 
fact that the British had learned crucial lessons in South Africa, translating them into useful tactical 
principles that served them well in 1914.   
The British Army also compared favourably to the French.  Although it possessed a colonial branch, 
some sections of the French army had blamed defeat in 1870 on the influence of colonial officers, 
who had developed great reputations in imperial wars but had failed in combat against the Germans.  
The simmering tensions between colonial soldiers and the metropolitan army remained unresolved in 
the pre-First World War period, preventing any interchange of tactical ideas.  The army was also 
hampered by political pressure from ever changing governments, who disliked the authoritarian aspect 
of the military and preferred the concept of patriotism replacing discipline.159  This contributed to a 
rejection of doctrine by the French army who, expressing similar sentiments to the British, feared it 
would stifle initiative.160  Unfortunately, while the British Army was able to develop effective low 
                                                     
155
 Samuels, Command or Control?, pp.124-158, 230-270 
156
 Gary P. Cox, “Of Aphorisms, Lessons, and Paradigms: Comparing the British and German Official Histories 
of the Russo-Japanese War” in The Journal of Military History, 56(2) 1992, pp.397-398 
157
 Gudmundsson, Bruce, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army 1914-1918 (New York, Praeger, 
1989) p.13;   Steven D. Jackman, “Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and ‘Old Prussian Drill’ in German 
Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871-1914” in The Journal of Military History, 68(1) 2004, pp.103-104 
158
 Terraine, Mons, p.83 
159
 March to Marne, pp.214-215 
160
 Ibid, p.215 
58 
 
level tactics from the Boer War experience, the French had no comparable examples to provide a base 
for tactical development.  Lacking guidance from above or experience from below, the French army 
reacted by seizing upon the “cult of the offensive”, a fashionable view that emerged at lower levels 
and spread throughout the rest of the army.161  Inspired by this idea, French training and tactics 
revolved almost entirely around the offensive a outrace, rejecting doctrine and tactics that took into 
account modern firepower.  British observers in 1912 noted with disquiet, “...the French infantry 
displayed marked inferiority to our own in minor tactics.  There was not... anything like the same 
efficiency in fire direction and control.  The infantry, like the cavalry, did not seem to realize what 
modern rifle fire was like.”162  The belief in the offensive a outrace bore bitter fruit in the opening 
months of the First World War, when the French army suffered over 300,000 casualties in reckless 
attacks against German defences.  While certain sections of the British Army had placed similar faith 
in courage and the bayonet in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, such ideas did not become 
universal.  Although they did lead to a modification of the cautious but realistic attack tactics of South 
Africa, this reform was never taken to the  extremes that prevailed in the French army, and at a 
tactical level there remained a belief in ‘fire and movement’ and a respect for modern weapons. 
However, while the B.E.F. was tactically superior in many ways to both the French and German 
armies, its colonial roots created operational weaknesses that were to become a problem in the 1914.  
The British Army had no experience in fighting such a large scale conflict, and lack of operational 
experience caused errors and a loss of command control during the critical month of August 1914.  
Indeed, while the stand at the Battle of Le Cateau proved to be of immense importance in holding off 
German pursuit, it has been suggested that the fact that Smith-Dorrien erroneously assumed his right 
flank was supported by Haig’s I Corps presented the Germans with a great opportunity to encircle and 
destroy virtually half of the B.E.F.163   
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 Chapter Two 
Infantry 
 
The experience of the Boer War shook the British Army to its very core.  Despite going to war on the 
back of tremendous public expectation and overall confidence, the army suffered shocking defeats in 
the early battles of the campaign.  As previously noted, the British Army lacked any real doctrine and 
instead went to war with a considerable variance of tactical ideas, many of which were found to be 
outdated and wanting.   The British infantry had swept most colonial opposition from fields across the 
globe, but fighting an opponent armed with smokeless magazine rifles and possessing great mobility, 
the British found themselves pinned down by accurate rifle fire and unable to make significant 
progress.   Over the course of the war, the infantry was forced to abandon a number of pre-conceived 
tactical ideas and adapt new, unanticipated solutions to ensure victory.  By the close of hostilities, 
although the British had devised a system that was successful in finally defeating the Boers, it was a 
widely held opinion that, in the words of Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem, the country and army had 
been taught “no end of a lesson”. 1 
Of the three main combat arms of the British Army, it was the infantry who learned the most from the 
experience of war on the veldt.  While the cavalry were initially small in numbers and later hampered 
by their tremendous problems with horse supply, and the artillery saw its importance and 
opportunities for action decline after the fall of Bloemfontein and Pretoria, infantry played a part in 
the opening battles of 1899 and remained in the front line until the end of the war in 1902.  By the 
close of this period of hard fighting, a number of serious weaknesses in pre-war tactics and training 
had been starkly revealed, and a need for reform in both respects to meet the challenges posed by 
modern firepower, was readily apparent.   
The issue was not if reform was needed, but of what kind and how it was to be implemented.  
Conditions in South Africa had been unusual, with the flat, barren terrain and clear atmosphere 
combining to make rifle fire highly effective, particularly at long range.  This made extrapolation of 
lessons difficult, and as revealed by the findings of the Elgin Commission, the army lacked a 
unanimous opinion on what tactical direction to take in the years following the war in South Africa.  
Ian Beckett has argued that the fact that the lessons of the Boer War were neither self-evident nor 
unambiguous meant its overall impact on tactical reform was somewhat diffuse and limited.2   
Additionally, persistent structural problems such as the lack of men available for training in the 
average company and the drain of drafts for India placed certain limits on the extent to which tactics 
                                                     
1
 From the poem “The Lesson” by Rudyard Kipling, first published in The Times in July 1901. 
2
 Ian Beckett, “The South African War and the Late Victorian Army” in Davis & Grey (eds.) The Boer War: 
Army, Nation and Empire (Canberra, Army History Unit, 2000)  p.32 
60 
 
could be improved.  Since the Cardwell reforms in 1871, British regiments had consisted of two 
linked battalions, one of which would be stationed in Britain and provide a source of recruitment, 
while the other would be sent to India to serve as part of the garrison.  In the 19th century, ensuring the 
security of India was seen as the primary role for the British Army and the home battalions were 
expected to provide regular trained drafts for their Indian partners.  This meant the forces based in 
Britain were constantly short of men, being forced to send their best soldiers abroad each year.  The 
lack of men and the negative impact it had upon training was cited as a serious issue by several 
witnesses who addressed the Elgin Commission.3   
However, in spite of these limitations, it is generally argued amongst historians that by 1914 the 
infantry of the British Army had reached a peak of excellence.  Edward Spiers noted that the infantry 
had reached a standard “…never before achieved in the British Army and unequalled among the 
contemporary armies in Europe”.4  Clearly, in achieving this level of skill, the army had undergone a 
considerable improvement from the Victorian force that had been embarrassed by the Boers. 
It is the aim of this chapter to demonstrate that the seeds of the vital tactical reforms that allowed the 
British Expeditionary Force of 1914 to be such an elite army were laid during and immediately after 
the Boer War.   Although acknowledging that the experience of combat in South Africa was 
somewhat ambiguous and open to debate, this chapter will argue that key lessons of modern warfare 
painfully learned on the veldt were absorbed into the tactical framework of the infantry.   
Martin Van Creveld has suggested that the years 1830 – 1945 marked an epoch of war he terms “The 
Age of Systems”.  He argues that the growth of battlefield firepower in this era produced three key 
tactical reactions in armies worldwide, in particular in the infantry branch.  In an attempt to increase 
the survivability of infantry in the face of modern weapons, there was a much greater appreciation of 
cover, including the use field entrenchments and earthworks to protect troops from incoming fire.  
Allied to this was a recourse to camouflage and concealment as opposed to colourful uniforms and 
bright equipment, making the individual infantryman a less distinct target than in previous eras.  Units 
also began to adopt dispersed formations, moving away from shoulder to shoulder formations and 
vastly reducing the number of soldiers per square metre of front line.5  While armies around the world 
were gradually moving towards these tactical concepts in the years prior to the First World War, the 
experience of conflict in South Africa gave the British Army an important head start. All the tactical 
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precepts suggested by Van Creveld were identified as important to victory during the Boer War and 
would provide the British Army with a vital framework upon which to build the most elite infantry in 
Europe in the period prior to 1914. 
The process of reform was not an easy one for the army and the South African experience was not the 
only source of tactical thought.  Contrary ideas vied for attention in the 1902 – 1914 period, and some 
officers came to regard the peculiar conditions of South Africa as a poor guide for future conflict.  
Ideas that gained precedence were not always progressive or positive.  Influences from the continental 
armies of France and Germany fed into the existing tactical debates and while their influence was felt 
less in the infantry than in the artillery and cavalry, they remained a factor in British thought 
throughout the period.  As well as the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05 caught the eye of 
militaries worldwide and in some cases its perceived lessons ran contrary to those of the Boer War.  
Furthermore, it has also been suggested by Tim Travers and Martin Samuels that preconceived ideas 
and traditional attitudes amongst some of the British Army’s leadership placed a brake on reforms and 
in some cases introduced retrograde tactical changes.6  Although the Boer War started the process of 
tactical reform, these other factors played a role in shaping the final tactical synthesis that emerged in 
1914, and their influence will be discussed and analysed during the course of the chapter. 
This chapter will therefore analyse the tactical development of the infantry of the British Army during 
the period 1902 – 1914.  Taking the experience of the Boer War as a base, it will argue that the 
infantry learned three crucial lessons in the 1899 – 1902 period which allowed it to develop into the 
elite arm that fought so well in the early months of World War 1.  These were greater formation 
extension to cross the fireswept zone, a need for improvement in marksmanship and fire tactics, and 
finally greater interest in the use of the earthworks and entrenchments.  These subheadings will 
provide a framework for analysis, demonstrating that although the tactical lessons of the South 
African war were neither entirely self evident nor unchallenged, they gave the British infantry an 
important head start in the tactics that were to become necessary on 20th century battlefields. 
 
Extension and Crossing the Fire Swept Zone 
The Boer War was a conflict that contained several unpleasant tactical surprises for the British Army, 
but arguably the increased deadliness of small arms fire should not have been one of them.  From the 
American Civil War 1861 – 65 onwards, there had been a steady increase in the effectiveness of 
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infantry firearms, with the Wars of German Unification and the Russo-Turkish War 1877-78 
providing further evidence of the power of modern rifles.  Infantry firepower had also revealed its 
considerable potential in the earlier campaigns in South Africa against the Boers.  In particular, the 
famous Boer victory at Majuba Hill in 1881 had shown the effectiveness of good weapons even in the 
hands of untrained militia, and should have shown that the Boers as a military force deserved to be 
taken seriously.  Prior to the debacle at Majuba the British had fought a number of small campaigns 
against the Boers, and although these had generally ended in victory, the British participants had been 
quick to note the unusual characteristics and skills of the average Boer.  For example, in 1848 a small 
force led by Sir Harry Smith, a Peninsula War and Northwest Frontier veteran, had put down a Boer 
rebellion at Boomplaats.  Although victorious, Smith described the skirmish as one of the most severe 
he had witnessed, and declared of the Boer shooting “a more rapid, fierce and well-directed fire I have 
never seen maintained.”7  However, as has already been discussed, little was learned from these 
experiences outside of individual units. 
Given that the Boers had already demonstrated the effectiveness of their firepower and ability to use 
skirmish tactics in earlier wars against the British, there was no reason to underestimate them in 1899.  
Indeed, in some ways they were more formidable than ever before.  A large-scale government-
spending programme had rearmed the Boers from 1895 onwards with the latest magazine loading 
Mauser rifles.  These were excellent weapons, capable of long-range rapid fire on flat trajectories.  
Crucially, they also used smokeless powder that not only increased accuracy, but also meant that 
firing the weapon did not give away the marksman’s position.  The potential effect of smokeless 
powder in the hands of an opposing force had been recognised as posing new difficulties as early as 
1892, but the failure to disseminate new tactical ideas within the Victorian army meant that these 
warnings had had little impact on the British Army as a whole by the time of the Boer War.8 
In fact, despite previous evidence of the formidable military capabilities of the Boers, initial 
assessments of them were often contemptuous.  On the eve of the war, pro-imperialists in the 
Economist and the Spectator dismissed the Boers as “stock breeders of the lowest type”, no more than 
“a rough mob of good marksmen”.9  The British Intelligence Department largely agreed in its secret 
report, “Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South Africa”.  It was felt that the decline of game 
on the veldt had reduced their once famous accuracy with the rifle and overall they were assessed to 
be inferior to the men who had achieved victory at Majuba in 1881.  The report expected the Boers to 
deploy little more than a raiding strategy against British possessions in South Africa, and offered the 
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opinion “It appears certain that, after [one] serious defeat, they would be too deficient in discipline 
and organization to make any further real stand.”10   
These early views on the weakness of the Boers were quickly dispelled by the opening engagements 
and especially the defeats of “Black Week” in December 1899.   While opinion on individual Boer 
marksmanship in this period varied considerably, from those who felt it was as good as before, to 
others who felt it was “shockingly bad”, it was almost universally agreed that modern rifle firepower 
was now capable of causing casualties at extremely long ranges, while at closer distances the sheer 
volume of fire was as significant as its accuracy, and made further advance exceptionally difficult.11   
In addition, smokeless ammunition made reconnaissance work more challenging than ever before and 
created an apparently ‘empty’ battlefield that placed a considerable psychological strain upon soldiers.  
For the infantry, the most pressing tactical problem was how best to cross this barren, fire swept zone 
to get into assaulting range of an entrenched and largely invisible enemy.  An anonymous officer 
offered a description of the changed nature of war: 
War is not what it was when armies manoeuvred in sight of each other, and when 600 yards 
was the limit of artillery fire.  I smile when I think of the face of a man who is bungling an 
attempt to bite off the end of a cartridge, with one eye cocked all the time on the gentleman 
advancing at the double to avenge the death of “poor Bill”.  That was old-time fighting, and 
some sport about it too.  Now Bill is killed at 2400 yards, and Bill’s pal hasn’t an idea where 
the shot was fired.  That is modern warfare…12 
To officers and men who had cut their teeth in colonial actions against poorly armed tribal foes, the 
new conditions of warfare were strikingly different.  Colonel A.W. Thorneycroft, a veteran of various 
small colonial engagements throughout Africa, noted at first his men were apt to disregard the 
potential effects of Boer fire as past combat experience had shown them that the “…Kaffir fires over 
your head as a rule.”13   In stark contrast, an officer who fought at the first engagement of the war, the 
Battle of Talana Hill 20th October 1899, left an account of the difficulty of facing modern rifle fire: 
I don’t suppose I am ever likely to go through a more awful fire than broke out from the Boer 
line as we dashed forward.  The ground in front of me was literally rising in dust from the 
bullets, and the din echoing between the hill and the wood below and among the rocks from 
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the incessant fire of the Mausers seemed to blend with every other sound into a long drawn-
out hideous roar…. the whole ground we had already covered was strewn with bodies…14 
In the face of such intense defensive fire, attacks were problematical.  Although study of the recent 
European wars had hinted at the difficulties inherent in attacking a determined, well-armed defender, 
this was the first practical experience the British had had facing modern firepower on a large scale, 
and it was soon found that the kind of close order assault tactics that had been so valuable in the 
Sudan and other colonial wars were redundant in South Africa.  For example, at the Battle of Enslin15 
25th November 1899, Lord Methuen described the attack of the Naval Brigade in his despatches.  
“The fire here was very heavy, and the Naval Brigade suffered severely, keeping in too close 
formation… [not] taking advantage of cover.”16  Although the attack achieved its objective, the 
brigade lost virtually all its petty officers and NCOs killed or wounded, and suffered an overall 
casualty rate of 44%.17  Even after this example, some officers still persisted with the use of close 
order.  At the Battle of Colenso 15th December 1899, Major General Hart, a believer in keeping his 
men “well in hand” advanced his 5th Brigade towards the Boer positions in quarter columns, even 
going so far as to countermand an order from the commanding officer of one of his battalions to open 
into extended order.18  The results were predictable, and not even the poetic words of Arthur Conan 
Doyle could disguise the fact this was a serious tactical blunder as he described the attack of the 
brigade in the following terms: “the four regiments clubbed into one, with all military organisation 
rapidly disappearing, and nothing left but their gallant spirit….”19 An additional limiting factor for the 
British Army was that in the early stages of the war it lacked enough cavalry to be able to outflank 
Boer positions, and the infantry were thus forced into making relatively narrow frontal attacks.  Even 
at best these attacks simply forced the Boers back to another defensive position with relatively few 
casualties compared to those suffered by the British.  Lord Methuen’s campaign to relieve the siege of 
Kimberly typified this kind of fighting, being described by a contemporary as “...an honest, 
straightforward British march up to a row of waiting rifles.”20   
While shoulder-to-shoulder formations had worked against colonial opposition that lacked modern 
weapons, existing British tactical thinking was not entirely ignorant of the threat of improved 
firepower, and close order formations were not formally recommended for use against well-armed 
opposition.  The 1896 edition of Infantry Drill had suggested extending from close order column 
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formations at a range of approximately half a mile from the enemy, although naturally this round 
figure was open to interpretation and was not always followed.21  Additionally, the lack of doctrine in 
the British army and profusion of tactical ideas based on individual regimental experience meant 
tactics and formations adopted for the attack varied considerably.  For example, a junior officer 
stationed with a British regiment in India noted that his battalion assault training in July 1899 
consisted of the attacking line being separated into “tight little bunches of about twenty men each” 
advancing in a line to within 200 yards of the enemy position.  While this was extension of a sort, it 
was hopelessly inadequate, the officer recording in his diary “I could not believe it was serious 
practice for modern warfare.  We should all have been wiped out.”22   
Nevertheless, the ideas of extension in Infantry Drill 1896 were a move in the right tactical direction 
and those officers who had prior experience of such formations, usually gained in fighting on the 
North West Frontier, were able to make use of them against the Boers.  For example, while Major-
General Sir Penn-Symons has been justifiably criticised for his strategic errors in the early stages of 
the war, it is often overlooked that his infantry initially advanced against the Boers at Talana Hill 
extended to 10 paces per man.23  The most prominent proponent of extension in the early stages of the 
Boer War was Ian Hamilton, a veteran of Majuba and the Tirah campaign, who was known for his 
innovative ideas on the nature of future warfare.24  While stationed at Ladysmith prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities he had begun training his brigade in some of the tactical ideas he had picked up on the 
North West Frontier.  When called upon to commit his troops at the Battle of Elandslaagte 21st 
October 1899, the three lead companies of the 1st Devons attacked with a very large frontal extension 
of somewhere between 700 and 1000 yards, with 450 yards between each successive line.  The troops 
advanced forward by rushes, one section firing to cover the advance of the next.25  These infantry 
tactics and formations at Elandslaagte helped contribute to a notable local victory for the British at 
relatively low cost and hinted at the future direction of tactical reform. 
After the initial disasters of “Black Week” and the appointment of Lord Roberts to overall command 
of British forces in South Africa, formal tactical guidance regarding extension was rapidly introduced.  
One of Roberts’s first actions was to issue a memo entitled ‘Notes for Guidance’ which set out a 
number of tactical tips for the three major service arms based on the experience of the opening months 
of the war.  These notes confirmed many of Hamilton’s earlier tactical ideas, suggesting abandonment 
of close order formations between 1500 and 1800 yards from the enemy, being prepared to have an 
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extension of between 6 and 8 paces per man and making maximum use of cover.26  In practice, 
extension and dispersion of formations went well beyond these guidelines on a number of occasions.  
For example, at the Battle of Diamond Hill 11 – 12th June 1900, British infantry was noted as having 
an extension radius of 30 yards per man, and in many actions between 10 and 20 yards was not 
uncommon.27 In nature, these tactical precepts offered little that was entirely new, and their value 
against well-armed enemies had been hinted at by writing in the aftermath of the Tirah campaign.28  
However, whereas the earlier campaign had been fought in a wild corner of India purely by forces 
stationed in the subcontinent, the Boer War was fought by virtually the entire regular army, plus 
numerous colonial and volunteer formations.  In the past, the influence of colonial wars had been 
limited outside of the immediate participants, but the scale of the war in South Africa ensured that the 
impact of its tactical lessons was far wider than any previous imperial war. 
The primary advantage of extension was that it provided a small, individual target that was less 
vulnerable to firepower than a mass of men in a tight formation, but it also had other benefits.  The 
first and arguably most important of these secondary benefits was that it allowed men to use their 
discretion and take advantage of cover during the advance.  Taking cover during the attack was a 
controversial subject within the pre-Boer War British Army and it was not widely practised in 
peacetime.  The army was proud of its reputation for ‘dash’ and there was a spirit of resistance to any 
tactical method that threatened to reduce this much-prized attribute.  Foreign observers were 
particularly surprised at this disdain of cover, Captain Slocum of the United States Army writing, 
“The disregard of the British officer and soldier of all corps of ordinary precautions for his own safety 
is astonishing.”29  However, the experience of combat began to erode this attitude, and in the face of 
modern firepower, the need to make the most of cover to avoid heavy casualties soon became 
paramount.  Lord Roberts’s circular memo had insisted that “Every advantage should be taken of 
cover” but lack of pre-war training meant that infantry instead had to learn by hard experience the 
potential value of taking shelter.30 For inexperienced units this could lead to almost comical errors.  
Major-General Colvile commented on his wartime experiences of such problems: 
At first officers and men were very stupid about taking cover.  I have seen men halted on a 
rise in full view of the enemy when a few paces forward or backward would have placed them 
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in shelter, the reason being that to have taken this step would have broken the dressing of the 
line.31 
Nevertheless, veteran troops soon became adept at taking cover when in action.32  For example, the 
infantry of Buller’s Natal Army, after experiencing a rough learning curve in early battles such as 
Colenso and Spion Kop, became particularly noted for their skill in taking up good positions.33  At the 
Battle of Vaal Krantz Neville Lyttleton remembered that his men had taken up positions “very 
cleverly” and suffered only relatively minor casualties, even though the Boer fire was so severe that 
one officer thought it was the wind howling through nearby undergrowth instead of bullets.34 
Dispersion facilitated the usage of cover, but there would inevitably come a time when it was 
necessary to cross a stretch of open ground to reach the next point of shelter.  In the Boer War, this 
was most readily achieved by a system of rushes. Once again, peacetime training had not prepared the 
British Army well for this tactical requirement, and in the early stages of the war it was under-utilised.  
Observing early operations on the Tulega, Captain Slocum commented “The infantry never make 
rushes in their attacks, but march erect and calmly forward.”.35  However, as the war continued, an 
appreciation of rush tactics soon developed.  Typically led by an officer, a small group of men under 
cover would rise and sprint a short distance to the next piece of shelter.  While simple in theory, 
rushes were harder to utilise in practice.  Ian Hamilton’s infantry had achieved success with rushes at 
the Battle of Elaandslaagte, but a German volunteer who fought for the Boers remembered that as the 
war dragged on, veteran commandos began to learn how to predict when a rush was about to take 
place by the sudden cessation of fire that usually preceded it.  This gave the Boers time to aim and the 
veteran recalled “Onsets such as these were almost always shattered… a few seconds were frequently 
enough to decide the matter.”36  How long to maintain a rush was also an issue open to debate.  The 
Boer veteran considered that the British rushes had been too long and given the burghers many 
opportunities to take aim and inflict damage, but German observers felt that the British rushes were 
too short and did not gain sufficient ground for the risk entailed.37  In the aftermath of the war, Sir 
William Gatacre summed up the ideal infantry rush as to be aimed for in training to be: 
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…sudden, short, rapid and irregular in interval and strength, otherwise the defenders get many 
chances; each rush must be locally supported by comrades’ fire till the runners have settled 
down ready to support the next group in turn.38 
A corollary of the increased use of cover and concealment was a necessity for camouflage.  The 
British Army had already adopted khaki as its standard overseas uniform colour, but bright buttons 
and other prominently visible items of kit held the potential to give away a man’s position, and as the 
war went on these were darkened or removed entirely.39  Officers, often forced to scorn cover to set a 
courageous example for the men, were particularly prime targets and attrition amongst them was 
extremely high.  By late October 1899, the Natal Field Force had lost 73 officers and 3 commanding 
officers, proportionally twice as many as the men.40  A contemporary source estimated the overall 
casualties for the men typically ranged between 3 – 6%, while casualties amongst officers were 12 – 
30%.41  While a major cause of these casualties was the need of officers to demonstrate personal 
courage and lead their men by example, the carrying of swords and wearing of rank insignia were 
factors seen as attracting fire.  One British observer said the wearing of the sword “…was quickly 
recognised as a sort of legend ‘Here I am an officer, shoot me’ and (was) laid aside with colours and 
other relics of the past.”42  Officers in Lord Roberts’s army carried rifles instead of swords, and by the 
time of Spion Kop the officers of Buller’s Natal Field Force had removed all badges of rank to avoid 
being a visible target for enemy sharpshooters.43 
Although they faced a difficult learning curve, by the end of the war in South Africa, the infantry of 
the British Army had learned more about facing modern firepower than any other army in the world.  
An army that had initially been wedded to a profusion of tactical ideas, many of them inappropriate 
for the conditions, had emerged as a highly skilled fighting force which had overcome a unique and 
determined enemy in difficult conditions.  Whereas in the early battles of the war, British infantry had 
sometimes attacked in narrow close formation and suffered as a consequence, by the latter stages they 
were capable of advancing in an extended order, taking advantage of available cover and able to 
maintain forward momentum in a manner which had seemed impossible in the early months of the 
conflict.  While the fighting in South Africa was undoubtedly unusual, in terms of both atmospheric 
conditions and the unique military culture of the Boers, the lessons of concealment and dispersion 
learned by the British in this conflict placed them considerably in advance of European rivals.   
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British peacetime training soon changed to reflect the lessons of the Boer War and the memory of the 
conflict remained paramount in the minds of many throughout the army.  Concealment, cover, 
extension and a respect of firepower were emphasised in infantry tactics.  At Aldershot, officers were 
criticised for remaining mounted while too close to the firing line, while infantry were berated for 
bunching too closely during the attack and in one case being accompanied by a brass band.44  Infantry 
were expected to take up an extension of 6 – 20 yards per man during the attack, and in his 
“Memorandum on the Training of 1st Army Corps 1905”, Sir John French summed up the post-war 
attitude towards training and tactics when he stated “Personally, I believe as strongly as ever in the 
wide extension of Infantry in the attack… The instinct of all infantry soldiers should be to take 
advantage of cover, and to avoid open ground.”45  The influence of the conflict could also linger in 
more subtle ways, as a training inspection report on 1st Division at Aldershot in 1904 revealed when it 
referred to hills as ‘kopjes’ after the South African terminology.46  In the immediate post war years the 
training and tactics of the infantry were acknowledged to have improved considerably.  Even staunch 
critics such as Leo Amery gave praise to the improvements, attributing much of the development to 
the presence of Boer War veterans amongst both officers and men.47 
However, dissenting voices on the value of the war were raised even in its immediate aftermath.  The 
unusual military characteristics of the Boers along with the uniquely clear atmosphere of South 
Africa, which allowed for shooting at extremely long ranges, were both cited as rendering the lessons 
of the war as lacking value or even being misleading.  Sir Henry Colvile summed up the views of 
many of the doubters: 
…it should be borne in mind that the conditions of warfare in South Africa were wholly 
exceptional, and it is unlikely that they will ever be reproduced.  I do not think, therefore, that 
our tactics in South Africa, successful as they eventually were, have by any means solved the 
difficult question of how to reach the enemy’s position in the face of modern smokeless 
magazine fire.48 
While a return to close order shoulder-to-shoulder formations was never seriously advocated, a 
number of officers questioned the lessons of extension derived from South Africa.  Those who 
challenged the value of the experience focused particularly upon the peculiar characteristics of the 
enemy.  The Boers had a unique military culture that placed little importance upon holding positions 
to the last extremity, preferring to use their mobility and the vastness of the country to trade space for 
                                                     
44
 TNA WO 27/502 3rd Division Inspection  24th – 29th July 1905 
45
 TNA WO 27/504 “Tactical Points” (Undated); TNA WO 27/503 Memorandum on the Training of 1st Army 
Corps 1905 31st January 1905 
46
 TNA WO 27/501 1st Division Defensive Work 27th June 1904 
47
 Amery, Leo, The Problem of the Army (London, E. Arnold, 1903)  p. 46 
48
 Elgin Commission, Vol.2, Q16974, p.288 
70 
 
time if the British advance could not be stopped by rifle fire.  The Boers lacked bayonets, and 
generally showed little inclination to counter attack the British during the advance or to try and 
reclaim lost ground, instead preferring to offer a passive, firepower based defence from good 
positions.  Additionally, while strong against frontal attacks, their numerical inferiority and the scale 
of South African geography made them weak against turning movements.  At battles such as Spion 
Kop, the British attacked on a very narrow front and were punished, but under the leadership of Lord 
Roberts they subsequently demonstrated a tendency to attack on a very broad front to pin the Boers in 
place, while separate forces turned their flanks.49  These broad fronts were particularly well facilitated 
by large infantry extensions, and the peculiar characteristics of the Boers reduced their potential 
weaknesses, particularly with regard to the threat of being counterattacked while dispersed.  As the 
Boers showed little inclination to resist close assault if the enemy were able to establish themselves at 
close range, it was relatively uncommon that the British needed to undertake the difficult process of 
reforming from wide extension into a thicker line which would carry weight in both the firefight and 
the subsequent charge.  This further encouraged the use of a single, heavily extended but thin line that 
would be able to advance with minimal casualties, rather than a somewhat more densely packed line 
that would find it easier to assault.  Lord Roberts stated that “Throughout the war the Boers were 
determined that there should be no hand to hand fighting” but observers at both home and abroad 
noted this would not be the case in Europe, where positions would be defended much more 
tenaciously and the cost to break through would be high.50   F.N. Maude summed up these views in 
1902: 
Against an enemy known to be adverse to counter-attacks, the extreme extension we adopted 
was justified by results, but it would be a very unsound generalisation to assume that similar 
extensions would answer against an active European drilled army…51 
Some continental observers further criticised the British Army on the grounds that wide extension and 
flank attacks were an illogical reaction to fear of casualties.  A German observer rejected these tactics, 
arguing: 
The English... endeavoured to obtain decisive victories without serious loss.  The first law of 
war is that lives of soldiers must be sacrificed without hesitation when the necessity arises.52 
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Such radical views achieved little support in the years immediately following the Boer War, when 
European conflicts were still far from the minds of most British Army officers.  However, from 1905 
onwards the value of large extension began to be called into question.  The core of this problem was a 
tactical paradox.  Modern infantry fire, effective at around 1500 yards or more, meant that dense 
formations were impractical for closing with the enemy and instead, wide extension was necessary.  
However, while extension would allow the men to close with the enemy, it did not provide enough 
strength at a point to actually overwhelm the foe, either with firepower or via a close combat assault.  
Indeed, for fire superiority to be gained over the foe, it was widely believed a ratio of at least one man 
per yard was necessary.53  How to cross the ground to get into a good fire position without suffering 
prohibitive casualties, and then have enough strength to win the fire fight and final assault was a 
paradox the British Army struggled with throughout the period.  Combined Training 1905 identified 
the problem without offering any real solutions.  While noting that in the infantry attack “…it is 
superiority of fire that renders the decision of the conflict possible”, it went on to state that against a 
well trained enemy, within 800 yards of their position “the ground over which the attack must pass is 
so closely swept by a sheet of lead as to be well-night impassable to troops in any other formation 
than lines of skirmishers…”54  Ultimately, the solution reached was a compromise.  Under this 
system, infantry advanced in extended formations as far as possible.  Once forced to ground and 
involved in the fire fight, the firing line would be built up by supports and reserves advancing forward 
by rushes, covered by the fire of the original line.  Therefore, the line only became dense at decisive 
range to ensure overwhelming infantry firepower.55 
The Russo-Japanese War highlighted the need to solve this tactical conundrum.  The Japanese were 
repeatedly forced to frontally assault Russian earthworks, and although often repelled with heavy 
losses, in contrast to the Boer War, bayonet charges and hand-to-hand combat occurred on a 
surprisingly frequent basis.56    Initially, the Japanese favoured old-fashioned Prussian style tactics, 
assaulting in relatively dense lines preceded by a swarm of skirmishers.  A French observer 
commented upon these formations, noting, “The losses were so ruinous that never again was this 
method of attack employed.”57  British observer Ian Hamilton also noted the terrible cost of using 
German assault tactics, and was pleased to be told that “…the Japanese are discarding German attack 
formations, and approximating more to those employed by us in South Africa.”58  By the time of the 
Battle of Mukden 20th February – 10th March 1905, a Japanese officer reported that he was doubling 
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the extension of his battalion from the distance set in pre-war guidelines.59  Hamilton was also 
impressed with the speed with which the Japanese were able to use rushes to cross open ground, but 
attributed this success partially to the dismal quality of Russian marksmanship.60  Conversely, some 
German writers saw the ultimate success of Japanese frontal attacks, regardless of their cost in lives, 
as a vindication that the British had lacked the moral strength to absorb casualties making frontal 
assaults in South Africa.61  The profusion of contradictory tactical lessons regarding infantry assault in 
the Russo-Japanese War did little to clarify the issue of extension.62   Indeed, although the Japanese 
had moved towards using very wide extensions by 1905, in subsequent years their infantry training 
manuals turned against this and gradually formations increased in density.63   There was abundant 
evidence that crossing the fire swept zone was now even harder than in the Boer War, but equally the 
success of Japanese attacks against Russian earthworks suggested that close assault remained 
possible.   
The successful Japanese frontal assaults and the local strength required to launch them contributed to 
the debate on the value of Boer War infantry tactics.  Ideas that had been formed during the 
experience of combat in South Africa came under scrutiny during the following years, notably the 
arming of officers with infantry rifles.  This had been a controversial topic for some time and had 
often been raised for Army Council consideration, but it was not until 1908 it was officially decided 
to abandon the rifle and reinstate the sword as the personal weapon for officers.64   More importantly, 
formations also came under critical examination in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War.  Even 
amongst reformers such as Ian Hamilton, doubts began to be expressed that extended formations were 
being taken too far.  While Hamilton considered wide extensions “probably the best of the many good 
ideas derived from the South Africa War” he cautioned that even these tactics “will not bear being 
turned into a fetish.”65  While serving as Inspector General of Forces, Sir John French echoed similar 
views on extension, arguing “I think it is well worth serious consideration whether we are not 
overdoing the so-called lessons of the South African War as applied to possible European war against 
masses of trained soldiers.”66   
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The tactical paradox of forming a strong firing line without suffering annihilating casualties 
beforehand still remained.  Complaints were made that the infantry were able to advance splendidly in 
training, but that there was no attempt at any stage in the attack to close up a firing line at a depth 
greater than “three or four paces” per man.67  The reaction against extension reached its peak in an 
article that appeared in the General Staff supported publication Army Review in 1912.  Criticising 
British assault training, the author, Brigadier-General F.C. Carter, felt in large part the flaws were due 
to “The fact that the fetish of ‘over-extension’ which, after the early disaster of the South African 
War, was set up as a God in the Temple of Mars, still claims some devotees among our senior 
officers.”68  Urging closer formations, the article concluded: 
We must harden our hearts, as our forefathers did of old to the heavy losses that will occur… 
a steady advance of strong, disciplined and brave men, prepared to suffer losses, to use their 
bayonets with effect and to snatch victory from the jaws of death.69 
While something of an extreme viewpoint, the article expressed tactical opinions that were not 
uncommon amongst continental armies or those who admired them.  The Boer War had had limited 
impact on formations of armies in Europe, and the Russo-Japanese War, with its bloody but 
successful attacks, seemed to be a vindication of traditional attack tactics to many in the German and 
French armies.  Ironically, the author of the Army Review article cited as a supporting example work 
by F.N Maude, the principal proponent of the pro-Prussian school in the Victorian era army.  As in the 
Victorian era, the British Army grappled with influences from both the colonial experience of the 
Boer War and the ideas of continental thinkers.  However, whereas in the 19th century the British had 
a great deal to learn about facing firepower as the Prussians had done in the Franco-Prussian War, by 
the Edwardian period it was the British Army who had the practical experience.   
As early as 1903, a British observer of German manoeuvres had been surprised at their dense 
attacking lines, noting “I pointed out the losses would be enormous.  I was told they were prepared to 
lose, as they lost at Gravelotte…”70 While there was a strand of thought within the British Army that a 
war against mass armies on the continent would require mass tactics, it was also well understood that 
the small numbers available to the British Expeditionary Force meant that any attempt to fight a 
continental conscript army on a like for like basis was unlikely to succeed.71  A call to absorb 
casualties in mass attacks on the German or French model was not in keeping with the military or 
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political goals of the elite but small British Expeditionary Force.  One anonymous officer summed up 
the problem, noting the British Army was “…bound for political, financial and national reasons, to 
economise life, and to win our campaigns with the fewest possible casualties.”72  Therefore, in terms 
of reducing extension, the European influence was limited beyond a small number of adherents, much 
as the Prussian influence in the Victorian era army had been.73   
Despite a number of calls for a counter reformation following the Russo-Japanese War, and the urging 
of men such as Carter to follow the continental example, the British Army did not abandon extension, 
although it was reduced from the standard adopted after the Boer War.  In 1908 Ian Hamilton reported 
that extension in Southern Command had been reduced to a level slightly above that adopted by the 
Japanese in the war in the Far East, giving attacks “greater cohesion, flexibility, and driving power”.  
However, he cautioned, “… the reaction against the exaggerated extensions adopted during and 
immediately after the South African War has gone far enough” and felt “…it is better for formations 
to be too open than too concentrated.”74  By 1912 and 1913, reports from the Inspector General of 
Forces were also cautionary regarding overly dense advancing lines.  The 1913 report noted; 
I desire to emphasize very strongly a marked tendency in our present day infantry tactics to 
ignore the effect of fire during movement.  Large bodies are frequently seen advancing under 
effective rifle and artillery fire bunched together in a manner that would entail very heavy 
casualties… attacks in this manner cannot hope to succeed…75 
The Army Council acknowledged this complaint and suggested it would be highlighted in a 
forthcoming revision of Infantry Training, although the outbreak of war prevented the issue of a new 
manual.76  The thorny problem of how to create a strong line from an extended formation to win fire 
superiority remained a contentious issue that was never entirely settled in the years prior to the First 
World War.   In Infantry Training 1911 the paradox remained, although there was now a greater 
emphasis on supporting fire from friendly infantry, machine guns and artillery to facilitate the forward 
movement of supports and reformation for the final fire fight.77  Additionally, the use of cover and 
short but rapid rushes to gain good positions were discussed at some length.  Unlike extension, the use 
of these tactical movements had never been seriously challenged in the post-Boer War years, and they 
remained a fundamental part of British infantry tactics.    
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Despite the controversy over extension and its relative value, by the eve of the First World War, 
British infantry remained skilful at crossing the fire swept zone.    Problems persisted, especially with 
regard to the compromise solution of thickening the line at the decisive moment, but nevertheless the 
necessity for dispersion, emphasised by the rough handling of close order formations in the Boer War, 
remained a valuable and enduring lesson.  Once war had broken out in Europe, the tactics for crossing 
ground that had worked in South Africa were often cited as good examples for the current conflict.  
For example, it is interesting that Notes from the Front, a handbook of tactical advice printed and 
issued for the army after the opening months of hostilities in 1914, once again reiterated the value of 
extension, stating a formation with “8 or 10 paces intervals (is thought to be) the least vulnerable.”78  
Additionally, in a September 1914 memorandum, Brigadier General Johnnie Gough called for 
increased usage of dispersed “loose and irregular elastic formations” as employed in South Africa.79    
Compared to the French and German armies who still made use of deep, close order formations in the 
early part of the First World War, British extension tactics were considerably advanced. Combined 
with the lessons of the value of cover and the importance of rapid, irregular rushes from point to 
point, the British infantry was arguably the best prepared in Europe to face modern rifle fire on a 
tactical level.  A French observer of the 1913 manoeuvres felt that British attacks were “carried out in 
an excellent manner…Infantry makes wonderful use of the ground, advances, as a rule, by short 
rushes and always at the double, and almost invariably fires from the lying down position.”80  The 
core principles of extension, cover and rushes realised in the Boer War were a logical and appropriate 
tactical response to an extended fire swept zone, and despite debate and controversy, the British Army 
still remembered the value of these important lessons at the outbreak of war in 1914. 
Marksmanship and fire tactics 
One of the most remarked upon aspects of combat against the Boers throughout the 19th century was 
the effectiveness of the marksmanship possessed by the average burgher.  The good shooting of Boers 
armed only with muskets had surprised participants in early combats in the 1840s, and by the time of 
Majuba in 1881 it was further improved by far better weaponry.  While there was a distinct lack of 
consensus on the overall quality of Boer marksmanship in 1899, the increased range and sheer volume 
of fire that could be produced by magazine rifles made even a poor marksman a potentially dangerous 
foe, especially at close range.  Additionally, the use of smokeless powder meant it was difficult for the 
British to return the fire, as there was no telltale puff of smoke to give away the firer’s position.  For 
British troops used to facing brave but reckless tribal opposition charging across the open, this was a 
rude awakening.  Neville Lyttelton described the startling change in combat experience. 
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Few people have seen two battles in succession in such startling contrast as Omdurman and 
Colenso.  In the first, 50,000 fanatics streamed across the open regardless of cover to certain 
death, while at Colenso I never saw a Boer all day till the battle was over, and it was our men 
who were the victims.81 
As previously discussed, British infantry in the Victorian period were poorly trained in marksmanship 
and were highly dependent upon volley fire, a method that had proved its value in various wars 
against primitively armed opposition.  Even against the Boers, at longer ranges volleys had a certain 
degree of suppressing effect and some tactical value.  For example, at the Battle of Elandslaagte, the 
advance of the Devons was made in rushes with supporting sections delivering volleys to keep down 
the fire of the Boers.82  However, within 600 yards and at closer ranges, the individual fire of the 
Boers, often termed ‘snap shooting’, proved far more effective than the cumbersome volleys of the 
British.  The volley was of limited use in inflicting casualties upon a dispersed, well concealed enemy 
in a good position or in earthworks, while the extension and use of cover necessary for survival at 
close ranges meant it was difficult for officers to organise a volley, as their voices would often be lost 
in the din of fighting and to expose themselves from behind cover invited death.83  In these types of 
conditions the more skilful individual shots of the Boers held a clear advantage over the British.  One 
officer remembered of this type of fighting “… where they [the Boers] beat us so completely was 
when we got onto kopjes at close quarters, say, a few hundred yards, a man could not put his finger up 
over a rock or ridge without being hit.”84 
A related problem was that the prevalence of volleys had created a very strict system of infantry fire 
control, which emphasised holding fire for as long as possible during the advance.  In 1899 it was 
expected that the infantry would not open fire until they reached approximately 500 yards from the 
enemy’s position.85  While this had some justification against poorly armed opposition, the Boers with 
modern rifles were able to inflict casualties at ranges more than triple this distance.  The result was 
that in the early stages of the war, British advances were often forced to ground at 900 – 1000 yards 
from the enemy without the attackers having fired a shot.86  Many early attacks took this course, with 
the British attempting to press onwards against increasingly heavy fire, suffering casualties and 
ultimately being forced to ground before they even began the firefight in earnest.87  Gaining infantry 
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fire superiority from such a weak initial position was virtually impossible.  Additionally, fire 
discipline and pre-war training encouraged firing at obvious, visible targets, a weakness the Boers 
exploited.  Major General Sir William Gatacre recalled “On several occasions I saw our men wasting 
their ammunition at purposely prepared vacant trenches on kopjes, when the men who were doing the 
mischief were under cover in front or to a flank.”88   
The volley was generally unsuited for the nature of combat in the Boer War, but the standard of 
individual marksmanship possessed by the average British soldier varied immensely.  While several 
officers suggested it was as good as, if not better than that of the Boers when shooting at static objects 
at known ranges, when engaging fleeting targets at unknown distances it suffered in comparison.  
Firing at a well-concealed enemy was difficult enough, but a further problem was the fact the unusual 
atmospheric conditions of South Africa made judging the distance difficult, and even veteran officers 
were known to make enormous errors of judgement in this regard.89  Furthermore, being largely 
trained in collective fire meant individual soldiers were often dependent upon an officer to call out the 
distance to the target for them, and were thus poor at setting their own sights without instruction.90  
An anonymous Boer remembered capturing some British infantry, only to find: 
“Of 35 men whom we took prisoners, after they had fired at us up to 350 paces, not a single 
one had got his sight correct.  Most of them had kept their sights fixed at 800 and 850 yards, 
because no order to change them had been given.”91 
The failure to correct rifle sights as the range changed was a persistent problem, especially prevalent 
amongst inexperienced or poorly trained men.  For example, the ability of the Boers to make close 
range mounted attacks during the later stages of the war was attributed by some officers to the 
inability of the British soldier to correct his sights to deal with a rapidly closing target.92 
An additional problem for the British was the presence of large numbers of reservists in the ranks to 
bring battalions up to full strength.  Although these men had been trained in marksmanship while part 
of the army, it was noted, “There is no regular system of the Reservists in the country having annual 
practice in rifle shooting” and their accuracy was considered to be of a somewhat lower standard until 
they had had a chance to practice.93  A further difficulty faced by the reservists was that some 25,000 
Lee-Enfields that were issued to them at the outbreak of war had defective sights, which shot 
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approximately 18 inches to the right at 500 yards and over.  Henry Brackenbury described this as “an 
awful blow”.94 
Nevertheless, despite these problems and difficulties faced by the British Army, the power of modern 
rifles in skilful hands was a lesson that was brought home in the strongest terms.  An individual was 
now able to produce a tremendous rate of fire, and a small group of determined, skilful men in a good 
position could prove a formidable foe.  For example, at the Battle of Bergendaal 27th August 1900, a 
group of Boers had taken up a strong position on a kopje, delivering punishing fire upon the attacking 
British.  Neville Lyttelton, a participant at the battle, related “It was so continuous that I thought there 
were quite 300 men in the kopje, but I doubt if there were 100.”95  On another occasion, prior to the 
Battle of Spion Kop, a British advance found itself under persistent and harassing sniper fire.  Two 
battalions with artillery support were deployed to flush out the Boers, only to discover the fire had 
been coming from just three well-concealed burghers.96 
For the infantry, the most important tactical development of the Boer War was realising the power and 
effectiveness of these smokeless magazine rifles.  The impressive firepower that could now be 
developed by even small numbers of skilled men hinted at the future.  Ian Hamilton caught the mood 
of post-War reformers when he suggested that attacks would now be based upon the determination 
and skill of a handful of men, who were able to work their way across the final 500 yards into good 
positions.  He argued “…if… the enemy’s line is penetrated, even by a few men, the power of their 
modern armament will make their flanking fire so demoralising and effective that the position will 
either be abandoned forthwith, or so much attention will be concentrated on the intruders that an 
assault may become practicable all along the line.”97  Concluding this strand of thought, Hamilton laid 
down the necessary requirement for these tactics of the future, suggesting, “We want an army 
composed of men each of whom can be trusted to make the fullest possible use of the finest and more 
delicately adjusted rifle that can be made.”98   
Improving marksmanship clearly required a vast overhaul of the pre-war musketry regulations and 
training routine.  The Victorian era army had assigned a miserly quantity of ammunition for rifle 
practice and had focussed almost entirely upon shooting at static targets at known distances.  In the 
aftermath of the Boer War, there was some call for marksmanship training to take place at long range 
with troops forced to estimate the distance themselves and set their sights accordingly.  This method 
was considered an effective way to simulate the South African experience, but to undertake such a 
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system required very long target ranges and complex training.99  The ranges of infantry fire in South 
Africa had been enormous, with effective fire at 2,000 yards being considered common by some, but 
this was in part due to the exceptionally clear atmosphere of the country.100  Other officers felt that 
these ranges were abnormal and that scoring hits at such a distance was more luck than judgement.101  
Ultimately, the issue was settled by Lord Roberts, who saw the crucial area of fire being at medium to 
close range rather than at great distances.102  ‘Effective’ rifle range was determined as being between 
1,400 to 600 yards, while less than 600 yards was considered ‘decisive’.103  It was at this latter range 
that Lord Roberts considered Boer shooting to have been most dominant over the British.104 
Debate continued on the ranges at which the men should practice, and a 1904 committee from 1st 
Army Corps suggested that men should be trained to fire accurately at ranges up to 1,000 yards.  
However, the School of Musketry rejected this view, arguing that “careful concentration of collective 
fire” rather than a handful of specially trained individuals were best at achieving results at long 
range.105  Trials showed that it took an expert marksman in favourable conditions an average of 12 
rounds to hit a dummy in the prone position at 600 yards, and therefore this distance was considered 
the maximum limit of useful individual fire.106  Musketry training emphasised rapidity and accuracy 
in this ‘decisive’ 600 yard range throughout the period up to the outbreak of the First World War.107 
However, the process of improving marksmanship took time and was not without difficulties.  
Initially, lack of shooting ranges led to considerable overcrowding at those that were available, 
causing practice to sometimes be rushed and inefficient.  Ammunition supply also became an issue.  
To improve the marksmanship of the men, the cartridge allowance for practice purposes was vastly 
increased, with a figure of 300 rounds per man being approved in 1903.108   However, in 1906 the 
allowance of ammunition for training was reduced as surplus supplies from the Boer War were 
running out, and to maintain the existing level of supply would cost between £70,000 and £80,000 per 
annum.  Although several members of the Army Council thought a reduction was feasible and even 
potentially beneficial, the move was almost unanimously opposed by the general officers 
commanding on the grounds it would be detrimental to training.109  Nevertheless, financial 
considerations won out and the ammunition allowance was reduced to 250 rounds per man.  However, 
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even with these limitations, the amount of ammunition and effort expended upon marksmanship 
training was still considerably more than on the continent or in India. 
Despite these difficulties, the quality of individual musketry and the seriousness that was now 
attached to it was the most striking change in the British infantry in the aftermath of the Boer War.  In 
1904, an anonymous officer noted with satisfaction: 
“The day has now quite gone by when the officer at the firing point brought down with him to 
the range, as a necessary part of his equipment, an easy-chair and a novel, and the officer in 
the butts if he hadn’t a novel went to sleep… greater interest is now shown by everybody… 
the keenness displayed by all ranks is as great as could be desired.”110 
The old system of firing at static targets at fixed ranges was replaced with a far more challenging 
system of concealed and ‘surprise’ targets that could be pulled up and then collapsed at short notice.  
Adapting to these new training methods took time, and early experiments with the method could 
produce embarrassing results.  During an early attempt at using surprise targets in training during 
1899, at least one company was so surprised by the sudden appearance of a 20 second target that they 
failed to get a single shot off.111  Nevertheless, these moving mechanical targets proved a great 
success and huge improvement on the old methods.  At Aldershot in 1909, a musketry course was laid 
out that included “…every sort of appearing and disappearing target…” and dummy attacks were 
made against a selection of them as part of competitive training.112  This gave practice at meeting 
counter attacks and aiming at active service style targets, and was considered by Aldershot 
commander Horace Smith-Dorrien to be “an unqualified success.”113 
As well as making the individual officer and soldier a good marksman, making effective tactical use 
of infantry fire was a keynote of British assault tactics in the years immediately following the Boer 
War.  Combined Training 1905 noted that fire action had increased greatly as a result of modern 
technology, going on to state: 
“All movements on the battlefield have but one end in view, the development of fire in 
greater volume and more effectively directed than that of the opposing force; and although the 
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bayonet still plays an important part, it is superiority of fire that renders the decision of the 
conflict possible.”114 
As previously discussed, gaining this superiority of fire posed a problem regarding the best type of 
formation to adopt during the infantry attack.  British musketry training was aimed at producing 
skilful individual marksman, capable of accurate and rapid fire at up to 600 yards.  However, a series 
of complex experiments at the School of Musketry discovered the unpalatable fact that between 400 – 
500 yards range, a dense firing line of average and indifferent shots possessed considerably greater 
firepower than an extended line of first class marksmen.  While the extended line achieved a higher 
proportion of hits to rounds fired, the sheer volume of fire from the dense line typically inflicted 
overwhelming casualties on their extended opponents within a minute of fire being opened.115   
This tactical problem highlighted the important fact that it was not enough to simply make men 
talented individual shots.  Instead, it was crucial that high levels of individual skill were allied with an 
effective system of fire tactics that encouraged and allowed movement.  Widespread use of 
earthworks meant that simply outshooting the enemy was not enough.  This issue had been well 
illustrated at several actions in the Boer War, most noticeably during the Battle of Paardeberg 18th – 
27th February 1900.  After an initial day of uncoordinated and costly infantry attacks, the British had 
settled down to what was practically a siege of Cronje’s laager.  Although the British held fire 
superiority throughout most of the battle, the Boers suffered few casualties and were only compelled 
to surrender by the combination of starvation and the presence of Canadian infantry at just 65 yards 
distance from their trenches.  The difficulty, if not impossibility, of using infantry firepower alone to 
move a determined enemy from a good position was further emphasised in the Russo-Japanese 
War.116 
With these experiences in mind, British infantry fire tactics essentially consisted of the two tightly 
connected elements of fire and movement.  Both were mutually supporting within the infantry attack.  
Covering fire from one section of the line would allow other parts to advance.  Once the advancing 
troops had taken up fire positions of their own, they would provide covering fire to allow the rest of 
the line to follow up.  In this manner, the attackers would advance in bounds, with troops only moving 
when their comrades could provide covering fire.  Ultimately, it was intended that the advancing 
infantry could take up progressively stronger fire positions and win superiority over the enemy.  This 
concept was to be the keynote of fire tactics for the British throughout the 1902 – 1914 period.  
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Although writing in 1912, an infantry officer summed up the attitude towards the issue throughout the 
era when he wrote “Fire and movement… must never be dissociated in peace training and must be 
regarded as complementary in war.”117   
Much like the efforts to improve individual marksmanship, replacing the old system of fire tactics that 
had relied on close control and volleys took considerable time.  However, progress was helped and 
supported by the work done at the School of Musketry at Hythe.  By 1907 it was noted with 
satisfaction that not only was the programme of instruction at Hythe excellent, but also that an 
interchange of ideas between the School of Musketry and the army practice camps was now becoming 
apparent.118  Nevertheless, translating this teaching into practice could sometimes be difficult.  For 
example in 1910 there was considerable concern that volley fire appeared to be making a return 
within certain units.  An alarmed Inspector General noted that while in some cases officers who still 
favoured old-fashioned methods were to blame, in most cases it resulted from a misinterpretation of 
teaching at Hythe, which suggested it was sometimes useful to employ a simultaneous burst of rapid 
fire but had somehow had its teaching “…twisted into the word ‘fire’ leading to an order to press the 
trigger several times in succession”.119  Steps were quickly taken at Hythe to correct this retrograde 
development.  In 1911, despite the fact that much work and discussion on the nature of fire and 
movement had been undertaken, translating this into practice was harder and little physical 
improvement was evident.  Officers were criticised for failing to “…recognise that musketry and 
tactics are synonymous and cannot be separated… Hythe teaching is so clear and definite on these 
points that it is incredible how little attention seems to be paid to them.”120  Yet from this low point, 
steady developments in fire tactics were observed in subsequent years.  In 1912 and 1913 
improvements were evident, and it was noted with satisfaction that the use of fire to facilitate 
movement was very well understood in all battalions by 1913.121   
A number of historians have taken a critical view of British infantry fire tactics on the eve of the First 
World War.122  Tim Travers has suggested that the army was forgetting the lessons of the Boer War 
and was instead focussing on psychological solutions to practical tactical problems, downgrading the 
value and effect of firepower and placing renewed emphasis on sheer determination to overcome it.  
Martin Samuels has most recently taken up this theme, arguing that the British General Staff were not 
only ignorant regarding fire superiority, but also downright hostile towards the concept.123  Samuels 
argues that by 1914 the British Army was reliant upon the assault power of its infantry, with minimal 
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firepower available.  There is some evidence to support the idea that there was something of a 
reaction against firepower in infantry tactics of this era.  A notable change was the subtle rewording in 
the discussion of the attack in Field Service Regulations 1909 from the original in Combined Training 
1905.  Whereas Combined Training had stated, “superiority of fire makes the decision possible”, 
Field Service Regulations noted “The climax of the infantry attack is the assault, which is made 
possible by superiority of fire.”124  Additionally, Samuels’s interpretation draws upon the opinions 
expressed by officers such as Aylmer Haldane and Lancelot Kiggell at General Staff conferences of 
the era.  Kiggell in particular saw the bayonet as still being the principal arbiter of combat and was 
disparaging on the value of firepower.125  
However, as John Bourne and Gary Sheffield have pointed out, the interpretation of the British Army 
as tactically backward and ‘professionally somnolent’ does not seem compatible with the tremendous 
internal reform and tactical improvements that developed in the aftermath of the Boer War.126  
Samuels draws much evidence from the de-emphasis on firepower which was raised in discussion at 
the General Staff conferences, but this should not be taken as an indication that the ideas permeated 
down to lower levels in the army and became doctrine.  As has been demonstrated by John Gooch, the 
British General Staff was a recent innovation in the Edwardian period and took time to develop its 
organisation into a truly efficient body.  Therefore it was not in a position to disseminate much 
doctrine or create a true ‘school of thought’ within the army.127  Indeed, as discussed in previous 
chapters, the entire concept of doctrine was regarded with a certain amount of suspicion,.  There is 
limited evidence to suggest General Staff ideas translated into training or tactics at lower levels as a 
mere matter of course.  For example, reports from the Inspector General of Forces continued to place 
very high value on fire tactics throughout the period in question, offering strong criticism when they 
were not up to standard.128   
Perhaps the most important rebuttal to Samuels’s interpretation can be found in the opening 
engagements of the First World War.   Although Samuels has lavish praise for the qualities of German 
infantry compared to the crudeness of the British, at the Battle of Mons 24th August 1914, British 
infantry fire inflicted severe casualties upon their German opponents.  British participants were 
amazed at the dense, old-fashioned German attack formations, with one British soldier describing 
them as ‘insane’.129  Walter Bloem, a German officer at the battle, related an experience leading an 
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infantry attack against the British.  After a difficult advance by rushes to within 150 yards of the 
British line, leaving behind them a meadow “dotted with little grey heaps”, the Germans noted British 
infantry fire had virtually ceased.  Bloem planned to launch a final 30-yard long rush, but in a tactic 
similar to those used by the Boers, the British were waiting for his men to break cover.  Bloem 
recounted, 
The enemy must have been waiting for this moment to get us all together at close range, for 
immediately the line rose it was as if the hounds of hell had been loosed at us, barking, 
hammering as a mass of lead swept in amongst us… Voluntarily and in many cases 
involuntarily we all collapsed flat on the grass as if swept by a scythe.130 
Mons has been described as a battle dominated by the infantry, and in this regard British troops were 
clearly superior.131  Indeed, as previously discussed the early battles of the British Expeditionary 
Force have been identified as ‘soldiers’ battles’, in which higher leadership was unable to exercise 
much influence and the course of the fighting often devolved on junior leaders and their men.132  In 
these conflicts, although seriously outnumbered and in a difficult strategic position, British infantry 
acquitted itself extremely well against their German opponents.  In the light of the experiences of the 
early battles of 1914, Samuels’s criticisms of British infantry tactics seem to be incorrect.  The Boers 
had taught the British hard lessons regarding the power of accurate rifle fire and the necessity for 
extended formations in 1899, but to the credit of the British Army these lessons had not been ignored, 
and instead formed a linchpin of infantry tactics.  Their value was emphasised in summer 1914, when 
it was the Germans who were forced to experience firsthand the problems of attacking skilful 
marksmen in good positions. 
However, while the Boer War taught valuable lessons regarding the necessity of improving individual 
marksmanship and fire tactics, its influence upon the development of the machine gun was largely 
negative.  Numerous historians have cited the miserly allocation of just two machine guns per 
battalion in the British infantry of 1914 as representing a serious material weakness.133  The official 
history of the Great War suggests that the impressive rate of fire possessed by the individual 
infantryman was a substitute for the lack of machine guns, which had been neglected for financial 
reasons.134 
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Perhaps the money may have been more readily available for machine guns had their performance in 
South Africa been more impressive.  Machine guns had proved extremely valuable in struggles 
against tribal foes, allowing a handful of Europeans to inflict crippling casualties upon the brave but 
crudely armed tribesmen.  However, when committed to action against a well-armed and carefully 
concealed opponent in South Africa, results were disappointing.  The Boers fought from behind cover 
and refused to provide the kind of massed target that the Dervishes had done in the Sudan.  How best 
to employ machine guns in the Boer War was a tactical problem to which no definite answer was ever 
found.  Some officers favoured pushing the guns right into the infantry firing line, where targets 
would be more visible and friendly troops would be encouraged by the sound of the weapon in 
action.135  Yet this tactic was deprecated by others, who felt bringing the gun so far forward made it 
too easy for the Boers to silence it with either rifle or artillery fire.  For example, at the Battle of 
Modder River, the machine gun of the 1st Scots Guards was brought in to close range action, but was 
knocked out in less than five minutes by Boer pom-pom fire.136  Reliability was also an issue, with 
jams and breakdowns frequent throughout the campaign.  One officer who fought at Modder River 
reported his battalion’s gun had jammed an incredible 29 times during the course of the 
engagement.137  Lack of technical training within the gun crews meant that repairing mechanical 
problems in the field was difficult and sometimes even impossible.138 
Views on the value and practicality of the machine gun remained varied throughout the war.  
Problems of where to deploy the weapon in an advance, its relative vulnerability and the lack of good 
targets generally presented by the Boers meant that many officers saw it as more useful in defence 
than in attack.139  A handful of adherents emerged from South Africa, one officer stating somewhat 
prophetically, “The effects cannot be exaggerated, and if understood tactically the machine gun 
dominates the whole question of attack in the future… neglect of proper tactical use of machine guns, 
was the most important lesson of the war”, but opinions such as these were in a distinct minority.140  
A more common view was that while the gun was valuable in both attack and defence against enemies 
who operated in dense masses, it was only useful in defence against opposition who made use of 
cover and entrenchment.141   
The Russo-Japanese War tended to confirm rather than dispel these ideas.  The Russians had made the 
most of machine guns in the early stages of the war, and their effectiveness when deployed in a 
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defensive role was undoubtedly great.142  The Japanese subsequently adopted the weapon and 
employed it in an offensive role, where it proved useful in suppressing Russian trenches during 
attacks.  However, its employment in this manner did little to shake the tactical orthodoxy 
surrounding the weapon.  Commenting on his wartime experiences, a Japanese officer noted, “For the 
commander to use the gun as a substitute for infantry fire shows ignorance of its nature” and 
considered the ammunition consumption was so great that to use it purely to suppress an enemy 
trench was wasteful, with artillery being capable of doing the same job more efficiently and at much 
longer range.143  Nevertheless, armies on the continent, particularly Germany, took an increased 
interest in the weapon and began moving towards increasing their establishments of machine guns.144   
However, in Britain no increase took place despite the efforts of a number of officers to emphasise the 
value of the weapon and encourage its use.  Apathy reigned regarding machine guns in the immediate 
aftermath of the Boer War, and a 1901 committee assembled to assess the value and organisation of 
machine guns and pom-pom guns in the future ignored its remit and omitted discussion of the 
machine gun altogether.145  After a brief spell of interest and allocation to the cavalry, pom-pom 
guns146 soon fell from favour, being unwieldy and relatively ineffective at inflicting casualties.  By 
1905, discussion of the pom-pom as anything other than a range finding device had ceased and the 
weapons themselves were apparently withdrawn.  Conversely, machine guns remained in service with 
infantry and cavalry, but training in the weapon lagged behind European armies for several years.  In 
Britain, nine months were allocated to train a machine gunner, whereas 3 years were assigned to do 
the same job on the continent.147  In 1910, one officer summed up the problem of the gun’s poor 
reputation: 
No doubt this is due very largely to the discredit into which the Maxim gun fell in South 
Africa… they were perfectly useless and had to be abandoned; had we known as much about 
it as we do now different tactics would have prevailed…. The way the guns are handled on 
manoeuvres, the way they are attacked, leads one to believe that people take very little 
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account of them.  At present half the mistakes in the training at manoeuvres are due to no-one 
knowing where the machine gun is, and certainly not caring.148 
Training did begin to show improvement from 1910 onwards, with experiments taking place 
involving overhead fire and organising machine guns into brigades.149  However, despite proposals 
from the School of Musketry to increase the quota of weapons, including the addition of light machine 
guns to infantry battalions, growing interest in the weapon came too late to ensure senior officers 
accepted these ideas.  John Ellis has been highly critical of this decision, arguing the rejection of 
machine guns was based upon anachronistic attitudes in the officer class and were not a rational 
response to either technical or financial considerations.150  However, Shelford Bidwell and Dominick 
Graham have convincingly challenged this interpretation, arguing that financial considerations played 
a far larger role than Ellis allows. The British Army had only recently rearmed its artillery at 
considerable expense and had also adopted a new short Lee-Enfield rifle.  Additionally, discussions 
were underway to change the calibre of the infantry rifle, which would entail further costs.  The 
Liberal government was committed to reducing the cost of the army where possible and in such 
circumstances to undertake a large-scale rearmament of the machine gun branch was financially 
impractical even though there was evidence that Britain was lagging behind European rivals in this 
regard.151  Perhaps if the machine gun had had a better reputation this might have encouraged its 
development and expenditure upon it, but as has been shown it performed poorly in South Africa and 
its role in the Russo-Japanese War seemed to confirm the idea that it was best employed as a weapon 
of defence.  Unfortunately for the British infantry, the Boer War experience was largely negative in 
this regard and did little to encourage the adoption of a weapon that would come to be crucial in the 
First World War. 
Nevertheless, despite the limited allocation of machine guns, the Boer War did provide valuable 
lessons on the necessity for the improvement of infantry marksmanship and firepower.  In spite of 
early difficulties and occasional setbacks, by the eve of the First World War considerable progress in 
fire tactics had been made.  Infantry tactics in combination with field artillery had also improved and 
will be discussed in depth in subsequent chapters.  The British Army had come a long way from the 
force that was forced to deliver clumsy and inaccurate volleys against well-concealed Boers in 1899.  
By 1914 every infantryman was expected to be capable of delivering 15 aimed shots per minute when 
required, and in practice many men exceeded this expectation and could deliver 20 or more.152  In this 
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respect the British regular infantryman had the best standard of marksmanship in Europe, and the 
effectiveness of British rifle fire would become famous during the early clashes of the First World 
War.  The emphasis on training accurate marksmanship against an the enemy within 600 yards range, 
which had been urged by Lord Roberts after the Boer War and supported by the School of Musketry, 
was vindicated during early First World War engagements.  Notes from the Front reported that “A 
short field of fire (500 yards or less) has been found sufficient to check a German infantry attack”, and 
successful defences were mounted at even shorter distances.153  The improvement and success of 
British marksmanship in 1914 can be directly attributed to the lessons that had been learned so 
painfully against the Boers in South Africa. 
Entrenchment 
The use of earthworks and entrenchments was not an entirely unknown art to the British Army on the 
eve of the Boer War.  More advanced colonial opposition in Egypt had made use of trenches and 
Britain’s tribal foes sometimes sought recourse to the employment of hill forts and other methods of 
primitive fortification.  However, the Boers were to provide a rude awakening with the complexity 
and the depth of their trenches, which provided excellent protection against both British artillery and 
rifle fire.  Furthermore, by making use of large amounts of native labour, the Boers were able to 
construct complex entrenchments in a relatively short timeframe, while the burghers who were to man 
them remained fresh.  A veteran of the British 6th Division recalled that “Bitter experience has shown 
us that to give the Boer time was to ensure an elaborate system of trenches and obstacles being added 
to his defensive assets.”154  The shelter these earthworks provided was extremely impressive.  For 
example, the trenches dug by the Boers at the Battle of Paardeberg provided such cover that casualties 
amongst the burghers were relatively low despite being under the regular bombardment of field and 
heavy artillery for over a week.  Inspecting the trenches after the surrender of Cronje’s laager, Lord 
Roberts commented, “They had constructed their trenches in an extraordinarily skilful manner.  Deep 
narrow trenches, with each side well hollowed out, in which they got complete shelter from shellfire, 
and if their food could have lasted, they might have defied this large force for some time to 
come…”155 
As well as providing excellent protection from incoming fire, Boer trenches were often extremely 
well concealed.  Combined with smokeless powder, this made locating the enemy before and during 
an attack a considerable challenge.  At the Battle of Colenso, a pre-battle bombardment had failed to 
inflict any damage on the Boers or even locate their main position.  Most famously of all, at the Battle 
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of Magersfontein the Boers had decided against placing their trenches on the summit of the kopje, and 
instead sited them at the base.  This unexpected move allowed the flat trajectory Boer rifles an 
excellent field of fire across the open plain in front of them.156  Equally, the tactic completely 
deceived the British under the leadership of Lord Methuen.  Prior to the attack, the real Boer trenches 
were not discovered, and instead British artillery carried out a heavy, two-hour bombardment of the 
largely deserted kopje.  Total Boer casualties from this shelling were just 3 men wounded.157  The 
subsequent night attack against the position miscarried disastrously, with delays and confusion 
causing the British to be caught in close order formation several hundred yards short of the Boer line 
at dawn.158  Leo Amery considered the placement of the Boer trenches at this battle “one of the 
boldest and most original conceptions in the history of war”, and while subsequent historians have 
been less impressed with the originality of the idea, there is no denying it came as an extremely 
unpleasant shock for the British.159 
In stark contrast to the Boers, British infantry expertise in constructing trenches was noticeably 
lacking.  Pre-war infantry regulations only recognised two kinds of shelter trenches, the ‘half-hour’ 
and the ‘hour’ named for the amount of time it was expected to take for them to be constructed.160  
These trenches were tiny compared to those of the Boers, being only 1½ feet deep, and although it 
was considered possible to increase their size if time permitted, in reality this was rarely practised in 
peacetime for fear of leaving dangerous obstacles behind for cavalry, or because of concerns that the 
land upon which the training was taking place was privately owned.161  In 1900, Sir Howard Vincent 
was scathing over this lack of training, writing: 
I think at some manoeuvres they have a piece of tape to represent a trench, or something of 
that sort.  That is the ridiculous farce which is played, and all because we cannot compensate 
some farmer or must not disturb some squire’s game, or something of that kind.162 
More detailed and serious entrenchment work was considered to be the domain of the Royal 
Engineers and the infantry was greatly dependent upon them in this regard.163  While a proportion of 
infantry carried a small entrenching spade, heavier tools were carried on pack animals and in local 
transport, only being distributed when digging in was considered necessary.164  However, both types 
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of tools were considered extremely poor for work on anything other than soft ground.  Major General 
Sir H.J.T Hildyard, who had commanded one of the best-trained brigades at the outset of the Boer 
War, remembered that the tools were “universally condemned” by both junior officers and men.165  
Indeed, his troops had much preferred Boer picks and shovels, and had taken them for their own use 
whenever the opportunity presented itself.166 
Poor equipment, limited training and over reliance upon the Royal Engineers had created a distinctly 
negative attitude towards the effort required to entrench properly.  Much as there had been a 
disinclination to take cover in the early part of the war, initially the men were resentful of the labour 
required to entrench and saw little value in it.167  An anonymous general in the field was reported as 
complaining of British troops, “I believe if our people were here for a month they would never 
entrench.”168  Major General Sir H.M.L Rundle issued a memo dated June 13th 1900 that summed up 
many of the problems associated with the attitude towards entrenchment: 
…Up to date I have failed to see intelligent use made of entrenchments by Brigadiers or by 
the troops under their command; they appear to think that a few stones hastily gathered 
together or 6in. of earth hastily scraped up at haphazard is adequate protection against modern 
gun and rifle fire.169 
The poor understanding and attitude towards entrenchment in the Boer War was neatly expressed in 
the famous tactical treatise The Defence of Duffer’s Drift, where the unfortunate protagonist is called 
upon to organise a defensive position, only to be repeatedly defeated through simple yet unforeseen 
errors.  Amongst others, these include making a shallow bullet proof trench that is vulnerable to 
artillery, making a completely straight trench that is too easily enfiladed and failing to conceal a 
trench line, allowing the Boers to observe a planned ambush from miles away.  The author summed 
this final point up with the words “To surprise the enemy is a great advantage… If you wish to obtain 
this advantage, conceal your position.  Though for promotion it may be sound to advertise your 
position, for defence it is not.”170 
As with the reluctance to take cover, experience under fire gradually began to erode the poor attitude 
towards entrenchment.  Boer methods were admired and imitated.171  Rundle felt that the examination 
of the Boer trenches at Paardeberg created a sensation throughout much of Lord Roberts’s army, and 
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its design was subsequently adopted throughout his divisions.172  The unpleasant experience of being 
shelled and under heavy rifle fire soon encouraged greater efforts with the spade, as the consequences 
of inadequate preparation were often fatal.173  By the latter stages of the war entrenchment was greatly 
improved, as then Major General Hubert Plumer recalled: 
…they [Plumer’s men] were very good at it, they were very intelligent, and in fact it did not 
require at the end of the war to tell them to entrench themselves; they always did it as a matter 
of course. 
We took up a position, and expected after an hour or so to find our men entrenched, and with 
very rare exceptions it was so; but at the beginning of the war we had to explain to them how 
very important it was and what a difference it would make.174 
Conflicting ideas on methods of entrenchment emerged in the aftermath of the Boer War.  While skill 
at ‘digging in’ had steadily improved, the standard British entrenching tool remained universally 
reviled.  James Grierson felt the tool could be abandoned entirely, arguing it was impossible to dig in 
under fire, and that it would always be possible to bring up mules carrying shovels and picks when 
necessary.175  Equally, Ian Hamilton expressed concerns that while entrenchment was valuable, the 
carrying of heavy tools by infantry would reduce their mobility too much.176  The old system of tools 
being brought to the front when necessary persisted until the Russo-Japanese War.  This conflict 
highlighted the fact that entrenchment had gained considerably in importance, in both attack and 
defence.  Ruminating on the experience, the Duke of Connaught cautioned, “It would appear that it is 
unsafe in modern war to trust entirely in carts or pack animals for the transport of entrenching 
tools.”177  Moves towards creating a more efficient entrenching tool proceeded slowly, but by 1907 a 
superior pattern had been devised and was carried by men and NCOs.  Heavier equipment such as 
picks continued to be carried on pack animals and in carts.178 
In terms of training and practical work, the army initially placed a great deal of thought and effort into 
improving entrenching methods and tactics.  Entrenchment was particularly emphasised during 
training at Aldershot, where there were facilities for digging and constructing thorough trench lines.  
Divisions were praised for their detailed work that took into account the experiences of the Boer War, 
particularly in terms of cleverly siting trenches and providing concealment and covered approaches.179  
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The standards by which the work was judged were extremely high.  For example, a trench constructed 
by a battalion from 2nd Division was picked out for criticism, the inspector noting, “It is perhaps 
hypercritical… but some trenches on the heather were concealed with bracken when a mixture of fern 
and heather would have been better.”180  While in command at Aldershot, Sir John French repeatedly 
emphasised the need for skill in the use of trenches, writing in 1905: 
I would strongly impress upon infantry officers that the skilful use of entrenchments is one of 
the most powerful weapons in their armoury, and I urge them here, also, to recall their own 
experiences and impress upon their minds the lesson which these have taught.181 
Aldershot was well suited for training in entrenchment, possessing government owned land that could 
be dug up and worked upon as required.  Soil at Aldershot was sandy and thus easily worked, 
although the loose nature of the earth could prove problematic when constructing deeper 
entrenchments.  However, for other elements of the British Army this was not the case.  Southern 
Command was particularly lacking in appropriate ground for entrenchment training.182  A further 
problem was that as the years passed by, the quality of training in entrenchment was observed to be in 
something of a decline, with elementary aspects poorly understood and an overemphasis upon 
elaborate schemes.  In a 1910 report, Sir John French complained, “I do not believe that instruction in 
the practical, thorough entrenching of positions receives adequate attention, although a few years ago 
it was a prominent feature of all our larger exercises and manoeuvres.”183  Despite being an issue 
singled out for improvement by the Army Council, problems with entrenching continued to be 
identified right up until the outbreak of the First World War.  Individual spade work was considered 
good, but there remained limited tactical thought in the placement of trenches and rarely was 
consideration given to steps necessary for them to be occupied for long term periods.184  Little 
improvement was evident by 1913, and it was considered that infantry had regressed in this regard.185 
A number of factors were responsible for the disregard of the lessons that had been learned in South 
Africa.  Ian Hamilton identified a natural turn over in the numbers of men and junior officers who had 
seen action as an influence, noting in 1908: 
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...[in the last three years] there has been an inevitable steady process of replacing war-trained 
subalterns, sergeants and corporals by young officers and non-commissioned officers of 
similar rank who have not as yet been able to profit by the experiences of field service.186 
This process continued throughout the pre-First World War period, and by 1914, 46,291 men of the 
British Expeditionary Force had less than two years’ experience with the colours.187  As the soldiers 
of the Boer War had been inclined to regard entrenchment as tedious and time consuming prior to the 
experience of combat, so these new soldiers and junior officers were inclined to form the same 
opinion without the shock of incoming fire to dispel it.  A further problem for the British Army was 
the increasing emphasis on the offensive, to the point where passive defence was considered fatal for 
any hope of success.  Infantry training manuals emphasised the importance of the offensive, 
downgrading the value of strong entrenchments and seeing them as primarily being of use in terms of 
reducing the number of men needed to hold a position, allowing more troops to be used in a counter 
attack.  Field Service Regulations 1909 stated “The choice of a position and its preparation must be 
made with a view to economizing the power expended on defence in order that the power of 
offence may be increased.” [Emphasis in original].188 It is likely that this great focus on the offensive 
contributed to the general apathy towards entrenchment work that pervaded British training in the 
latter stages of the period. 
Of all the key lessons learned by the infantry in South Africa, entrenchment had the least lasting 
influence.  While in the years immediately following the Boer War entrenchment had been well 
practised and understood, the tactical use of earthworks underwent something of a regression in the 
later part of the Edwardian period, despite the example of the Russo-Japanese War proving it was 
more important than ever.  Over-emphasis on the offensive, a decline in the numbers of war hardened 
soldiers and a lack of facilities upon which to train all played a part in the fading of these important 
lessons.  Nevertheless, the standard of entrenching in the infantry had come a considerable way from 
the virtually non-existent level it had been at in 1899 prior to the Boer War.  While the First World 
War would ultimately require a revision of entrenchment methods and tactics as trenches became the 
dominant aspect of the battlefield, in the early months of the war the experience of the Boer War 
helped to give the British infantry a basic grounding in entrenchment tactics.  Nevertheless, the heavy 
German artillery fire of 1914 came as an unpleasant shock for the British and necessitated the 
reiteration of the lessons of concealment and depth for trenches that had originally been identified in 
South Africa, but which had declined during the years of peace that followed.189 
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Conclusions 
From 1902 – 1914 the infantry of the British Army experienced a vast overhaul of training and tactics.  
The British Expeditionary Force of 1914 was tactically almost unrecognisable from the army that had 
been defeated by the Boers at Colenso, Magersfontein and Stormberg in 1899.    Whereas the 
Victorian infantry system had placed faith in volley firing and cumbersome, linear formations, the 
army of 1914 utilised flexible tactics that emphasised dispersion, intelligent use of the ground and 
skilful employment of fire power.     
Despite the persistence of some tactical and material weaknesses, the British infantry of 1914 were far 
better trained to wage modern war than they had been in 1899.  The lessons of the Boer War were 
sometimes ambiguous and often challenged, but the key themes of dispersion, use of ground, 
maximisation of infantry fire power and the value of spade work emerged from the conflict and 
became the core tactical principles for the infantry.  As previously discussed, useful lessons had often 
emerged from colonial conflicts in the Victorian period, but a failure to disseminate them to the wider 
army meant they had little impact beyond the regiments who had fought in therm.  In this regard the 
Boer War was different.  By sucking in virtually all the regular regiments of the British Army it 
ensured the fighting was experienced by a far wider audience than had smaller campaigns such as 
Tirah or Sudan.  Furthermore, the embarrassment of struggling to overcome two of the smallest 
nations in the world while the rest of Europe watched with a mixture of hostility and schadenfreude 
emphasised the need for rapid, thorough and lasting reforms.  While the Boer War ended in victory 
for the British, early defeats, the long duration and the bitter guerrilla nature of the final years of the 
conflict meant that there was no time to bask in glory or feel anything but fleeting satisfaction over 
the result.  In this regard, the struggle in South Africa not only provided the tactical direction for 
future developments but crucially gave the impetus for wholesale reform that had been missing during 
the years of easy victories in the Victorian era. 
With hindsight, it is possible to identify aspects of the reforms that did not develop as fully as perhaps 
they should have.  In particular, the failure to equip the infantry with machine guns in greater numbers 
was undoubtedly an unfortunate decision, but as has been demonstrated a combination of financial 
restrictions and the poor performance of the weapon in South Africa militated against its wider 
adoption.  However, in placing emphasis on such errors, there is a danger of ignoring or marginalising 
the fact that as a whole, British infantry tactics and training improved to a previously unknown level, 
placing them considerably in advance of European rivals.  Not only were useful tactical lessons 
derived from South Africa, but the need for improved training to ensure they were absorbed by the 
army was also identified and successfully implemented.   
95 
 
The process of infantry reform begun by the Boer War had born fruit by the outbreak of the First 
World War, and the experience gained in South Africa led directly to the creation of the highly trained 
B.E.F. infantryman of 1914.  The ability to fight in dispersed formation and produce very rapid and 
accurate rifle fire came from reforms introduced as a direct result of the Boer War.  In the confused 
opening battles of August 1914, these skills were to be decisive in allowing the British Army to fight 
crucial delaying actions against the numerically superior Germans.  Whereas the French and German 
infantry attacked in clumsy, dense formations and suffered terrible casualties in the opening months, 
the British infantry displayed superior tactics of both fire and formation, shocking the attacking 
Germans in crucial defensive battles such as Mons and Le Cateau.  British performance in these early 
battles gave the ‘Old Contemptibles’ an enduring reputation for skill and determination that proved 
that many of the hard lessons of the Boer War had been well learned. 
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Chapter Three 
Artillery 
 
The Boer War was a rude awakening for the entire British Army, but the arm which received the 
greatest surprise was the Royal Artillery.  The gunners had to look back several decades to the 
Crimean War to find a conflict in which they faced an enemy who was comparably armed, while 
years of small scale colonial warfare had left little room for the artillery, which generally had a very 
limited combat role against crudely armed foes.  Lacking practical experience of fighting against 
technologically equal enemies, the gunners based much of their doctrine upon German writing which 
drew examples from the Franco-Prussian War.  Unfortunately, many of these ideas were to prove 
irrelevant to artillery combat on the veldt. 
Although the Royal Artillery possessed a substantial numerical advantage over the handful of guns 
available to the Boers, in the early battles of the war the British were often disappointed by the 
performance of their long arm.  The Boer gunners refused to conform to expectations of battle derived 
from the Franco-Prussian War, which suggested guns of both sides should engage in a preliminary 
artillery ‘duel’ against one another in the open.  Instead, the Boers made the most of concealment, 
long range and dispersion to continuously harass the British, despite the best efforts of the Royal 
Artillery to locate and destroy them.  Although the physical damage inflicted by the Boer guns was 
small, its impact on morale was considerable.  The apparent effectiveness of Boer artillery tactics 
were greatly magnified by the reporting of the British press, further heaping humiliation upon the 
Royal Artillery. 
These embarrassments and the press reaction to them caused the government to approve a complete 
overhaul of the equipment of the Royal Artillery, with new guns and howitzers for both field and 
heavy artillery being introduced.  In technical terms, particularly range and rate of fire, the guns of 
1914 represented an enormous advancement from those with which the British had gone to war in 
1899.  However, the difficulty for the Royal Artillery in the years following the Boer War was 
designing workable tactics and doctrine to take advantage of these new weapons.  The Boer War had 
shaken many long held ideas in the artillery and a variety of replacement theories struggled for 
prominence in the years preceding the First World War.  While initially ideas from the war in South 
Africa were dominant, as the period progressed there were concerns that the conditions on the veldt 
and the nature of Boer artillery were both radically different from those likely to be encountered in a 
potential European conflict, and therefore influences from the continent and the Russo-Japanese War 
became popular, further complicating the process of developing new tactics.  Technological changes 
were fundamentally altering the employment of field artillery, while the permanent introduction of 
heavy guns into the field marked a new tactical element which had only been seen on rare occasions 
in the previous wars.  At the same time the gunners were grappling with these changes, there was a 
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gradual but growing recognition that on a fire swept battlefield, artillery would become the dominant 
weapon.   
Whereas the infantry of the B.E.F. have won much praise from historians for their development in the 
aftermath of the Boer War, the Royal Artillery of 1914 has not received such universal admiration.  
Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham have offered praise for the Royal Artillery in the post-Boer 
War years, noting that intelligent officers, particularly those who had fought in South Africa, were 
working hard to improve tactics. 1 
However, competing theories and a lack of consensus on their value meant that a level of uncertainty 
over correct artillery doctrine persisted.2  Conversely, Robert Scales has been critical of the artillery, 
arguing that too much faith was placed in the lessons of the Boer War, blinding the gunners to 
developments on the continent.  Scales argues that by 1914 the British artillery was materially and 
tactically inferior to that of Germany, and cites the heavy losses suffered by the Royal Artillery at the 
Battle of Le Cateau 26th August 1914 as an example of how German gunners were more combat 
effective.3  Edward Spiers has taken a more balanced view, feeling that the artillery possessed a well 
considered doctrine by the eve of the First World War.  However, Spiers suggests this was not due to 
the Boer War experience but was instead formed by the “fortuitous coincidence” of the examples of 
the Russo-Japanese War and closer links with the French military following the entente of 1904.4   
The variety of historical opinion concerning the effectiveness of the Royal Artillery in 1914 mirrors 
the lack of consensus that existed within the arm during the pre-First World War period.   However, 
despite a number of weaknesses within the long arm in 1914, the Royal Artillery had developed 
considerably both materially and tactically from the force that had gone to war in 1899.  This chapter 
will argue that the experiences and lessons of the Boer War were a driving force for effective reform 
during the period.  Although certain aspects of the Boer War were unique and sometimes misleading, 
key ideas were implanted in the minds of the Royal Artillery during the conflict.  The Russo-Japanese 
War provided important artillery examples, but many of these tended to confirm existing lines of 
thought rather than generate completely new ideas.  The continental influence offered some useful 
comparisons, but the much admired French artillery suffered from several serious tactical and material 
flaws of its own, and attempts to adopt its methods were potentially misleading.  However, the most 
serious problem during this period of reform was the failure to create a true artillery doctrine from 
these competing theories.  Instead, flexibility of method was encouraged which allowed certain 
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outdated ideas to survive right up until the First World War.  Nevertheless, in spite of this problem, 
the Royal Artillery had advanced enormously in terms of tactics from 1899 to 1914, and fought 
tenaciously against vastly superior numbers of German guns in the opening battles in August 1914. 
Discussion of this topic will be structured around several important developments within the artillery 
branch during the 1902 – 1914 period, all of which had their roots in the experiences of the Boer War.  
It will cover the ongoing debate within the Royal Artillery over the potential usefulness of long range 
fire and how best to incorporate the new branch of Heavy Artillery into the existing tactical 
framework.  Additionally, the vociferous debate over whether engaging from concealed positions or 
using close range deployment in the open was the correct method to employ will be analysed, along 
with the development of the relatively new indirect support weapon in the form of the field howitzer.  
The final part of the chapter will concentrate upon arguably the greatest tactical problem that 
dominated thinking amongst artilleryman, namely how best to support infantry, especially during the 
attack.  Taking these themes as a base, this chapter will demonstrate how the Boer War provided a 
crucial impetus for artillery reform.  Although the lessons from South Africa sometimes proved to be 
misleading, its tactical influence provided a crucial starting point for future development.  Further 
shaped by examples from Manchuria and the continent, the Royal Artillery was able to develop tactics 
by 1914 that were a considerable advance on the faulty ideas with which it had gone to war against 
the Boers. 
Long Range Fire and Heavy Guns 
On the eve of the Boer War the Royal Artillery remained wedded to tactical ideas developed by the 
Germans during the Franco-Prussian War.  Part of the Prussian experience was that long range fire 
was generally ineffective, and therefore it was felt shooting at ranges above 1,800 yards should be 
avoided if possible.5  While modern artillery pieces of the 1890s were technically capable of 
delivering fire at far longer ranges, it was generally believed that any shots beyond observable 
distance would be wasted, and therefore the Royal Artillery worked towards securing maximum 
accuracy and effect at shorter ranges.  To this end, the practice range at Okehampton was just 1,500 
yards long in 1897, although it had been increased to 2,148 yards by 1899.6  Other arms endorsed 
such ideas.  For example, the infantry anticipated 3,000 yards to be the extreme “useful range” of 
hostile artillery, and did not expect to come under fire at greater distances.7  The limited experience 
the artillery had gained in fighting against colonial foes had done nothing to shake this faith in close 
range action, and indeed the guns had fought at almost point-blank distances against the Zulus and the 
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Dervishes.  Although time would prove this to be a weakness against the Boers, on the eve of the 
conflict there was felt to be little cause for concern.  Even staunch critic Leo Amery felt the British 
artillery was “perhaps the best trained in Europe” prior to the war.8 
 Unfortunately for the Royal Artillery, lessons drawn from a war fought thirty years earlier and 
limited experience against primitively armed foes had done little to prepare the arm for combat 
against a determined enemy equipped with modern weapons.  Small arms fire against gun crews had 
been a growing feature of warfare from the American Civil War onwards, and the latest long range, 
smokeless rifles made close range tactics extremely dangerous for the artillerymen.  However, 
amongst many colonial veterans this fact went unrecognised.  Captain N.F. Gordon related a 
conversation with a handful of officers of the Natal Field Force prior to them seeing action, where one 
veteran of “small wars” offered the opinion that;  
...long and medium ranges would hardly ever be necessary, that the motto for the mounted 
artilleryman should be ‘Push forward, push forward’ and that endeavours should be made to 
first come into action 500 yards to 800 yards from the objective, which should ensure success 
to your own side and be very bad indeed for the enemy.9 
However, in the face of modern small arms fire, these tactics were dangerously out of date.  This fact 
was brought into stark focus in the early months of the Boer War, when an attempt to make use of the 
kind of daring tactics that had worked in ‘savage’ warfare failed disastrously.  At the Battle of 
Colenso, Colonel Charles Long took two batteries of field artillery into close range action in the open 
against an entrenched Boer position, without any friendly infantry support.  Redvers Buller 
subsequently put the range as “...1,200 yards, and I believe within 300 yards of the enemy’s rifle 
pits.”10 Long had fought at Omdurman where he had caught the eye with the daring handling of his 
guns, and he was reported by a journalist as expressing the opinion on the voyage to South Africa that 
“the only way to smash these beggars is to rush in on them.”11  While this may have been appropriate 
in the Sudan, where the Dervishes had been armed with hand to hand weapons and fought in the open, 
at Colenso the Boers were equipped with modern rifles and fought from well dug trenches.  At such 
close range, the contest was an unequal one despite the courage of the gunners.  Long was seriously 
wounded, while crews and horses suffered heavy losses.  The batteries managed to sustain the action 
for almost an hour before mounting casualties forced the gunners to fall back, abandoning their 
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weapons in the open.12  Valiant attempts to recover the lost pieces followed, resulting in further 
casualties including the death of Lord Roberts’s only son.  However, despite the best efforts of a 
number of volunteers, only two of the twelve abandoned guns were brought back to British lines.  The 
Boers dragged the remainder away in the night, completing a humiliating reverse for the British, 
especially for the artillerymen, who prided themselves on preventing the loss of guns in action.13  
Explaining his tactics, Long later claimed that he had been confused by the atmospheric conditions 
and had got closer to the Boers than he had intended.14  Some years after the war he also somewhat 
uncharitably blamed Buller for not giving him more precise guidance, relating to another officer that 
when Buller pointed out the position he wanted Long to occupy, “his damned, fat thumb covered 
three square miles of the map!”15  It remains unclear how and why Long blundered into such a 
dangerous position, but it is likely that the reckless charge was the product of the misleading 
experiences of numerous wars against ill armed opposition. 
Long’s close range disaster at Colenso was not repeated by other batteries, but the dangers posed by 
infantry fire remained serious.  At the Battle of Elandslaagte, Boer marksmen wounded several 
gunners including the commander of one battery, and at the Battle of Stormberg, while covering the 
British retreat, 77th Battery came under such intense rifle fire that its commanding officer gave the 
order for the gunners to kneel while working the guns.16  It was clear that old methods inspired by the 
Franco-Prussian War and colonial actions were no longer adequate in the face of well armed infantry.  
Significantly, when Lord Roberts took charge in South Africa, the very first point relating to artillery 
in his ‘Notes for Guidance’ was “At the commencement of an action Artillery should not be ordered 
to take up a position until it has been ascertained by scouts to be clear of the enemy and out of range 
of Infantry fire.”17  With Boer rifle fire considered capable of inflicting casualties at 1500 yards or 
more, this forced the guns to rely on longer ranged fire than it had been possible to practice at 
Okehampton for much of the pre-war period, and represented quite a shock to artillerymen who had 
not considered small arms fire to be dangerous at more than 1,000 yards.18   
However, a further problem regarding appropriate ranges also confronted the artillery.  Despite the 
varied experience of imperial conflict, a significant gap in British military knowledge was methods of 
combat against enemy guns.  Foes encountered in colonial actions had lacked any meaningful 
artillery, and the example of fighting the Russians in the Crimea was rendered largely irrelevant by 
the tremendous technological advancements that had occurred during the following decades.  The 
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Boer War would represent the first time in almost fifty years that the Royal Artillery faced a foe with 
comparable, and in some respects superior weapons.  As the Boers could not financially sustain a gun 
for gun arms race with Britain prior to the war, emphasis had been placed upon gaining qualitative 
advantages by importing the most modern European artillery.   Weapons used by the Boers included 
75mm field guns from French and German manufacturers, plus the notorious Creusot 155mm, 
nicknamed “Long Tom” by the British.19  These weapons were manned by the Transvaal’s 
Staadtsartillerie and the Orange Free State’s Artillerie Korps.  Amounting to a little over 1000 men, 
these two small formations represented the only professional element of the militia based Boer 
military.  While some historians have considered that the level of tactics amongst the Boer gunners 
did not match the quality of their equipment, more recent scholarship has argued that following the 
botched Jameson Raid in 1896, the artillerists took their duties very seriously and worked hard to 
improve their gunnery and tactical handling.20 
Of these weapons, the one that was to create the most profound shock and have the longest lasting 
influence upon the British was the “Long Tom”.  The 155mm was essentially a fortress gun designed 
to be placed in a fixed mounting.  British intelligence had identified their presence in the Boer arsenal 
but assumed they were to be used in the recently constructed fortifications around Pretoria, noting that 
they were “not really mobile guns at all.”21  However, against all expectations, the Boers were able to 
move these weapons into the field and maintained such mobility with them that the British were never 
able to capture one intact.  Combined with its inherent range, the uniquely clear atmospheric 
conditions of South Africa meant that these “Long Toms” could deliver surprisingly accurate fire at 
ranges of 10,000 yards and beyond.  Even the smaller field pieces of the Boers were typically used to 
fire at long ranges, refusing to engage the British in a straightforward gun duel and instead relying on 
distant, harassing fire.22  
The actual effectiveness of this long range shooting was a matter of some debate within the British 
Army.  The Boers suffered persistent problems with their fuses which meant their shells often burst in 
the ground or not at all, seriously reducing their effectiveness.  However, when the fuses were correct 
and the ammunition worked properly, they were capable of inflicting damage at unprecedented 
ranges.  Lord Roberts related an example of a Boer shell fired from around 7 miles away hitting a 
Volunteer company of the Gordon Highlanders, killing and wounding 18 men, while an artillery 
officer of the Natal Field Force remembered a single Boer shell causing 21 casualties at 
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approximately 10,000 yards.23  Nevertheless, such shots were rare and casualties from very long range 
fire were limited.  Ruminating on this fire, one officer noted that Boer shells regularly “...burst with 
marvellous accuracy, but, for the most part, entirely harmlessly.”24  Henry Brackenbury expressed a 
more critical view of the value of the “Long Toms”.  
...I do not think the physical effect of the Boer heavy guns was ever anything at all.  They 
never did any serious harm of any sort, and nothing was so astonishing to me, and I think to 
many others among us, as the extraordinary moral effect which the presence of these big guns 
had upon our troops, especially the cavalry.25 
Despite Brackenbury’s surprise, it must be remembered that being under hostile artillery fire was a 
new and uniquely frightening experience for much of the British Army.  Having not faced artillery in 
over fifty years, it was perhaps inevitable that being shelled by long range guns would exert a 
disproportionate effect.  Rear-Admiral Hedworth Lambton, commanding the Naval detachment 
trapped at Ladysmith, highlighted the problem; 
What really caused the depression was the extraordinary ignorance of the power of Long 
Tom.  So far as I can make out there was hardly a single soldier who had ever seen a big gun, 
and the exaggerated apprehension of this gun was really very marked.26 
How to deal with this long range fire was a problem for the British.  Standard field artillery armament 
was the 15-pound gun, with the horse artillery possessing a smaller, more mobile 12-pound gun, both 
of which were out ranged by the 155mm despite the best efforts of Royal Artillery officers to deliver 
effective counter battery fire.  The absence of a mobile, long range gun was a clear gap in the 
equipment of the British Army, a legacy of years of colonial war against opponents who possessed no 
real artillery of their own and could thus be engaged at close range.  Lacking suitable equipment, the 
British brought 4.7 inch naval guns into the field, mounted on improvised carriages taken from heavy 
howitzers, as an emergency stop gap to deal with Boer 155mm.27  These pieces certainly possessed 
comparable range to the “Long Toms”, and were able to engage at up to 11,000 yards, although 8,000 
yards was generally considered the limit of truly effective range.28  However, they had never been 
intended for field use, and as with all improvised weapons they suffered from certain drawbacks, 
particularly regarding their heavy carriage and consequent lack of mobility.  Despite matching the 
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“Long Toms” for range, the 4.7 inch guns did not win universal praise.  Artillerymen themselves 
recognised that bringing the weapon into the field was essentially a compromise solution, and few 
were satisfied that it had achieved an acceptable balance of power, range and mobility.29  Other 
officers had even stronger criticisms.  For example, Lt. General Sir Archibald Hunter was especially 
scathing, recounting that the shooting of the 4.7 inch guns manned by naval crews in Ladysmith was 
so bad “that I offered to take the girls out of the school to come and serve the guns, and make as good 
practice.”30  Some older artillerymen felt the press had blown the danger of long range fire out of all 
proportion, and that using the 4.7 inch guns at all was a waste of resources and ammunition.  One 
retired gunner complained in 1900: 
The public are very much exercised because we do not fire at from 8,000 to 10,000 yards.  
What is the good of firing at from 8,000 to 10,000 yards?  How much is that?  From 4.5 to 6.5 
miles... I say it is perfectly impossible to make accurate practice at such distances...I think 
these great ranges have been utterly useless, and I hope, for Heaven’s sake, we shall not copy 
them. 31 
Nevertheless, the 4.7 inch gun also drew praise, particularly from the infantry who appreciated its 
ability to engage the Boer long range guns on equal terms.  Lt. General Hildyard considered that; 
“The heavier guns in use have proved of great value.  The 4.7 inch Naval Gun is the only one that can 
compete with the Boer guns in range, and any fire [sic] operating without them feels itself, in a certain 
sense, in an inferiority.”32  Commanding officers such as Buller and Charles Warren also singled out 
the 4.7 inch for praise, particularly in support of infantry attacks.33  While the actual equipment was 
regarded with a somewhat circumspect eye by many soldiers, other officers saw the value of long 
range fire as being one of the most important lessons to be drawn from the Boer War.34  Even the 
critical Archibald Hunter noted “I think one of the chief lessons of the war that the Boers taught us is 
how to move guns of positions about and use them as field artillery.”35  It was also a point of concern 
that the Boers had sprung such a surprise upon the British with their long range guns, and the fear that 
it could happen again with disastrous results if the Royal Artillery was not properly equipped.  
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Artilleryman G.H. Marshall recognised that “...as long as the Boers or anybody else have a long range 
gun against us we are bound, even if only for the moral effect, to have a gun of equal range.”36   
The need for artillery to engage at greater ranges, both to avoid the effects of small arms fire and also 
to deal with long range enemy artillery soon received official endorsement, with the new attitude 
towards combat distances being reflected in post war drill books.  Whereas prior to the war, it had 
been considered that 2,500 – 3,500 yards was “medium to distant” range, in 1902  artillery range 
tables put “distant” range as 4,500  - 6,000 yards.37  “Effective” range was considered to be 3,500 – 
2,000 yards, with ranges below this termed “decisive”.  Heavy batteries were given a separate ranging 
table which put their maximum range at 10,000 yards.  These ranging standards were first introduced 
in 1902 and remained in force throughout the period up to the outbreak of the First World War.38  To 
facilitate training at these new ranges, Okehampton had its target area extended, with the distance 
more than doubled from the 1897 length to 3,209 yards in 1902.39  By 1904, the artillery training 
range at Salisbury Plain stood at an impressive 4,000 yards.40   
While the older 15-pound field gun had been able to achieve ranges beyond pre-war expectations in 
South Africa, for the gunners to deliver effective fire consistently at such distances required new 
equipment.  Artillerymen had been agitating for a rearmament programme in the years prior to the 
Boer War, and the shock of the opening six months caused the government to approve a complete 
overhaul of artillery weapons.  However, the experience of combat in South Africa generated a 
considerable debate on the nature of any future field artillery.  The capacity of the Boers to bring very 
large weapons into the field and keep them mobile had been well matched by the British ability to 
keep 4.7 inch guns and heavy howitzers moving, even during column operations where mobility was 
considered a crucial asset.  Despite their weight, these heavy pieces acquired a good reputation 
amongst column commanders, and their popularity was such that attempts to remove the guns from 
columns were met with fierce resistance.41  In the years following the end of the war, a school of 
thought emerged which argued that the Boer War had shown that very heavy weapons could prove 
mobile enough for the purposes of infantry support, and therefore heavy artillery should become the 
new form of field artillery.  Ian Hamilton was an early champion of this viewpoint, relating to the 
Elgin Commission that “...I hold very strong views that there is no longer any room for Field Artillery 
in a modern army... It is uselessly mobile for the infantry...”.42  Other officers echoed this idea, with 
Leslie Rundle considering that “...we go for too light a gun.  I do not think horses galloping about is 
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[sic] necessary in modern warfare... I want to see heavy field artillery brought in and dragged up by 
mules, traction engines, or anything that would do it; that would be my tendency.”43  While the use of 
heavy pieces for field artillery was not a unanimous view, it did reflect a more general desire for 
improved range and especially firepower in the artillery that was common throughout the army.  
This urge for greater firepower ultimately bore fruit in the adoption of the 18-pound gun for field 
artillery and the 13-pound gun for horse artillery.  When its introduction was mooted, the 18-pounder 
was considerably more powerful in terms of shell weight than any gun in its class then in service in 
Europe, but it was also heavier.  There were concerns over the fact that the gun was too heavy and not 
in line with typical European artillery equipment, with the Secretary of State bemoaning that such a 
heavy weapon did not “conform to the rest of the world” and suggesting that setting out on a separate 
path would only end with Britain having to revert to European standard at great cost.44  However, the 
example of the Boer War was cited in response, the Adjutant General pointing out that “The great 
majority of officers who saw service were of the opinion that both Horse and Field Artillery guns 
should have greater range, and that the Field Artillery should have greater shell power.”45  By this 
point Ian Hamilton had moderated his views on heavy guns for field artillery after witnessing the 
difficulties experienced by the Japanese moving heavy pieces into action in Manchuria, and 
contributed to the discussion via letter endorsing the 18-pounder as a good compromise.46  After a 
considerable debate between the government and the Army Council, the new guns were somewhat 
reluctantly accepted by the Secretary of State.47  A technical response to the problems encountered in 
South Africa, the new weapons were nevertheless modern and powerful when the designs were 
accepted in 1904.  In terms of range and weight of shell the guns were excellent, and compared 
favourably with field guns then deployed by France, Germany and Russia.  Shields were fitted as 
standard to the weapons for the first time in the Royal Artillery, providing some protection for the 
crew, particularly from shrapnel and small arms fire, and encouraging the gunners to operate the gun 
while crouched.  However, despite their apparent quality, the new guns suffered from certain 
drawbacks which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
In addition to rearming the Field and Horse artillery, a better weapon for the newly formed heavy 
branch was required.  The 4.7 inch was an unsatisfactory compromise and although it remained in 
service for several years after the end of hostilities, a committee to consider its replacement was 
appointed in October 1902.48  As early as 1900, Lord Roberts had called for a new heavy gun and laid 
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down the simple requirements as, “Range 10,000 yards, weight behind the team not more than 4 tons, 
shell of as large a capacity as possible.”49  This resulted in the design, approval and subsequent 
introduction of the 60-pound gun in 1905-1906.  Compared to the difficulties of introducing the guns 
for Field and Horse artillery, the process of design for this heavy weapon was remarkably painless, 
the gun matching the specifications assigned by Lord Roberts in all respects except for an unavoidable 
extra half ton of weight.50 
Equipped with all these new, longer ranged weapons, the immediate issue facing the British was how 
to devise a doctrine for their usage.  This was especially difficult in the case of the heavy artillery, 
which had been born as a result of the Boer War, and as such had to draw virtually all its arguments 
for employment from this conflict.51  As Robert Scales has argued, the 60-pounder was a design 
which owed almost everything to the experience of the veldt.52  It was a flat trajectory gun, using 
heavy shrapnel as its principal ammunition, and, although it also carried a proportion of lyddite 
ammunition for dealing with ‘hard’ targets, the primary role of the weapon was as a man killer rather 
than a material destroyer.  This was very much inspired by the usage of heavy guns in South Africa, 
where, with the exception of entrenchments, the opportunities for material destruction had been 
relatively limited.  The veldt lacked built up urban areas or even large stretches of woodland where 
high explosive could be used with great effect.  Furthermore, the poor performance of lyddite 
explosive from heavy guns prejudiced many officers against its use and encouraged the use of 
shrapnel instead.53  Although heavy guns had been used to pound Boer trenches, their main duty had 
been to try and silence enemy artillery and sweep rear areas at great distances.  Regarding this topic, 
one officer wrote shortly after the war: 
Our South Africa experience has shewn us that the principle which we have long recognised 
as true in the case of the field gun, is equally so in the case of all guns used in the field, viz., 
that the gun is a man killing weapon, and shrapnel should therefore be its principal 
projectile.54   
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The sensation created by the Boers’ use of long range fire lingered in the memories of many soldiers.  
Officers had been shocked at the tremendous fear created by the shooting of the “Long Toms” in the 
early stages of the war, and hoped to create similar panic amongst potential enemies.55  To further 
facilitate this idea, some advocated copying Boer methods of extreme dispersion of heavy guns, to the 
point of using them as individual ‘sniper’ style weapons.  Winston Churchill was an early advocate of 
such tactics, but some officers also saw potential value, especially for terrifying colonial foes.56  
However, most artillerymen were disparaging of the idea, noting that it was wasteful of ammunition 
and produced a very limited physical effect when compared to concentrated fire.57   
Nevertheless, the Boer War did give birth to some useful ideas for the employment of heavy guns.  
Although Boer counter battery fire had been considered ineffective, this had generally been caused by 
faulty ammunition rather than poor shooting. Equipped with better fuses, heavy guns held the 
potential to inflict severe damage upon exposed field batteries, which would be unable to return fire 
due to the long range.58  While this advantage would be most pronounced when fighting on the 
defensive, methods of using heavy guns to silence enemy artillery in the attack were also considered, 
as this would allow the lighter guns to concentrate on enemy infantry.  There had been some examples 
of this in the Boer War, with the Battle of Alleman’s Nek 11th June 1900 cited by one officer as a 
good example. 
Our infantry had to cross an open plain to attack what looked like an impregnable position ... 
[but] the Boer guns were silenced by heavy guns; the 7th and 64th Field Batteries changed 
position under the cover of fire of our heavy guns, so as to enfilade the Boer position... This 
was practically the turning point of the action.59 
However, in contrast to these ideas, there was a distinct school of thought that was prejudiced against 
the employment of long range fire and saw little real future for heavy weapons.  There were concerns 
that the extreme ranges encountered in South Africa were unlikely to be repeated anywhere else, 
especially in Europe.  The atmosphere on the veldt had been remarkably clear, allowing observation at 
great distances, but in Europe this would not be the case.  As well as hazy conditions, the presence of 
villages, towns and woodland on the continent would further reduce the visible range.  Some officers 
countered this by pointing out conditions in parts of the Empire were similar to those that had been 
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found in South Africa, but the assertion that ranges in Europe would be so short as to devalue long 
range fire and limit the use of guns capable of employing it remained a constant theme throughout the 
era.60   
With many infantry officers seeing a limited role for long range fire in the future, forging links 
between the two arms proved difficult.  This was further exacerbated by the unusual organisational 
position of the Heavy Artillery.  Although the 60-pounder was a mobile gun capable of field 
operations, its size and weight meant that men of the Royal Garrison Artillery provided the crew.  
This caused the weapon to fall between two stools, being expected to perform in the field but not 
being manned by the Royal Field Artillery itself, and therefore occupying an anomalous position not 
entirely within the remit of either branch.  The initial training of Royal Garrison Artillery troops was 
in manning fortifications and heavy weapons on the seacoast.  Inevitably, this meant it took time to 
train the gunners in the skills needed for duties in the field, and early results were embarrassing.  For 
example, after watching the heavy guns at work at Okehampton in 1905, the camp commandant 
Colonel W.E. Blewitt was scathing, noting their standard of fire discipline was little more than 
“elementary” and going on to state, “Seeing the batteries left the impression on my mind that they had 
been only taught to fire very slowly at a 6 foot target.”61  Furthermore, the size and slow speed of the 
heavy guns made them a burden on commanders during manoeuvres, where time was often of the 
essence.  One gunner remembered how during the manoeuvres of 1903 “...it came to be a by-word not 
to get blocked by the ‘cow’ guns”.62  The danger of becoming stuck behind the slow moving weapons 
caused commanders to place them at the rear of marching columns, but this wasted much of their 
tactical value.  By engaging enemy guns, the Heavy Artillery could be expected to open up the battle, 
but if they were too far to the rear of a column then either time would be lost bringing them forward, 
or they would be forced to deploy rapidly in a potentially inadequate position.63  At the 1904 
manoeuvres, an officer reported the deleterious effects this had had: 
...the eight 4.7 inch guns... marched astern of the whole army corps when this was advancing 
by a single road, and, thanks to the drivers being on foot, they could not hurry to the front for 
action when fighting began and when the situation offered them a rare opportunity.64 
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An additional, unresolved problem was the lack of space on manoeuvres to really demonstrate the 
potential of heavy weapons.  Artillerymen had soon identified that a distinct asset of these guns was 
the ability to deliver enfilade or oblique fire by virtue of their great range.  Rather than being forced to 
engage directly against enemy lines, they could be pushed out to a flank, enabling their fire to rake the 
foe at an angle.  Combined Training picked up on the value of this idea and identified it as a key role 
of heavy artillery.65  However, while this was a fine tactical idea, implementing it in the cramped 
confines of the manoeuvre areas proved to be difficult.66  Some success was achieved in the 1906 
manoeuvres at Aldershot, where heavy guns enfiladed a defensive position considered to be 
impregnable from the front, but problems in achieving this kind of effect and having it recognised on 
manoeuvres remained throughout the period.67  By deploying at great distances and out of sight of 
much of the army, Heavy Artillery struggled to have its work recognised by the umpires.  Judging the 
effect of long range fire from heavy guns during manoeuvres could prove problematic, especially as 
the high pace of the exercises meant that targets were often fleeting. 
While the quality of battery training amongst the gunners improved markedly over the period, there 
was little matching development of their role at manoeuvres.  With just four guns assigned per 
division, the infantry rarely had the opportunity to train with the heavy pieces.  General Belfield, 
commanding 4th Division complained in 1908: 
One is not blessed in the Fourth Division with having a heavy battery, except for a very short 
period in the year, and then one must do one’s best to try and ascertain how best to employ 
it.68 
The situation showed little sign of improvement throughout the pre-war years.  Although the batteries 
were able to develop greater accuracy and skill on the field, in terms of work alongside the infantry, 
little advancement was made.  The commanding officer of the 35th Heavy Battery noted with 
disappointment in 1909 that “... the use of Heavy Artillery has gradually become neglected, until at 
the last manoeuvres it was scarcely (advisedly) used at all.”69 
The devaluing of long range fire in the aftermath of the Boer War left the role of heavy artillery 
poorly defined, and the experience of the Russo-Japanese War did little to clarify the issue.  The great 
use of earthworks and difficulty in taking them showed a need for heavier guns to smash trenches, but 
as one Russian participant noted “...flat-trajectory weapons would be useless... These conditions 
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imperatively demand the employment of high angle fire.”70  Designed as a long range man killer and 
counter battery weapon, the 60-pounder was not the type of gun that could break down complex 
earthworks.  Historian Robert Scales has been critical of this aspect of the design of the gun and 
compares it unfavourably with heavy German weapons that were designed to destroy material.71  
However, this criticism is somewhat unfair.  The British rearmed in the aftermath of the Boer War in 
the anticipation of using the weapons in a future colonial struggle against a wide variety of potential 
opponents, whereas the Germans could equip their batteries with the express intention of using them 
to destroy French and Belgian fortifications in Europe.72  The colonial duties of the British required 
them to possess weapons that would be appropriate for deployment around the globe, and thus the 60-
pounder was designed to be suitable in a variety of conflicts.  The British were well aware of the need 
to engage trenches and fortifications, and never intended the 60-pounder to be a substitute for the 
howitzer, which was expected to deal with enemy earthworks.  Indeed, despite Scales’s criticisms, the 
British kept the 60-pounder gun in service with minor modifications throughout the First World War, 
where it was principally used as a counter battery weapon, and it remained in use up until 1944.  In 
1914 they served the British well, with John Terraine considering the 60-pounder to be of 
“inestimable value” in the opening battles.73  
A more valid criticism is that the British did not develop a clear enough doctrine for usage of their 
heavy artillery once they had been equipped with it.  The guns were in short supply, with just a four 
gun battery being assigned per regular division at the outbreak of war, reflecting the fact the B.E.F. 
was not a mass army on the continental model.74  Although the old idea of using ‘sniper’ guns had 
long since fallen from favour, a section of two 60-pounders was still seen as the main tactical unit, 
derived from the old Boer tactics of dispersion in the face of greater numbers of enemy guns.75  Ideas 
of the tactical employment of heavy artillery were rooted in the experiences of South Africa.  Field 
Service Regulations 1909 described its role in action in the following terms: 
Its principal duty is to engage shielded artillery with oblique fire, to enfilade targets which the 
lighter guns can only reach with frontal fire, to search distant localities in which supports or 
reserves are concealed, to destroy buildings or other protections occupied by the enemy, and 
in the final stage to support the assault by fire converging on the most important points.76 
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The tactics suggested by the manuals were fundamentally sound, and some of these valuable ideas 
had been further developed in the pre-First World War period, particularly the potential use of heavy 
guns to render enemy entrenchments untenable via enfilade fire, and the use of long range weapons to 
eliminate lighter field guns.77   The lessons of the Boer War on the employment of heavy guns may 
have been deceptive regarding the extreme range at which they could engage in the clear atmosphere 
of South Africa, but in many respects the British grasped the potential value of using them to deal 
with enemy artillery and sweep rear areas.  The examples themselves were not misleading, but 
translating them into effective practice proved difficult in the cramped confines of British 
manoeuvring areas.  Indeed, the greatest weakness in the B.E.F. regarding heavy artillery was a lack 
of numbers and a failure to integrate the guns into wider tactical thinking.  Instead, these valuable 
weapons were often neglected in manoeuvres due to their slow speed and typically left to their own 
devices.  For these reasons, the links between infantry and Heavy Artillery saw little improvement 
during the 1899 – 1914 period.  Instead, the British Army of 1914 relied upon the Field Artillery for 
infantry support, with the heavy guns remaining as specialist pieces with limited, specific roles that 
were poorly understood by the infantry.78  
Despite these problems, the experience of the Boer War and the subsequent equipping of the artillery 
with heavy guns proved to be a valuable step.  For example, while the weapons may be criticised for 
not matching their German equivalents, they were vastly superior to those possessed by France.  The 
French placed almost complete faith in their powerful 75mm field gun, and neglected heavy weapons 
until the very eve of the war.  In 1912, British observers were distinctly unimpressed with French 
attempts to put heavy guns into the field, noting that of four types of guns deployed at manoeuvres, 
two were at an experimental phase, while the other two were antiquated weapons dating from 1878 
and 1884 respectively.79  By the time serious efforts were made to equip with heavy guns, it was too 
late for the French Army and confusion reigned over their usage.  A French officer noted in 1913: 
We have heavy artillery.  Do we have a doctrine for the employment of this heavy artillery?  
It does not appear so.  Ask one hundred officers picked at random of all ranks and arms: 
“What is heavy artillery?  What is it used for?  How is it used?  Whom does it support?  
Where is it positioned?  The odds are 100-1 that you get no answer or that the same question 
will be asked of you.80 
Douglas Porch has identified the failure to equip with heavy artillery as a critical flaw in the French 
Army of 1914, with their shorter ranged field guns unable to deliver counter battery fire against the 
                                                     
77
 Bailey, J.B.A, Field Artillery and Firepower, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2004) p.229 
78
 Ibid, p.232 
79
 General Staff, Report on Foreign Manoeuvres in 1912 (Uckfield, Naval and Military Press, 2008 reprint) p.28 
80
 Quoted in Porch, Douglas, The March to the Marne: The French Army 1871-1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) p.236 
112 
 
long range German weapons, and consequently being smashed to pieces by shelling from heavy 
German batteries.81  Pre-war belief in France that it was not worth the effort in firing beyond visible 
range proved to be a serious tactical weakness in 1914 and cost their artillery dearly.82  Conversely, 
the Germans had long anticipated the need for heavy howitzers to destroy fortifications in Belgium 
and France, and were thus well equipped with long range weapons that proved highly effective when 
deployed in a field role in 1914. 
While the Royal Artillery had experienced a reaction against the extreme ranges encountered in South 
Africa, this school of thought did not gain ascendency and produced limited overall effect.  The 
artillery range tables of 1914 were identical to those of 1902, suggesting that there was still official 
belief in the value of long range fire throughout the period.  While flaws remained in the usage of 
heavy guns with the wider army, the lesson of the Boer War that artillery could engage effectively at 
long range remained.  Whereas the French placed complete faith in short range action, the British did 
not forget the example of South Africa and thus were somewhat better prepared for the tactical 
problems of artillery combat in 1914, although were not so well equipped as the Germans in this 
regard.  “Long Tom” had been an unpleasant surprise for the British, but the artillery had adapted well 
to the expectation of long range action and proved a tenacious foe for the Germans in the opening 
weeks of the First World War.  Despite its limited numbers, the 60-pound gun proved a valuable 
asset, being the only weapon in the British arsenal that had the range to engage the devastating 15cm 
howitzers deployed by the Germans.83  However, the 60-pounder may have been even more useful 
had greater efforts been made to forge closer links between the Heavy Artillery and the infantry in the 
years prior to the outbreak of war, and the failure to capitalise upon this must be counted as an 
opportunity missed by the British Army. 
Concealment 
On the eve of the Boer War, an expectation held throughout the British Army was that any major 
battle would begin with a preliminary artillery duel.  The opposing artillery would deploy in the open 
and attempt to pound one another into submission, the winner then having a virtually free rein to 
distribute his fire across the battlefield, with the loser forced to shelter his surviving guns and employ 
them as and when possible.  As with much thinking within the Royal Artillery, this idea was drawn 
from the Franco-Prussian War, where German artillery had typically overwhelmed the French guns 
before the battle was joined in earnest. 84 
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However, the Boers were not wedded to any European doctrine and had no intention of conforming to 
this unrealistic expectation.  Although the Boers possessed certain qualitative advantages over the 
British artillery, in numerical terms they were hopelessly outmatched and faced certain destruction if 
they attempted to engage the British in an open duel.  Instead, the Boer gunners chose to take 
advantage of the smokeless powder that gave their rifle armed comrades such an unexpected 
advantage.  Fighting from concealed positions, with no tell tale smoke puffs to indicate the direction 
of fire, the Boer artillery proved incredibly difficult for the British gunners to locate.  This failure to 
track down Boer artillery was perhaps even more humiliating for the British than being outranged.  
Whereas the gunners could cite material weaknesses for being unable to reply to long range fire, in 
terms of silencing a concealed enemy they had no such excuse.   
As well as firing from cover, the Boers used additional methods to frustrate attempts to knock out 
their weapons.  Multiple positions were usually prepared for the guns, so that if the British located 
one, the gun could be moved to another and resume fire.  Entrenchments and emplacements for the 
gun and crews were considered essential, and the Boers were not too proud to shelter in them if 
located, waiting for the British fire to lift before manning their weapons once more.85  One Boer 
gunner ruminated that without them “...it is probable not a man of us would have been left...” owing 
to volume of fire the numerically superior British guns could deliver.86  Simple tricks were also 
employed to confuse the British, including firing a concealed smokeless gun from one position and 
simultaneously detonating a flask of black powder at a separate, false point.  The eye was inevitably 
drawn to the smoke discharge, causing the British to waste their fire at a decoy position while the real 
gun continued to operate unmolested.  This ruse proved to be so prevalent that attention was called to 
it in an official memo issued by Lord Roberts.87   
During the early part of the war, the British employed observation balloons in an attempt to locate the 
position of Boer trenches and guns.  Balloons proved most useful around Ladysmith, where the siege 
lines and static nature of Boer positions made them a potentially valuable reconnaissance asset.  
However, in terms of locating enemy guns, results were disappointing.  Lieutenant Colonel Henry 
Rawlinson reported the difficulties associated with observing Boer guns from the air, noting that “...[it 
is] difficult to spot guns from the Baloon [sic] as it rocks about so and keeps revolving round so much 
that one cannot keep ones glasses steady.”88  A further major problem was the inability of observation 
balloons to send rapid messages to friendly troops stationed below, with attempts to use heliographs 
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from balloons proving a failure.89  While aerial reconnaissance had uses in the Boer War, it did little 
to solve the problem of locating Boer guns. 
For the British, the failure to locate and inability to deal with the outnumbered but concealed Boer 
artillery came as a profound shock.   Sir George White noted that at no point during his combat 
experience did he believe a Boer gun had been knocked out by counter battery work, commenting “It 
has been a lesson to me that in modern warfare it is pretty hard to dismount an enemy’s guns.”90  Even 
the most skilful gun crews had problems engaging hidden Boer guns.  J.M. Grierson remembered: 
The Boers developed a truly marvellous skill in concealing the position of their guns; the 
officer who commanded the best-shooting battery at Okehampton in 1899 told me that, in all 
the actions up to occupation of Kroonstad, he had never been able to range on a Boer gun, and 
at the passage of the Vet River one of our batteries was for hours under the fire from a long 
range gun which it could not locate...91  
Although concealed Boer artillery fire generally proved to be a source of indignation rather than 
injury for the British, the refusal of the Boers to fight in the open rendered the belief in the opening 
artillery duel a fallacy.92  In combination with much longer artillery ranges, this represented a 
challenge to pre-war tactical ideas and training methods, which had anticipated a straightforward 
engagement over open sights at relatively short distances.  Pre-war training had reflected this 
expectation, with artillery aiming for rapidity and accuracy at visible targets and achieving 
satisfactory results.93  Indeed, the Royal Artillery, with the notable exception of the R.G.A, had taken 
a somewhat perverse pride in its unscientific methods towards gunnery and ranging, relying on the 
kind of ‘dash’ demonstrated by the unfortunate Colonel Long to achieve results in battle.94   
The Boer War shook faith in these concepts and caused a considerable degree of introspection 
amongst the gunners.  A particular source of concern was that a contest between guns in the open and 
guns in cover was clearly an unequal one.  Although the Boer guns had been hampered by poor 
ammunition, the potential damage that could have been inflicted upon exposed British batteries was 
well recognised.  For example, at the Battle of Vaal Krantz, several batteries of British artillery 
deployed in the open, and were enfiladed by a Boer “Long Tom”, with only faulty fuses saving the 
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British guns from severe casualties.95 Charles Callwell noted the changed circumstances of warfare 
meant that: 
A single well concealed hostile gun will wipe out a whole battery if this is brought into action 
in a bungling fashion; cases have occurred when even a pom-pom – not a formidable weapon 
– has given a battery in the open a lot of trouble.96 
A fellow gunner echoed these sentiments in a blunter fashion, stating simply that to deploy in the 
open against hidden artillery was “little short of madness”.97  The idea of utilising cover and 
concealed positions also found favour outside the Royal Artillery.  Lord Roberts cited training in 
concealment of guns as necessary for improvement of the arm as a whole, and his views were echoed 
by Ian Hamilton and Charles Warren.98  Warren offered particularly strong opinions, noting 
“Concealment of guns both on attack and defence is now a matter of primary importance, and in 
defence can be brought to such perfection that it is almost impossible to locate them.”99 
However, reversing the tactics of the previous thirty years was not a simple task.  While the idea of 
fighting from behind cover had been mooted prior to the Boer War, the difficulty in achieving 
accuracy from such positions had discouraged its use.100  Field Artillery Training editions for 1904 
and 1906 both emphasised the use of cover for guns, but translating this into training was more 
difficult, and required devising new methods of delivering accurate, indirect fire.  This work 
inevitably took time to bear fruit.101  For example, in 1903 Lord Roberts noted at a post manoeuvres 
conference, “I was disappointed to find the guns were so much exposed.  There were exceptions, but 
on the whole there was practically little attempt at concealment.”102  In 1904, John French wrote in an 
Aldershot training memorandum “We can all remember how splendidly the Boer guns were concealed 
and how it was often utterly impossible to locate them, at any rate for a long time...I trust Artillery 
officers will give the matter their serious consideration.”103  Nevertheless, there were improvements 
over time, especially after the introduction of superior equipment in the form of new field and horse 
artillery guns.  In 1906, Ian Hamilton had great praise for the artillery of Southern Command, writing, 
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“So great has been the progress made during the past summer in the use of indirect laying and in the 
art of entrenching, that the methods of 1904 are already, to a great extent, obsolete.”104 
The Russo-Japanese War appeared to offer confirmation of the value of cover.  The Japanese artillery 
was considered materially inferior to that of the Russians, but was better trained and more willing to 
fight from concealed positions.  Conversely, Russian gunners went to war with tactics similar to the 
pre-Boer War British, expecting to use their weapons at relatively close range and being prepared to 
sacrifice guns if necessary.105  Against the Japanese this doctrine was costly and ineffective, with 
exposed Russian batteries being knocked out in short order.  A British journalist saw a Russian battery 
attempt to redeploy across open ground at the Battle of the Yalu River 30th April – 1st May 1904, only 
to be caught by Japanese fire after moving around 200 yards.  The journalist noted “...the whole of the 
teams, men, guns, and everything else were all piled up at the end of that distance.”106  Observers on 
both sides were shocked by the ferocity of artillery fire.  A British attaché with the Russians reported 
to the Army Council that; “The present shrapnel fire with Q.F guns is such that no troops can face it in 
the open nor can Artillery serve their guns under it.  Indirect fire seemed to be the only practicable 
method.”107  A French officer noted that unless covered approaches were available, artillery generally 
only moved at night, commenting, “Invisibility has become an essential condition; this is the 
dominating fact of the whole war.”108  After the initial shock of combat the Russians adapted methods 
of indirect fire, and, as in the Boer War, well concealed guns proved “uncommonly difficult” to 
silence.109  A British observer noted how on one occasion the Japanese had fired over 1,000 shells in 
an attempt to eliminate a hidden Russian battery, without success.110  At another engagement, it was 
reported that the Japanese shelled Russian positions for 15 hours prior to an attack, only for hidden 
Russian guns to unmask and overwhelm the infantry once they began their advance.111   
The experience of the artillery in the Russo-Japanese War seemed largely to validate the lessons of 
concealment that the British had drawn from South Africa.  However, even as the war in Manchuria 
was in progress, a movement against the use of concealed positions for artillery was beginning to 
gather force in Britain.  The root of this reaction lay in the problem of achieving accuracy from a 
covered position.  Reflecting prior prejudices against scientific gunnery, there was some disquiet 
amongst the artillery over the need to employ several “strange appliances” to achieve effective 
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indirect fire, while some felt the emphasis on technical matters threatened to overwhelm tactical 
considerations.112   
The greatest tactical conundrum which seemed to militate against the use of concealed positions was 
the need to hit fleeting targets.  While the South African experience had shown the resilience of 
hidden guns, the conflict had also highlighted the fact that in battle against opponents who made the 
most of cover, opportunities for effective fire were likely to be brief and had to be seized immediately.  
This required a skilful gun crew, able to rapidly acquire the range and fire accurately.  As with 
attempts to improve infantry musketry, training methods were revamped with moving and “surprise” 
targets introduced to test the reactions of the gunners.  Initially the results were somewhat farcical.  
When Sir Evelyn Wood was asked if surprise targets had made a difference in training, he replied, 
So much so that this year within a month or so, I have seen an artillery officer so taken by 
surprise that he has said: “1,600 yards, 1,200 yards, 1,400 yards.  As you were.” and the target 
escaped.113 
However, the careful calculations and positioning required for delivering indirect fire seemed 
incompatible with seizing such fleeting opportunities.  The paradox between taking covered positions 
to protect the guns and yet still being able to deliver sudden and effective fire when necessary was a 
serious problem.  At Okehampton it was noted that time was a factor not considered enough in tactics, 
the camp commandant complaining: 
A battery that comes into action under cover, and takes half an hour or more to open fire, with 
no certainty that it will be effective, when the G.O.C requires artillery fire at once, does 
wrong.114  
Reacting against the somewhat ponderous methods necessary for effective indirect fire, some officers 
began to denigrate the use of concealed positions, instead suggesting that rapid, direct fire was bound 
to be more damaging to the enemy than slow, deliberate indirect shooting.  For example, artilleryman 
Major J.F Cadell argued that the addition of shields to the latest field guns gave them great protection 
against enemy fire, allowing them to fight in the open once more.115  Cadell’s views were reminiscent 
of pre-war thinking, arguing the role of artillery was to help secure victory regardless of the cost, 
writing: 
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To remain in action all day and fire off thousands of rounds over a hill is not an object in 
itself, even if you only lose three horses; what is required is a victory, even if obtained at 
some expense, by the artillery.116 
Despite the examples of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, such views found support.  
Indeed, the Russian adoption of indirect fire was held to have been greatly adverse to their fighting 
spirit, discouraging them from taking risks and thus leaving their infantry unsupported at critical 
moments.117  Even reformist officers such as Ian Hamilton expressed a certain degree of disquiet over 
the way in which artillery in Manchuria had settled into semi-permanent concealed positions.  
Hamilton commented that in the latter stages of the war, the Japanese were spending so long 
concealing and positioning their field artillery that “..they become almost as immobile as guns of 
position.  They take far too long in getting in or out of their pits, and I think the habit of entrenching... 
is tending to lessen their initiative and audacity.”118  This loss of spirit was seen as potentially 
damaging to the army as a whole.  Infantryman Captain P.A Charrier ruminated; “The doctrine held 
by any Army of avoiding losses, when carried too far, has invariably ended in defeat, and it seems to 
me that the use of indirect fire, carried too far, can only lead to the same result.”119  Similar views 
were also expressed at higher levels, the Inspector General of Forces writing in 1906: 
As the reports of our attaches in Manchuria became available it soon made itself apparent that 
protection was only one means to an end, and that to attach too much importance to it would 
be disastrous to the spirit of the arm; and Artillery officers have come to recognize, from 
study of the subject and experience as to the limitations of indirect fire, that its use is 
frequently incompatible with affording effective support to the other arms and inflicting loss 
on the enemy.120 
With the pendulum beginning to swing against the use of concealed positions, the attention of the 
Royal Artillery was drawn towards the fire tactics of the French.  In 1897, the French had introduced 
the famous 75mm “Quick Firing” gun to their field army, a weapon which possessed an 
unprecedented rate of fire due to a recoil absorbing system that eliminated the need to run the gun 
back into position after firing.  As well as providing an exceptionally stable fire platform, the gun also 
benefited from an automatic fuse setting machine to further increase the speed which it could be 
loaded and fired. Taking advantage of this rate of fire and placing faith in their gun shields to keep 
them protected, French tactics emphasised achieving annihilating fire effect at short to medium 
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range.121  The culmination of French artillery tactics was the rafale, a short but intense burst of fire 
that aimed to overwhelm the target through ferocity and volume rather than precise accuracy.122  
British observers were often favourably impressed with these tactics, which stood in stark contrast to 
the slower, more deliberate methods of fire in the Royal Artillery.  Charles à Court Repington, the 
influential military correspondent of The Times, wrote to Ian Hamilton on the subject, arguing, “In the 
12 minutes which it takes for one of our batteries to range laboriously, a French battery will wipe out 
a British brigade.”123  Other officers echoed these opinions, feeling that the French had truly grasped 
the technical potential of Q.F guns, whereas the British emphasis on slow, precise methods did not 
take advantage of the vastly improved rate of fire now available to them.124 
Interest in French fire tactics grew as the two nations forged greater military links in the pre-First 
World War period.  By 1910, Sir John French was expressing concerns that British artillery tactics 
were becoming out of date.  German authorities were critical of British methods, and French himself 
noted: 
My opinion is that our Artillery compared with the French is slow in ranging and in opening 
fire for effect, and that the ever-growing complication of our method is tending to surpass the 
capacity of the average battery commander and to become foreign to the atmosphere of the 
battlefield.125 
In 1911, it was observed that some gunners who had attended manoeuvres in France were organising 
and training their batteries on French lines without official sanction.126  There were also concerns that 
the reputation of the 75mm was resulting in a tendency to denigrate the 18-pounder in comparison, 
leading to calls for a programme of artillery rearmament to produce guns that could match the French 
weapons.127  Ultimately, the growing disquiet with British compared to French tactics resulted in a 
series of trials in 1911 to ascertain if an adoption of French methods could improve the firepower of a 
British field battery.  The French four gun organisation and methods of rapid ranging were tested, but 
the results were somewhat inconclusive and a unanimous decision on their practicality was not 
reached.128  The main result of the tests was to reveal that the 18-pounder gun had a number of 
technical defects that prevented it replicating French methods effectively.  It was found there was a 
lack of steadiness in the carriage which necessitated relaying the gun from round to round, while the 
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need to set the fuse on each shell by hand could not keep up with very high rates of fire.129  The Chief 
of Imperial General Staff noted that the existence of these technical issues rendered the argument over 
the adoption of French methods largely irrelevant until they were corrected.130  Financial 
considerations prevented this occurring before the outbreak of the First World War, and technical 
limitations meant that French ideas were widely admired but difficult to put into actual practice.   
The technical inability of the British guns to deliver the kind of fire that the French used meant that 
the Royal Artillery never became completely wedded to the idea of direct fire.  Instead, throughout 
the period there was an ongoing debate on the value of indirect versus direct methods, with both 
camps enjoying periods of ascendency.  As previously discussed, the British Army of the Edwardian 
period was very reluctant to adopt any official doctrine, and instead preferred to place emphasis on 
tactical flexibility.  This was especially true of the field artillery.  As early as 1907, the Inspector 
General of Forces had complained that there was an absence of uniformity in artillery training, and 
had requested an official pronouncement from the General Staff regarding the merits of direct versus 
indirect fire.131  However, little had been done by the following year, and it was noted that in some 
commands nothing but indirect fire was employed, while in others the opposite was true.132  At no 
point did the Royal Artillery officially declare itself dedicated to either method, and indeed on the eve 
of the First World War the emphasis remained on flexibility with regard to choice of position, with 
the French observing in 1914 that although British manuals were excellent, British doctrine was non-
existent.133  A number of historians have identified the ongoing debate regarding indirect versus direct 
fire in the British Army.  For example, in his history of the Royal Artillery, former gunner Sir John 
Headlam considered the 1904 edition of Field Artillery Tactics “the high water mark of South African 
inspiration” and suggested that a gradual shift away from concealed methods began from this point.134  
Phillip Towle has also identified a vigorous debate over the covered versus open positions, suggesting 
that the influence of middle ranking artillery officers in favour of concealed positions was becoming 
more prominent from 1910 onwards, and gradually swung the General Staff in their favour.135  Most 
recently, J.B.A Bailey has noted that the Royal Artillery was struggling between competing ideas of 
direct and indirect fire throughout the period, with indirect fire popular amongst battery commander, 
but direct fire having more official sanction by 1914.136  The lack of historical consensus on Royal 
Artillery doctrine of the period mirrors the lack of doctrine that existed in the arm itself. 
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It was perhaps fortunate for the Royal Artillery that it did not completely adopt French methods.  
Although the 75mm was a superb gun, the French belief that it could fire direct at relatively short 
range was anachronistic and was revealed as a dangerous fallacy once war had broken out.  
Conversely, the tactical lessons the Royal Artillery had learned in South Africa, and which had been 
confirmed by the Russo-Japanese War, were highly relevant to combat in 1914.  Finding themselves 
outnumbered and outgunned by the Germans, it was important that the British adopted concealed 
positions to avoid being swept away by sheer weight of fire.  Unfortunately, while never abandoned, 
the importance of concealment had become somewhat diluted in the intervening years.  Historian 
Robert Scales has argued that the serious losses suffered by the Royal Artillery  at the Battle of Le 
Cateau proves the weakness of British artillery tactics compared to those of the Germans, noting that a 
number of B.E.F. batteries occupied open positions and were punished by concealed German guns.137  
However, of the three British divisions engaged, 3rd, 4th and 5th, it was the artillery of 5th Division who 
chose to occupy forward positions, ostensibly to inspire the infantry.138  The artillery of 3rd and 4th 
Division chose to deploy further back in more covered positions and suffered relatively minor 
casualties, with certain batteries eluding German attempts to locate them throughout the entire 
battle.139 The fact that the artillery of the B.E.F. divisions chose to adopt such distinct tactics at Le 
Cateau is more illustrative of the lack of formal artillery doctrine rather than inherent tactical 
weakness. 
The Boer War had demonstrated the value of concealed positions, and although interest in such tactics 
waxed and waned, the use of cover remained an important part of Royal Artillery training throughout 
the period.  The growth of interest in French methods of direct fire from open positions was largely 
regressive, and if it had been adopted as a whole by the outnumbered artillery of the B.E.F., the results 
of early battles against the Germans could well have proved disastrous.  Lack of formal doctrine on 
the type of position to employ remained a consistent weakness, but emphasis on flexibility at least 
ensured the British were not wedded to a costly and ineffective tactical system such as the French.  
The lessons of the Boer War had faded somewhat by 1914, but the experience of fighting against the 
numerically superior and more heavily armed German artillery soon highlighted the need to adopt the 
methods the Boers had made famous on the veldt.  Fortunately for the British, although the popularity 
of concealment had declined to an extent, it had never been abandoned and was still considered an 
important element of training up to the eve of the First World War.140  Although the gunners had 
much to learn about the new conditions of warfare, the lessons of concealment from the Boer War 
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were an important element of future tactics, and provided a valuable asset for future artillery 
development. 
Field Howitzers 
While the delivery of indirect fire from concealed positions was difficult for guns designed to fire on a 
flat trajectory, the British Army possessed a weapon specifically designed to carry out this role in the 
form of the howitzer.  Field howitzers were a relatively new addition to the arsenal of the Royal 
Artillery, having only been introduced to the arm in 1896.141  Prior to the Boer War they had only 
seen action during Kitchener’s campaign in the Sudan, where their high explosive shells had been 
used to bombard the Mahdi’s tomb.  The fearful destruction created by these lyddite shells had 
attracted favourable notice, and much was expected of them in the future.142 
Unfortunately lyddite proved to be something of a disappointment in the Boer War.  Although it 
created spectacular explosions and large craters when it worked, it suffered from persistent 
malfunctions, with one gunner estimating that no more than 60% of his lyddite shells had detonated 
properly.143  Furthermore, despite being visually impressive when it exploded, in terms of inflicting 
actual casualties its effects were noted as being “exceeding local”.144  Artillerymen brought up with 
the idea that the guns were there to be man-killers were especially critical of this apparent failure , one 
arguing shortly after the war that, “I think lyddite [shells] are of so little value for heavy guns that I 
should myself be quite prepared to make them entirely auxiliary projectiles...”.145   
Nevertheless, the Boer War had shown the need for an explosive shell to engage enemy earthworks, 
and a number of infantry officers at the Elgin Commission made reference to the potential value of 
common shell for dealing with trenches.146  Common shell was old fashioned ammunition that was in 
some ways the forerunner of high explosive, but it had been largely phased out of the artillery due to 
its ineffectiveness.  It had been found to lack a bursting charge large enough to damage hard targets 
and had failed to produce enough segments to cause heavy losses to troops in the open, and 
artillerymen were perplexed and frustrated by the call for its return.147  However, in delivering a 
rebuttal to the common shell arguments, artilleryman Major-General Sir G.H. Marshall unwittingly 
highlighted the key issue behind the revival of interest in the old ammunition when he noted; 
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I may say that the object of all field artillery ammunition is man-killing and not the damage of 
material... We do not attempt it, and not only that, but we do not profess in the Artillery to kill 
people who get underground, with time shrapnel.148 
In fact, howitzers and not common shell were the ideal solution to inflict damage upon a sheltering 
foe.   Although lyddite fired from howitzers proved disappointing in South Africa, the combination of 
plunging fire and explosive detonation held the potential to scour trenches of their occupants as well 
as destroy emplacements and earthworks.  Indeed, despite the limitations of the ammunition, where 
they had been well handled howitzers had proved extremely effective in this role.    Some officers had 
much praise for the howitzer, although generally for its effect on enemy morale.  Lord Methuen 
commented; “The lyddite shell did not come up to its reputation, but I always took one howitzer with 
me in the hills, as it terrified the enemy more than any other arm.”149  Charles Warren felt that the 
assertion made by several Boers that they had no fear of lyddite was bravado and “mere fiction”, 
arguing that the effect had in fact been considerable.150  This was particularly true in Natal, where the 
British had been forced to hammer through a series of entrenched Boer positions in a campaign which 
resembled the kind of trench warfare that would become common in Manchuria and the Western 
Front.  Here the howitzers had been so popular with the infantry that officers had often squabbled 
over who had authority over them, and they had proved vital in supporting difficult assaults.151  
However, howitzers still emerged from the Boer War with something of a mixed reputation.  They 
had been most successful in the rugged terrain of Natal, where the Boers had made extensive use of 
trenches and flanking moves were impractical, forcing the British to fight their way through in frontal 
assault with the aid of artillery support.  However, they had achieved relatively little elsewhere, 
particularly during Lord Roberts’s advance.  Here, the wide open spaces of Orange Free State and 
Transvaal made it possible to outflank the Boers rather than having to attack their trenches in a 
methodical manner.  The best opportunity for his howitzers came during the Battle of Paardeburg, but 
their performance was disappointing against the cleverly constructed Boer entrenchments.  J.M. 
Grierson noted these contrasting experiences on his return from South Africa. 
The 5-inch howitzer was a disappointment, but opinions differ as to its value.  On the Natal 
side they swore by it and praised its effect, but on the force advancing from Bloemfontein, 
Lord Roberts left the brigade-division of howitzers behind, preferring to take heavier metal.152  
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Even after the war, the relative ineffectiveness of lyddite remained a contentious point, and there were 
calls for more shrapnel to be carried to increase the howitzer’s utility as a man-killer.153  Indeed, some 
went so far as to argue that high angle time shrapnel fire was the only solution to dealing with 
entrenchments owing to the failure of high explosive ammunition in South Africa.154  Furthermore, it 
was clear in the aftermath of the Boer War that the 5-inch field howitzer had serious defects, 
including being too heavy for rapid movement during field operations and possessing an inadequate 
range to cope with long range enemy artillery.155  Unfortunately, design delays, financial parsimony 
and manufacturing hold ups meant that a new howitzer was extremely slow in forthcoming, with a 
replacement 4.5-inch field howitzer not entering British service until 1909.  The slowness of 
rearmament was a source of great frustration to the artillerymen, and helped to contribute to a general 
lack of understanding of the weapon in the years following the Boer War.  It was noted that although 
howitzers were well liked by the infantry for their ability to deliver plunging fire, their precise role as 
field artillery within the British Army remained poorly defined.156  Lack of modern equipment was 
partially blamed for the cold attitude towards field howitzers, and they were also available only in 
limited numbers, with just three batteries per three infantry divisions in 1906.157  Major C.B Levita 
summed up the problems the weapon faced, writing: 
Hitherto the official books, which fortify the mind of military readers, have presumed a 
discreet silence on the subject of Field Howitzers, or dismissed it with a few broad statements 
which have failed to excite commanders, at any rate at peace, to a study of their uses... [on 
manoeuvres howitzers are] generally stowed away in the first hole available, out of touch with 
the infantry advance, and without a knowledge of the Q.F gun’s targets...158 
J.B.A Bailey has suggested that the Boer War caused howitzers to develop a bad name in the British 
Army and that they were neglected throughout the period, with just three batteries of six guns being 
assigned to each B.E.F. infantry division in 1914, comparing extremely unfavourably with 380 field 
howitzers available in the German Army, with each German corps possessing a further 16 heavy 
howitzers.159  However, this criticism is unfair.  Although in numerical terms the provision of 
howitzers seems miserly when compared to the Germans, it must be remembered that a British 
division of 1914 only possessed 72 guns in total, and thus the howitzer brigade represented a full 
quarter of the total divisional artillery strength, a vast improvement from the pre-Boer War standard, 
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where there had been just 3 howitzer batteries out of 92 field batteries.   This represents a considerable 
proportion for a weapon which Bailey asserts had developed such a poor reputation.  Additionally, the 
British allocation was far larger than that of the French, who provided just 6 howitzers to each corps 
and did not incorporate them into manoeuvres.160 
Furthermore, despite its mixed performance in South Africa and the long delays before a new field 
howitzer was introduced, a number of junior officers in the artillery were favourably impressed with 
the weapon and saw a future for it in both European and colonial warfare.161  The scale of 
entrenchment and the impressive performance of howitzers in the Russo-Japanese War confirmed 
these early ideas and emphasised their value in the field.  Indeed, the employment of these weapons 
was selected as the first purely artillery subject ever to be discussed at a General Staff conference, 
with Colonel A.H. Hamilton-Gordon, a howitzer battery commander who had achieved distinction in 
Natal, as a key speaker.162  Although lack of modern equipment hampered the development of the 
arm, once it had come into service the 4.5-inch howitzer proved to be an excellent weapon and was 
superior to continental rivals in the same class.163  The new weapon proved popular amongst both 
artillerymen and infantry.  For example, in 1909 the Inspector General of Forces complained that 
“Howitzer batteries are used almost too freely in all attacks...” and warned that their limited 
ammunition should instead be conserved for critical moments.164  There was perhaps an overemphasis 
on shrapnel from howitzers, with 75% of their ammunition being of this type, but in the early part of 
the First World War, this did not prove a weakness.   Indeed, it has been suggested that shrapnel 
remained the most effective artillery ammunition throughout 1914.165   
Although certain flaws remained, particularly the tendency in parts of the R.F.A to see howitzers as 
being highly specialised and technical, it is difficult to agree with Bailey’s assertion that there was a 
lack of interest in the weapon.166  Despite a somewhat mixed performance in South Africa, the success 
of the weapon in Natal showed its value against well constructed earthworks, and the Russo-Japanese 
War confirmed the early faith many British artillerymen had in the gun.  Bailey himself notes that the 
work of officers such as Hamilton-Gordon with howitzers in the pre-First World War period proved 
“invaluable” in 1914.167  Although howitzers were not given the same level of prominence they 
received in the German Army, they remained an important and integral part of the B.E.F.’s artillery 
complement and the Boer War played a large role in emphasising their future value.   
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Infantry – Artillery Co-Operation 
Although the embarrassments and difficulties of fighting against modern enemy artillery had a 
profound effect upon the Royal Artillery, the most important issue to emerge from the Boer War was 
the need for far greater levels of infantry – artillery co-operation.  As with many tactical 
considerations, pre-war manuals had seen artillery support for infantry attacks as a straightforward 
process.168  After winning the artillery duel, it was expected that the guns would bombard the enemy 
position prior to the infantry advance, softening up the foe for the final assault.   In the event of the 
attackers meeting stiff resistance, the gunners were expected to support as best they could, but 
suggested means by which this could be achieved were vague.  A common maxim throughout the 
long arm during the period was “The greater the difficulties of the infantry the closer should be the 
support of the artillery”, but this was generally held to mean pushing guns up to short range, a tactic 
which brought Colonel Long to grief at Colenso.169  The difficult matter of infantry support had 
received little clarification on the eve of the conflict, and training in co-operation prior to the Boer 
War was virtually non-existent, with one gunner noting that the only result of peace manoeuvres was 
to prove that as far as the subject went, “lamentable ignorance is very apparent”.170  These problems 
were to be brought into stark focus in South Africa.  Modern small arms fire vastly increased the 
difficulties of assault, and the infantry had greater need of artillery support than ever before. 
As discussed in previous chapters, one of the initial difficulties that faced the artillery in South Africa 
was the invisibility of enemy positions.  Use of concealed trenches and smokeless powder made 
finding appropriate targets difficult, and inadequate reconnaissance failed to ease these burdens.  At 
the battles of Colenso and Magersfontein, the artillery carried out heavy bombardments of presumed 
enemy entrenchments, when in fact they were shelling false positions that the Boers had left 
unmanned.  A German writer offered a scathing description of the bombardment of Colenso, noting 
that “...the fire of the guns was directed upon the opposite bank at random, the actual positions of the 
enemy being unknown, [and] the effect, as might have been anticipated, was nil.”171 At 
Magersfonetein, an even greater bombardment was delivered during the late afternoon prior to the 
planned night march.  This artillery preparation was the heaviest bombardment delivered by British 
guns since the Crimean War.  Lord Methuen noted in his official despatch that “...[with] the additional 
effect of lyddite I expected great destruction of life in their trenches, and a considerable demoralising 
effect on the enemy’s nerves, thereby indirectly assisting the attack at daybreak.”172  However, as 
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previously discussed, the correct location of the Boer trenches had not been ascertained, and the 
majority of the fire was delivered at unoccupied areas of the kopje.  Those shells that did land 
amongst the Boer earthworks inflicted practically no damage.  Furthermore, far from terrifying the 
burghers, the artillery preparation simply alerted them to the fact that an attack was imminent.   
While the relative invisibility of Boer positions made such pre-battle bombardments largely 
ineffective, they also posed problems for the close range tactics that had been favoured in colonial 
wars.  Guns that attempted to push forward to the infantry firing line and beyond, as Colonel Long did 
at Colenso, could find themselves in grave difficulties of their own if they blundered into previously 
unseen Boers.  Furthermore, occupying a close range position did not always ease the difficulties of 
locating invisible and fleeting targets.  For example, at Modder River, British batteries managed to 
push forward to within 1200 yards of the Boer line in an attempt to give renewed vigour to the stalled 
British attack.  Although these guns drew praise for their efforts and had success in keeping down 
enemy artillery fire, they could avail little against the dug-in Boer riflemen and could not help the 
British infantry advance any further.173   
Overcoming well constructed Boer defences required more than ineffective preliminary 
bombardments, and no amount of close range heroics could make up for a lack of thoroughness in 
preparation.    The solution lay in better co-operation with the infantry, who by advancing could force 
the Boers to occupy their defences and also cause the burghers to reveal themselves as they rose to 
fire.  Summing up this issue, one gunner noted that “Artillery preparation is essential, but a 
bombardment followed by an attack is futile.”174  However, given the lack of pre-war training on the 
subject, achieving this level of co-operation posed considerable difficulties.  The artillery had to 
ensure their fire was well timed and accurate else they risked hitting their own side, while the infantry 
required a means of signalling to their guns to change target or cease fire when necessary.  Inevitably, 
there were errors in the heat of battle.  For example, at the Battle of Talana Hill, British guns 
continued to fire on the Boer position even after friendly infantry had seized it, causing such chaos 
that the hard won hill top was briefly abandoned.175  At the Battle of Spion Kop, British infantry in the 
firing line lacked the means to communicate with the gunners as their heliographs had been smashed 
by bullets early on in the fighting, and flag signals were hard to read.  Lacking information, the field 
artillery attempted in vain to try and silence invisible Boer guns, when their fire could have been more 
profitably directed on the riflemen who were engaging the British line.176  When a battery of 4.7 inch 
guns opened an effective fire on the Boers from long range, Charles Warren, stationed at the bottom 
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of the kopje and out of touch with the fighting there, sent an alarmed message for them to cease fire, 
stating “We occupy the whole summit and I fear you are shelling us severely.”177  In fact, Warren was 
wrong and this valuable supporting fire was lost to the hard pressed infantry. 
Nevertheless, the experience of combat began to improve the level of co-operation between the two 
arms.  After the disaster at Spion Kop, artillery and infantry in Natal began to forge closer links and 
improve their tactical combinations.  At the Battle of Vaal Krantz 5th-7th February 1900, heavy Boer 
fire from an unexpected quarter had deflected the infantry advance, but well positioned artillery 
reacted quickly to suppress it and allow the infantry to continue forward.178  During the fighting for 
control of the Tugela Heights later in the same month, Neville Lyttelton ordered his supporting 
artillery not to open fire until his infantry advance had compelled the Boers to man their positions, a 
policy noted as a “considerable tactical improvement” by Leo Amery.179  These gradual 
improvements bore their greatest fruit at the Battle of Pieter’s Hill 27th February 1900.  Preparation 
for assault was exceptionally thorough, applying techniques normally reserved for sieges to a tactical 
field battle.  The British assembled around 76 guns along a 4.5 mile front to support the infantry 
attack, and had pre-registered the ranges to important targets during the previous day.  Describing the 
preparations, Lord Roberts noted; “Every sangar and important point of the enemy’s position had 
been given a name, the gun positions were connected by signallers, and special observers were posted 
at the principal points.”180  Specific instructions to the artillery of 5th Division stated: 
Follow the infantry attacks up closely.  When no longer safe to shoot at enemy’s position, do 
not cease fire, but shoot over the enemy’s trenches, “pitching them well up”, so as to make 
the enemy think he is still being shelled, and also catch as he runs down the other side.181 
The time spent in preparation was not wasted, and when the attack was delivered the artillery support 
proved decisive.  Field guns firing shrapnel were forced to switch to firing over the Boer trenches as 
their infantry approached, but the howitzers and 4.7 inch guns continued their fire with lyddite and 
common shell until virtually the last moment, Lord Roberts reporting the fire was maintained until the 
infantry were just 15 yards from the Boer line.182  Although some British troops were hit by their own 
artillery, it was generally considered by infantry officers that without such close supporting fire the 
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attack would have failed.183  The artillery preparation at Pieter’s Hill was the most thorough of the 
war, and the Natal Field Force further demonstrated good levels of infantry – artillery co-operation at 
subsequent engagements such as Botha’s Pass and Bergendal.184   
The war in South Africa revealed several important issues with regard to supporting an infantry 
attack.  Shrapnel from field guns was relatively harmless against entrenchments, but had a 
suppressing effect that could keep down enemy rifle fire.  High angle fire from howitzers was more 
useful for inflicting damage upon earthworks, and could be continued longer with less fear of causing 
friendly casualties.  In combination, the two weapons possessed synergy, with the shrapnel sweeping 
a wide area to prevent reinforcement or evacuation of the position, while howitzers searched the 
earthworks and caused chaos amongst the defenders.  This effect was achieved at Pieter’s Hill, where 
the Boers were noted as being “...practically confined to their trenches by the severity of artillery 
fire.”185   
Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the conflict, the subject of co-operation in the attack received less 
attention than the value of long range fire and the usage of concealed positions.  Although a number 
of officers from both branches identified the fact that modern conditions made artillery support more 
critical than ever, little improvement in training was made in the years immediately following the 
war.186  It is not entirely clear why the links that had been forged in South Africa were neglected in the 
aftermath of the conflict, but several factors may have contributed to the decline.  As previously 
discussed, the service branches of the British Army tended to learn within their own frame work and 
both infantry and artillery tended to focus on branch specific issues in the years following the war.  
Artillery focused upon long range, accurate shooting at difficult targets, while infantry devoted 
attention to their own tactical reforms such as extension and marksmanship, causing the two arms to 
drift apart and forget the lessons learned so painfully in Natal.  Furthermore, an absence of suitable 
areas where combined training was possible limited the development of co-operative tactics.187  When 
artillery and infantry did train together, infantry officers tended to leave all fire support decisions to 
the gunners, focussing solely upon their own tactical problems.   Artilleryman Major C.O. Head 
addressed the issue in a polemical article in 1904, writing: 
An unfortunate idea has grown up in the Army that the use of field artillery is an obtuse 
science, to be understood only of a few [sic], and beyond the intelligence of anyone not 
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directly connected with it... The ignorance of infantry officers on the employment of artillery 
is astounding, and it is only equalled by their misconceptions of its power.188 
Voices were beginning to be raised regarding forging closer links between infantry and artillery by 
1904, and this ground swell of interest fortuitously coincided with reports from the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese War, with reports from this conflict serving as a timely reminder of the importance of 
close co-operation between the two arms.189  In Manchuria, artillery was noted as being more 
powerful than ever before, forcing infantry to dig themselves even deeper underground and presenting 
problems for assaults.190  Nevertheless, as in the Boer War, the artillery lacked the strength to shell 
determined troops out of their positions in preparatory bombardments, and instead combination in the 
attack was vital.191 In terms of teaching co-operation, there was relatively little in the Russo-Japanese 
War that should have come as a surprise to veterans of the Natal campaign, but it had the valuable 
effect of revitalising interest in the neglected subject and highlighting it as a critical element of future 
tactics.  Interest steadily grew in the issue through the second half of the Edwardian period, although 
blunders could still occur in training.  In 1907, Hubert Gough defeated John French during 
manoeuvres at Aldershot, citing infantry and artillery co-operation as an important factor:   
He (French) still talks of the artillery duel and artillery preparation, which are worse than 
useless.  The preparation for the decisive struggle must be done by both Infantry and Artillery.  
The Infantry must advance and threaten assault to force the defenders to expose themselves to 
artillery fire.192 
 
While there was recognition of the need for co-operation, the problem for the infantry and artillery 
was how effective combination and support could best be achieved at tactical level.  The debate was 
further complicated by the continuing, unresolved arguments over whether artillery was best 
employed from long range, concealed positions, or at short range over open sights.  Despite the 
unfortunate fate of Colonel Long’s batteries at Colenso, and the excellent example of carefully 
prepared artillery at longer range at Pieter’s Hill, emphasis remained on getting guns close to the 
firing line during the decisive attack.  Combined Training 1905 emphasised the old pre-war mantra 
when it noted “...it should be borne in mind that the greater the difficulties of the infantry the closer 
should be the support of the artillery; this may necessitate some of the artillery being pushed forward 
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to within decisive ranges during the final stages of the engagement.”193  Officers from both branches 
supported the idea that guns needed to be deployed at close range to ensure attacks were successful.  
Long range fire was held to increase the risk of friendly fire incidents and also was accused of failing 
to inflict sufficient damage or give the required moral support.194  The need for fire to improve morale 
was considered especially important, particularly as both South African and Manchurian experiences 
had proven it was difficult to inflict actual casualties upon well entrenched defenders.  Furthermore, 
the extended formations adopted by infantry in the Edwardian period were noted as requiring greater 
moral encouragement than the old close order columns.195  While well positioned, concealed guns 
were noted as having a distinct material effect upon the enemy, some officers argued that this was not 
enough and suggested that the infantry needed to see their own guns to draw support from them.  
Undoubtedly, the sight of friendly artillery could be inspiring for hard pressed infantry.  For example, 
at a critical moment during the Battle of Elandslaagte, Ian Hamilton had ordered two guns to be 
brought up to the firing line, “...and was able to do some good by shouting out to the infantry that the 
guns were coming up to help them.”196  Building on this idea, artillerymen Captain B. Atkinson 
offered the opinion; 
...the sight of even a single gun shooting indifferently from an adjacent, exposed position will 
be far more morally valuable than a whole brigade under cover a mile away... Moral support 
from the drawing-room never yet induced a frightened child to go upstairs alone in the 
dark.197 
However, there were serious problems with this idea.  The long ranges at which artillery initially 
deployed meant that moving them closer to the firing line would be a slower, more difficult process 
than many imagined.  Infantry officers were heard at post-manoeuvre conferences offering to use their 
own men to man handle guns into the front line if the gunners would serve them, but artillerymen 
noted that this would be far harder in war than it appeared in training.198  Furthermore, as proved at 
Colenso and in the Russo-Japanese War, exposed batteries ran the risk of being knocked out by both 
infantry and artillery fire if they deployed in the open.  The fate of artillery that attempted to cross 
open ground under fire in Manchuria had proved that to do so was “to court disaster”, with one 
Russian battery that tried such a deployment at the Battle of Liao-Yang suffering appalling casualties 
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that included all its officers, 56 men and 15 horses.199  A senior British artilleryman recognised the 
consequences of such losses in a rebuttal of close range tactics, writing “...the spectacle of a holocaust 
of men and horses in their immediate neighbourhood cannot but have a most unnerving effect on the 
best of infantry.”200  Conversely, guns operating from covered positions would be safer from 
incoming enemy fire and could continue firing with relative calm, which would be far more 
conducive to accuracy than occupying an open, bullet swept crest.201 
The debate continued throughout the pre-1914 period, with neither side gaining official ascendency.  
As with the discussions over the value of cover, considerable freedom was allowed to individual 
artillery officers with regard to how they chose to fight their guns.  Although training and equipment 
allowed the use of accurate fire from concealed positions, the insinuation that artillery was not 
properly supporting their infantry comrades unless they were fighting their guns in the open touched 
raw nerves, and Field Artillery Training made mention of the need for batteries to be willing to 
sacrifice themselves if necessary to support the attack.202  Nevertheless, by 1914, the confusing and 
potentially misleading phrase “close support” had been dropped from British regulations, and while it 
was recommended to have guns at close hand to repel enemy counter attacks, the idea of pushing 
batteries up to decisive range during the attack was not to be found in Field Service Regulations.203  
However, Field Artillery Training for 1914 offered a somewhat contradictory view, suggesting that 
“To support infantry and to enable it to effect its purpose the artillery must willingly sacrifice 
itself.”204 [Emphasis in the original]  This lack of official doctrine on how best to support the infantry 
prevented a systematic approach to co-operation and instead allowed a profusion of methods to exist, 
as revealed by the artillery deployments at the Battle of Le Cateau.  5th Division’s guns followed the 
line of Field Artillery Training and although offering strong support also suffered serious casualties, 
while 3rd Division’s guns took the concealed route preferred by Field Service Regulations, but missed 
certain opportunities to deliver effective fire.205 
While the debate on close range or long range support continued, a problem common to both schools 
of thought was how to ensure effective communication between the infantry and artillery.  In the Boer 
War, flag signals, heliographs and even men fixing bayonets and waving their rifles over their heads 
had been used to communicate with the artillery, but even in the crystal clear atmosphere of South 
Africa these methods had not always been reliable and communication had broken down at battles 
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such as Spion Kop.  In Manchuria, the Japanese had utilised various methods including the carrying 
of prominent flags in the firing line, but more importantly had also experimented with the usage of 
field telephones to link infantry and artillery.206  However, the technology was still very much in its 
infancy and was bedevilled by a host of technical problems.  Many British artillerymen saw a bright 
future for telephones, but few were prepared to place complete faith in them until the technology was 
more reliable.207  While telephones had value in connecting guns to observation posts, they were not 
yet sufficiently advanced to permit them being carried into the firing line itself.  This problem of 
communication between artillery and front line infantry was one that affected all armies during the 
First World War, and would not be adequately solved until the advent of portable wireless.208 
In the absence of precise communications that could give the artillery an accurate picture of 
conditions in the firing line, a major tactical issue was how long the guns should continue firing 
during an assault.  Fear of friendly fire was a serious one, but despite this concern the general opinion 
amongst both gunners and infantry was that fire should be continued until the very last moment, with 
one officer stating, “It is not sufficient, in the infantry attack, that the artillery support should be 
continued up to the last minute; it must be kept up to the last second.”209  The experience of South 
Africa was crucial in encouraging the idea that very close support was possible and demonstrating that 
‘friendly fire’ incidents were far less common than had been feared.  The valuable experiences in 
Natal placed the British Army in advance of continental rivals, who expected to be forced to cease fire 
with the infantry around 300 yards from the enemy line.210  Conversely, British experience suggested 
fire could be continued for much longer, with one veteran of South Africa recalling that the last shells 
burst over the Boer trenches when his own men were less than 50 yards from the position, offering the 
opinion “This is how it should be.”211  Nevertheless, the fear of causing friendly casualties was a real 
one for many artillery officers, and official regulations on the difficult issue were vague for much of 
the period.212  No specific distance at which to cease fire was laid down in British regulations, the 
emphasis remaining on flexibility and individual judgement, but Field Service Regulations 1909 
effectively endorsed close support in the style that had been seen in South Africa, noting; 
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...artillery fire will be continued until it is impossible for the artillery to distinguish between 
its own and the enemy’s infantry.  The danger from shells bursting short is more than 
compensated for by the support afforded, if fire is maintained to the last moment...213 
As theoretical interest in the difficult issue grew, improvements in co-operative training between the 
two arms followed.  Calls for greater links between infantry and artillery had been raised at Aldershot 
in 1905, with Sir John French noting that he believed close relations between the two “...to be one of 
the great secrets of success on the modern battlefield.”214  Nevertheless, problems with achieving 
these laudable goals remained.  There was little fraternisation between infantry and artillery, and it 
was observed that these somewhat frosty relations reached the extent that artillery officers chose to 
mess with the Royal Engineers rather than the infantry if a battery mess was unavailable.215  Ian 
Hamilton described relations and co-operation between the two arms as “...one of the weakest, if not 
the weakest, spots in our system of training.”216  Various attempts to improve the situation and 
increase mutual understanding between the arms were made, with Hamilton at Southern Command 
pioneering a successful policy of attaching infantry officers to artillery and vice versa.217  Infantry 
officers were also encouraged to visit artillery practice camps to observe their methods, but by 1906 
the Inspector General of Forces felt this was not enough, and instead suggested that officers should be 
ordered to attend, with the Army Council approving of this policy.218  Gradually, these initiatives 
began to improve the relationship between the two arms, but the process was slow, and relations 
between gunners and infantry could still prove somewhat bitter at post-manoeuvre conferences.219  
Nevertheless, the efforts had begun to bear fruit by the later part of the period.  In 1913, Captain C.E. 
Budworth noted that discussions of co-operative tactics were “...carried out to a much greater extent 
than before”, while in the same year the Inspector General reported “There is a considerable 
improvement in the co-operation of Artillery and Infantry during training at all stations at which it can 
be arranged...”, although he felt still more could be done in this direction.220 
While the Royal Artillery had initially taken less interest in infantry support than in developing long 
ranged and indirect fire, by the end of the period the issue was prominent and widely debated.  The 
experience of combat in South Africa had shown the potential of close co-operation during infantry 
attacks, and Thomas Pakenham has suggested that the artillery tactics employed in the later stages of 
                                                     
213
 Field Service Regulations 1909 (Reprint 1914) p.143 
214
 TNA WO 27/503 Memorandum on the Training of 1st Army Corps 1905 (31st January 1905) 
215
 Atkinson, “Co-operation in action” in JRA XXXV 1908-1909, p.331 
216
 General Ian Hamilton, “Remarks by General Sir Ian Hamilton K.C.B, D.S.O, Commander-in-Chief Southern 
Command, on the training of troops under his command during 1908” in Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute, 52(2) 1908, p.1152 
217
 Hamilton, “Training of Troops During 1906” in JRUSI 50(2) 1906, p.1525 
218
 TNA WO 163/12 IGF Report for 1906 and Army Council comment, p.58 
219
 Gore-Browne, “Co-operation between Infantry and Artillery” in JRA XXXIII 1906-1907 , p.310 
220
 Major C.E. Budworth, “Training and action necessary to further co-operation between Artillery and Infantry” 
in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 57(1) 1913, p.68;  TNA WO 163/20 IGF Report for 1913 
pp.328-329 
135 
 
the Natal campaign were revolutionary, foreshadowing the ‘creeping barrages’ that were used in the 
First World War.221  Unfortunately, rearmament and the debate over cover and concealment meant the 
artillery lost sight of these valuable lessons for several years after the conflict, and it took the example 
of the Russo-Japanese War to renew interest in the subject.  While the artillery and infantry worked 
hard to improve their methods of co-operation, the flaws of existing communications technology and 
lack of clear doctrinal guidance on the best positions to occupy placed limitations on what could be 
achieved.  The core principles of artillery co-operation learned in the Natal were excellent, but British 
emphasis on flexibility meant that although close co-operation was seen as a crucial factor on the 
battlefield, the artillery had no systematic approach to providing fire support for infantry.  This led to 
contrasting deployments at Le Cateau, and its effects were also felt during later actions in 1914, such 
as the fighting advance through Artois in early autumn.222  Although the Royal Artillery acquitted 
itself reasonably well during 1914, ensuring co-operation on the vast battlefronts that emerged from 
1915 took time, training and bitter experience and it was not until 1917 that such methods were to 
become truly effective.223   
Conclusions 
Of all the combat arms in the British Army, the Royal Artillery faced the greatest challenge in the pre-
First World War period, being forced to adapt to both new equipment and new tactics in a short space 
of time.  Many long held tactical ideas were found wanting in South Africa, and the debates on their 
potential replacements inevitably aroused controversy and argument.   
The Boer War produced many important tactical ideas, including the need for accurate, long range fire 
and the importance of close co-operation with infantry.  The introduction of the 60-pound gun and the 
excellent 4.5-inch howitzer both stemmed from the experience in South Africa, and although these 
weapons were in short supply, they provided a crucial platform for further development in the First 
World War.  Equally, the ability of the Royal Artillery to engage from concealed positions and the 
attendant interest in more precise methods of fire were to serve it well on the Western Front.  The 
flirtation with rapid but inaccurate French rafale tactics was fortunately abandoned, and it is 
significant to note that the French expressed considerable admiration for the precision of Royal 
Artillery fire in late 1914.224 
The Russo-Japanese War provided a timely reminder of the growing importance of artillery and had 
the valuable effect of increasing interest in co-operative tactics.  However, it offered relatively little 
that was new to the Royal Artillery.  The use of howitzers to overcome earthworks, the dangers of 
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deploying guns in the open and the need for strong artillery support for infantry attacks had all been 
emphasised in South Africa, particularly in Natal.  The Russo-Japanese War tended to confirm the 
lessons that had been demonstrated in the Boer War rather than offering anything that was entirely 
new, but it did have the valuable effect of increasing interest in and debate upon the subject. 
However, the great weakness of the artillery in this period was a failure to settle upon any formal 
combat doctrine.  Instead, a wide variety of tactical ideas were in circulation, with individual officers 
generally left to choose between them.  Throughout the period, the popularity of certain tactical 
principles waxed and waned, with some briefly gaining ascendancy only to be abandoned soon after.  
For example, the use of covered positions was never truly codified, with its reputation peaking after 
the Boer War, declining as the French rafale system gained popularity, and then enjoying a 
resurgence as French methods were found to be impractical.  In such an environment, much 
responsibility devolved onto the artillery commander for choosing how to fight his guns.  While this 
ensured flexibility, it failed to create uniformity.  In an army used to colonial campaigns with small 
numbers of troops in a variety of climatic conditions, this flexibility was an asset, but it became a 
source of weakness as the army underwent massive expansion from 1914 onwards.  The result was 
that for the early part of the First World War, the success of artillery was often dependent upon the 
degree of enlightenment of the officers in charge, with higher command choosing not to enforce 
uniform fire plans.225  This approach could achieve local successes but had serious flaws when 
employed across a large battlefront such as that of the Somme. 
Nevertheless, although flaws remained, the Boer War had the important effect of prompting a 
complete rearmament, as well as forcing the Royal Artillery away from outdated ideas drawn from 
1870 and into more practical tactics.  In criticising the British artillery performance in early part of the 
First World War, it is possible to lose sight of the level of development the branch underwent during 
the 1899 – 1914 period.  In 1899, the artillery had been poorly equipped, wedded to outdated tactical 
ideas and was lambasted for being outclassed by a handful of Boer guns, but by 1914 the British 
gunners were adept at fighting from concealed positions and were noted for their precision and 
accuracy by their allies.  The ideas drawn from the Boer War and confirmed by the Russo-Japanese 
War proved a valuable basis for future development.  The tactics of accurate long range fire, 
concealment and close infantry support were all essentially correct, and it was a lack of numbers and 
absence of uniform doctrine that hampered the gunners in 1914 rather than inherent tactical flaws as 
in the case of the French.  Although the reforms of the Royal Artillery were not as strikingly 
successful as those of the infantry, they nevertheless represented a substantial improvement in both 
tactics and equipment on those of the army that had fought in South Africa.   
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Edward Spiers has suggested that the artillery went to war in 1914 “with a well-considered doctrine, 
which commanded confidence.”226  In fact, doctrine was notable by its absence from the Royal 
Artillery, but this problem was compensated to extent by highly accurate gunnery and many good 
tactical ideas within the branch, even if they were not formally codified in the pre-war years.  
Building upon the hard experience of the Boer War, the Royal Artillery was able to improve itself to 
the extent that it proved a determined foe for the numerically superior Germany artillery in the 
opening months of the First World War, providing crucial fire support to their infantry comrades in 
battles such as Le Cateau and First Ypres despite the persistent ammunition shortages.   
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Chapter Four 
Cavalry 
 
Despite its pre-eminent social status, the cavalry of the British Army had played a relatively minor 
role in the colonial struggles of the late 19th century, and had limited combat experience prior to the 
Boer War.  However, the struggle in South Africa proved to be a conflict in which mounted troops 
were to become the dominant arm.  The Boers were an entirely mounted force, and their military 
ethos was based upon maintaining mobility to avoid being overwhelmed at close range by superior 
numbers.  Although the Boers often fought from earthworks in the conventional stage of the war, 
during this period the cavalry were kept busy with carrying out difficult reconnaissance against well 
concealed foes and trying to cut off Boer retreats after British advances.  Both these roles proved far 
harder than anticipated.  Smokeless powder and long range rifles made effective scouting 
exceptionally difficult, while the superior quality of Boer mounts and small numbers of British 
cavalry meant that the exhausted horsemen were often left trailing behind in pursuits, unable to turn 
local victories into decisive ones.  After the fall of Bloemfontein and Pretoria and the beginning of the 
guerrilla war, the mobility of the Boers became even more pronounced.  Abandoning their artillery 
and wagon laagers, fast moving commandos were able to strike at exposed and vulnerable British 
formations with alarming success, before escaping the relatively slow moving British pursuit 
columns.  To counter Boer mobility, the British deployed a vast number of mounted troops in South 
Africa, including regular formations of cavalry and mounted infantry, as well as yeomanry from 
Britain and colonial volunteers from around the Empire.  Campaigning over the enormous geography 
of South Africa against a highly mobile foe made great demands upon the British mounted forces.  
The varied duties included reconnaissance, screening, turning the flanks of fixed Boer positions and 
finally striking and pursuing when the opportunity arose.  The workload resulted in a staggering 
number of casualties amongst horses.  Official figures noted that 347,007 animals were ‘expended’ 
during the campaign, mainly as a result of exhaustion and disease, the figure representing around 67% 
of the total number of horses sent to the theatre. 1 
With such an important and prominent part to play, the performance of the British mounted forces 
became a subject of scrutiny and criticism even while the war was still in progress.  Critics argued that 
the cavalry had achieved precious little with sword or lance and had failed to effectively pursue the 
Boers and turn retreats into routs.  Supporters however pointed to incidents such as the successful 
pursuit at Elandslaagte and the bold advance of the cavalry division at Klip Drift, suggesting that 
these examples had proven the viability of traditional cavalry on a fire swept battlefield.  The role of 
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the Mounted Infantry also proved controversial, with some feeling that their ability to combine 
cavalry mobility with infantry firepower made them exceptionally valuable, while others argued their 
rudimentary riding skills and poor horsemastery made them a liability that merely increased the 
number of horse casualties.  The experiences of the Boer War set the stage for a heated debate that 
would rage throughout the pre-First World War period as to what tactical role cavalry would play in 
any future conflict.    The crux of this discussion revolved around whether cavalry was better served 
focusing on a dismounted combat role or keeping the old shock action traditions and aiming for a 
decisive charge.  Fierce passions were aroused on both sides, and some of the most important soldiers 
of the British Army became involved in the debate, including the last Commander in Chief, Lord 
Roberts, and future B.E.F. commanders John French and Douglas Haig. 
This vociferous debate has caught the eye of historians, and the tactical development of cavalry in this 
period has received greater academic study than either infantry or artillery.  Traditionally, views of 
cavalry have been largely negative, seeing the arm as antiquated and reactionary, with key officers 
such as Haig stubbornly wedded to obsolete ideas and ignorant of new technology.2  For example, 
Edward Spiers has argued that attempts to reform the cavalry in the 1899 – 1914 period were a failure, 
ending with mounted arm using the same shock tactics it had used prior to the Boer War.3  
Ineffectiveness of cavalry during the years of trench deadlock on the Western Front is cited as final 
proof that the mounted arm was little more than an expensive, unreformed relic by 1914.4  However, 
in recent years a revisionist view has emerged to challenge the idea that cavalry was a military 
anachronism in the 20th century.  Historians such as Stephen Badsey and Gervase Phillips have argued 
that the British cavalry underwent important and valuable reforms prior to 1914, emerging as an 
effective battlefield force in the First World War during the more mobile periods of the conflict in 
1914 and 1918, whilst also proving valuable in the Middle East.5  Far from being wedded to old 
fashioned shock tactics, the revisionists argue that the British cavalry was considerably in advance of 
continental rivals in use of the rifle during the pre-First World War period, with tactics comprising an 
effective hybrid mixture of cold steel charges and dismounted firepower.6   
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This chapter will discuss the development of the regular army’s mounted forces, tracing how the 
experiences of the Boer War produced a long running tactical debate that saw cavalry tactics develop 
considerably from the force that had struggled to cope with the Boers on the veldt.  Although the 
focus will be on experiences and reform of the regular cavalry, British mounted forces in South Africa 
were made up of a variety of different types of horsemen including Yeomanry, colonial formations 
and local volunteers.  It is difficult to disentangle these jumbled units.  Passing reference will be made 
to the non-regular forces, although the focus will remain firmly fixed upon the regular cavalry and 
Mounted Infantry.  The chapter will be structured around three important developments that came to 
prominence during the Boer War.  The key part of the chapter will centre on the long running 
firepower versus shock debate that dominated discussion of virtually all aspects of cavalry reform 
until the outbreak of the First World War.  The chapter will also examine the rise and fall of the 
popularity of Mounted Infantry as a distinct arm in the 1899-1914 period.  Finally, the chapter will 
examine the importance and value of cavalry reconnaissance and its associated skill of horsemastery.  
Utilising these divisions, this chapter will demonstrate that the British cavalry underwent a difficult 
and controversial process of reform in the 1899 – 1914 period.  At the end, while some weaknesses 
remained, the cavalry was able to acquit itself well in combat during 1914 using both firepower and 
cold steel. 
The Firepower versus Cold Steel Debate 
On the eve of the Boer War the cavalry of the British Army drew inspiration from a variety of 
different conflicts, including the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War and the experience 
gained in various small scale colonial operations.  While views from the continent emphasised the use 
of the shock charge, dismounted firepower had proved useful in colonial actions, particularly in 
Afghanistan and on the North West Frontier, and the lack of formal doctrine in the British Army of 
the time meant that individual officers had considerable leeway to train their men in the use of the 
rifle if they saw fit.  Indeed, the employment of dismounted firepower was becoming fashionable 
amongst cavalry officers in the 1890s.7  Nevertheless, this freedom also meant that reactionary 
colonels could choose to reject the ideas entirely, while official textbooks placed firm emphasis upon 
the use of the mounted shock charge with dismounted work being seen as strictly subsidiary.8  Lord 
Wolseley was a particular critic of fighting on foot, arguing in 1891 that “The cavalry soldier is 
intended to fight on horseback.  If you intend to make him fight on foot, well, you will make him into 
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a very bad mongrel... I think it would be prostitution of the finest part of our Service if for a moment 
you convert cavalry into men fighting on foot...”9   
However, while a variety of ideas were in vogue in the British cavalry prior to the war, the nature of 
combat in South Africa forced the arm in unexpected tactical directions.  The Boers were peculiar 
opponents for the regular cavalry to face.  The commandos were an entirely mounted force but had 
little tradition of shock charges.  Instead, the burghers typically engaged dismounted, taking 
advantage of the ability to deploy rapidly to seize good positions and then make the most of their 
rifles.  Just as the Boers worked to avoid hand-to-hand struggles against British infantry, they also 
attempted to avoid mounted clashes with charging British cavalry.  Using small, native ponies as their 
primary mount, the Boer forces were faster and possessed greater endurance than the British cavalry, 
who were mounted on much larger animals that were often under fed and  poorly acclimatised.  The 
result was that with a few important exceptions, the British cavalry were rarely able to catch the Boers 
to deliver an effective cold steel charge, and were often forced to make much greater use of 
dismounted fire themselves. 
The choice of tactical role to be adopted was complicated by the existence of several notable 
successes achieved in a traditional mounted role.  At Elandslaagte, two squadrons of cavalry had been 
able to launch a successful charge against disordered, retreating Boers, inflicting heavy casualties and 
creating a profound impression amongst participants on both sides.  Douglas Haig recorded in a letter 
to his sister that “They [the Boers] are wild at the way the fugitives were killed with the lance! They 
say it is butchery not war.”10   A Boer who managed to escape the charge recalled after the war; 
“Revolvers were being promiscuously fired at us...I could see their long assegais; I could hear the 
snorting of their unwieldy horses, the clattering of their swords.  These unpleasant combinations were 
enough to strike terror into the heart of any ordinary man.”11   Haig subsequently attributed the shock 
and fear created amongst the Boers as a key factor in allowing the bloodied British forces at Dundee 
to retreat unmolested despite their vulnerable condition.12  The success of the charge also left a 
profound and lasting impression upon John French, who subsequently recorded the date of the battle 
in his diary for the rest of his life, the only action to which he afforded such an honour.13 
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Perhaps an even more important cavalry charge was to take place some months later on 15th February 
at Klip Drift.  Whereas the charge at Elandslaagte had involved just two squadrons of cavalry, at Klip 
Drift the entire British cavalry division was committed to rapidly break through the Boer lines and 
raise the siege of Kimberley.  Around 900 Boers on a 6 mile front with some artillery support opposed 
the advance, but despite having the British horsemen under a crossfire for a significant time, 
casualties were negligible and the cavalry broke through, relieving Kimberley as a result.14  The 
advance was hailed as tremendous success by participants including French, Haig, Allenby and 
Rimington, but it was peculiar in the sense that it was not a ‘shock’ charge in the style of Elandslaagte 
as the objective was a breakthrough rather than a direct collision with an enemy formation.15  This 
factor made the charge somewhat unique and would prove a source of controversy, but at the time the 
ability for a mass of horsemen to successfully advance across open ground in the face of infantry fire 
was seen as highly significant.16  Two days later, the cavalry division achieved further success by 
outmanoeuvring the Boers who were retreating from Kimberley.  French’s cavalry were able to place 
themselves on the Boer line of retreat at Koodoosrand, holding the position using dismounted tactics 
and resisting attempts to dislodge them.17  With British infantry pursuing the Boers and cavalry 
blocking their line of retreat, Boer leader Piet Cronje made the fateful decision to dig in, ultimately 
leading to the Battle of Paardeberg and the eventual surrender of virtually his entire force.18  However, 
cavalry actions such as Elandslaagte and Klip Drift were relatively rare, and the majority of the work 
undertaken by the arm in the Boer War involved fighting dismounted.    
Two related issues in South Africa made this type of fighting particularly demanding.  Firstly, as 
discussed in earlier chapters, the crystal clear atmosphere of the veldt meant that targets could be 
spotted and engaged at incredibly long ranges, allowing the Boers to snipe at British troops from 
exceptional distances.  Secondly, the Boers were armed with infantry rifles as compared to the 
carbines of the cavalry.  The carbine was a small weapon that was easy to carry on a horse, but it was 
not designed for long range shooting and was thus considerably outranged by the Boer Mausers.  
Forced to engage at such unusual ranges in dismounted actions, the inadequacies of the weapon were 
soon exposed and a chorus of criticism followed.  An officer of the 18th Hussars complained “The 
carbine is useless as opposed to the modern pattern rifle, being completely outranged... On many 
occasions during the present campaign, the men under my command have had to submit to a heavy 
rifle fire at ranges 2,500 – 3,000 yards, being quite unable to reply with the carbine...”19  Charles 
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Warren noted similar problems, complaining that although the carbine was accurate up to around 
1,200 yards, “...beyond that it rapidly tails off, and consequently the cavalry when armed with it were 
at a great disadvantage when meeting Boers.  The Boers had only to keep at 2,000 yards from our 
cavalry in the hills, and they could shoot them down with impunity or surround them... they [the 
cavalry] were practically useless in hilly country, and could not do the duties of cavalry or mounted 
infantry.”20  A handful of officers came to the defence of the carbine, but in the face of bitter combat 
experience, such views were in a distinct minority.21   
With the carbine proving inadequate in combat and cavalry being outranged in dismounted fire fights, 
it became necessary to seek a replacement weapon.  Aside from keeping the carbine, the only option 
was to equip the cavalry with infantry rifles, which possessed the range and accuracy to compete with 
the Boer Mausers.  However, the advantage of the carbine lay in its small size, allowing it to be 
carried without undue encumbrance, and while the rifle gave cavalry greater strength in dismounted 
combat, its large size was a problem for already overburdened horses and it proved awkward to carry 
in addition to swords and lances.  As the war moved into the guerrilla stage, the need for the cavalry 
to possess high levels of endurance and mobility became even greater, and the extra weight of 
equipment posed serious questions about the role of the mounted arm in South Africa.  The Earl of 
Scarborough noted that the cavalry during this period “...were working all day long to find the enemy, 
and acting practically as Mounted Infantry, attacking positions, and when the enemy did retire their 
horses were completely done up, so that they were not able to deliver any effective pursuit or to over-
take them.”22  With dismounted action the main employment for cavalry, even cavalry officers such as 
Douglas Haig had cause to doubt the value of the arme blanche, Haig writing soon after the war had 
begun “It is a question whether the Dragoon-lancer is not a mistake!  His lance hampers him.”23 
In early 1900 Lord Roberts had toyed with the idea of removing steel weapons from the cavalry to 
improve their mobility and reduce encumbrance when fighting dismounted.  However, the reaction 
from officers to the proposal was largely negative and Roberts did not formally introduce the policy, 
instead leaving the decision to local commanders.24  Nevertheless, the germ of the idea remained, and 
returned to prominence following the fall of the Boer capitals.  In the small scale skirmishes and 
ambush actions that were typical of the early part of the guerrilla phase of the war, being able to 
dismount rapidly and take up effective positions was crucial to tactical success.25  Conversely, the 
cavalry had few opportunities to deliver shock charges against small groups of scattered Boers in this 
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stage of the war, and in combination with demands for ever greater mobility to catch rapidly moving 
commandos, the balance between the value of rifle and cold steel seemed to tip in favour of firepower.  
This culminated in October 1900, when lances and swords were officially withdrawn from regular 
cavalry regiments.26  An order from Kitchener’s headquarters added that “The rifle will henceforth be 
considered the cavalry soldier’s principal weapon”, while Lord Methuen echoed similar sentiments on 
cavalry armament when he argued “In this campaign I should say any weapons but a rifle is an 
incumberance.[sic]”.27  The policy stirred up considerable controversy and was strongly opposed by 
cavalrymen such as John French, who sought and received permission to ignore the order for troops 
under his command.28  Column commanders were also given a certain degree of flexibility on the 
armament of their cavalry, which allowed some units to retain edged weapons longer than others.  For 
example, the 5th Lancers were still carrying their lances as late as June 1901, until their column 
commander Horace Smith-Dorrien informed them they could either keep the lance and remain in 
camp, or abandon the weapon and stay in action.29  
Opponents of the decision such as French and Haig argued that removing the arme blanche seriously 
diminished ‘cavalry spirit’, suggesting purely rifle armed horsemen lacked morale and fought in a 
timid manner.  In May 1901 Haig bemoaned such an attitude, noting after a small action involving 
mounted forces that “Many men do not care to be shot at, and instead of pushing on, were satisfied at 
shooting off their rifles at 2,000 yards.  This sort of thing will never end the war...”, while Rimington 
felt that it caused the fighting to devolve into “...fire at long distances and infinitely wearisome 
tactics...”30  A further criticism of the policy was that the absence of close combat weapons 
encouraged the Boers to approach to close range during attacks against the British, either dismounting 
and making use of snap shooting to overwhelm the enemy or even launching mounted charges, firing 
from the saddle.31  These methods were a striking change from the tactics employed in the early stage 
of the war, and could prove highly effective in the right circumstances.  At Blood River Port, 17th 
September 1901, an advance guard of around 250 Mounted Infantry was lured into a hasty attack on 
dismounted Boers, only to find themselves pinned by rifle fire to the front and charged from the right 
flank by mounted commandos, who killed or captured the entire force including commanding officer 
Hubert Gough.32  Similar results were achieved by the Boers at Onverwacht, 4th January 1902, when a 
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double envelopment was made by mounted commandos after dismounted Boers had acted as bait.33  
The skill of these Boer attacks often left British observers impressed.  An assault on a supply convoy 
in Western Transvaal in October 1901 saw three commandos launch a combined charge, each forming 
up two or three lines deep and charging “like a regiment of European cavalry straight for the centre of 
the convoy.”34  Perhaps the greatest success achieved by a Boer assault came at Tweebosch 7th March 
1902, when a commando attacked and overwhelmed a British column, wounding and capturing Lord 
Methuen in the process.  Methuen himself described the Boer rush as “a magnificent charge”.35   
Although Boer charges could end in failure, such as at Rooiwal 11th April 1902 where the British 
stood firm and shot the Boers down as they advanced, the experiences left a profound impression 
upon the army.  Explaining the reasons for the success of such tactics and what they suggested for the 
future remained a contentious issue for much of the period. 
After the conflict had finally come to an end, a number of officers cited the absence of edged weapons 
as encouraging the Boers to make such bold charges.36  While British cavalry remained armed with 
cold steel, it was suggested that the Boers would not approach for fear of being counter charged, but 
once the weapons had been removed, the confidence of the Boers markedly increased.  John French 
“...was perfectly certain that on several occasions if we had stuck to our swords and lances, our men 
would not have been ridden down by the Boers with their rifles.”37  Although referring to his 
experiences in the Yeomanry, one officer summed up the effect the removal of the lance apparently 
had upon Boer tactics when he noted “...directly they found that we had not a lance, which they hold 
in mortal dread... then they said: ‘Hello, here are these fellows, we can go at them’, and they came at 
us, and used to kick us from one end of the country to the other.”38  However, not all officers felt that 
the removal of the arme blanche was to blame for encouraging Boer attacks.  Firepower advocates 
such as Ian Hamilton argued that the veteran status of the surviving commandos made them more 
inclined towards bold tactics, while the poor shooting of irregular mounted formations such as the 
second contingent of Yeomanry meant the Boers knew they could charge across the fire swept zone 
with relatively minor losses.39  Nevertheless, even some outside the cavalry branch wondered whether 
the complete removal of steel weapons had not ultimately been a step too far.  For example, in early 
1900 Sir Howard Vincent had confidently predicted “...the day of the sword is done save as an 
emblem.  It is doubtful if a sword in this campaign has ever inflicted a wound upon anyone save upon 
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the hips and legs of the wearer, or the flanks of a horse.”40  However, by 1902 he had reversed his 
position and was expressing concern that the army had gone too far in turning cavalry into mounted 
infantry, citing the successful charge at Elandslaagte as “one of the few real lessons we have been 
able to drive home in blood to the enemy.”41 
For the cavalry, the experiences of the Boer War had been confusing and the lessons far from self 
evident.  Whereas the infantry could look towards improved marksmanship and extended formations 
as crucial lessons, the direction to take for future cavalry reform was less clear.    The key tactical 
question that required resolution was whether firepower or shock action was to be the primary mode 
of engagement for cavalry.  Dismounted action had been the principal tactic employed for much of the 
war and cold steel had achieved relatively little, but the policy to remove edged weapons entirely had 
been distinctly unpopular and had arguably contributed to a number of small scale British defeats.  
Furthermore, the success of the charges at Elandslaagte and during the Klip Drift operation showed 
the potential of more traditional cavalry methods, while the ability of the Boers to charge across fire 
swept zones suggested that modern rifles were not as decisive at stopping mounted troops as 
firepower advocates such as Hamilton argued.  Reconciling these views and solving the problem of 
future cavalry tactics was to produce a stormy debate that was to impede effective reform for several 
years.  The heart of the debate was between those who favoured dismounted firepower as the principal 
tactic, championed by Lord Roberts, and those who preferred shock action, headed by John French.  
Although there were extreme views on the fringes of both camps, at its heart the debate was relatively 
narrow.42  Both schools of thought emphasised flexibility of method and essentially advocated the 
creation of a hybrid soldier who could fight effectively both mounted and on foot.   
Roberts and his core supporters wished to see cavalry reform based on the dismounted experiences of 
South Africa, but had no wish to abolish shock action entirely.  Speaking before the Elgin 
Commission, Roberts summed up his views as “...although it is very desirable that cavalry should be 
expert with their swords and trained for shock tactics, my belief is that in future wars shock tactics 
will be few and far between, and that cavalry will have to fight far more frequently on foot...”43  Ian 
Hamilton expressed stronger opinions, feeling that the sword and lance were “medieval toys” on a 
modern battlefield and that dismounted cavalry with good rifles would have a distinct advantage over 
troops looking to force a mounted action.44  Such opinions drew the ire of cavalrymen, Hamilton 
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noting on his personal copy of the commission’s report that “This infuriated Haig and French beyond 
measure”, while future Chief of Imperial General Staff William Nicholson reportedly annotated his 
own copy with “This man has a tile loose!”45  Nevertheless, Hamilton followed Roberts’s line and 
expressed his support for the retention of the sword, albeit as a secondary weapon to the rifle.46  The 
viewpoint offered by Roberts attracted support from a variety of sources.  For example, Austro-
Hungarian Field Marshal Gustavus Retzenhoffer was impressed by British cavalry’s dismounted work 
in South Africa, feeling it distinguished itself in the role and calling for a thorough study of the details 
to assist in future training in Austro-Hungary.47  Even some cavalrymen supported Roberts’s ideas, 
including successful Boer War commander Lord Dundonald, who felt the ideal cavalryman should be 
a first class rifle shot above all other considerations.48  Dundonald went on to embody his views in the 
Canadian edition of Cavalry Training 1904, arguing that cavalry who could “coolly dismount” in the 
face of a mounted charge could kill as many men in five minutes with their fire as could be killed in 
five hours by cold steel.49  There were a few individuals at the periphery of the debate who called for 
the abolition of the arme blanche entirely, including Winston Churchill who urged the cavalry to 
abandon “the sharp sticks and long irons” which were fit only for savage and medieval wars, but such 
views were in a minority.50  Instead, the views offered by Roberts and his supporters were relatively 
moderate and represented a change of tactical emphasis towards dismounted work rather than a 
complete revolution. 
Those who opposed the firepower school were primarily led by cavalrymen John French and Douglas 
Haig, and were termed the “Old School” by Lord Roberts.51  Although their continued belief in the 
viability of shock action has been used as a means to criticise them as reactionary by historians such 
as Gerard De Groot and Tim Travers, in reality their viewpoint was not as divergent from Roberts and 
his supporters as it initially appeared.52  Early in the Boer War, Haig had been impressed with the 
ability of the Boers to move rapidly to a flank, before dismounting and pouring enfilade fire into 
advancing infantry, suggesting that it could be imitated by British cavalry.53  By the end of the 
conflict, while remaining critical of the withdrawal of steel weapons in South Africa, Haig argued that 
“The ideal cavalry is that which can fight on foot and attack on horseback”, although he felt the 
morale advantages and potential for decisive success meant that shock action should take precedence 
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in most circumstances.54  French offered similar views, arguing that “...no stone should be left 
unturned to make cavalry soldiers the best possible shots and thoroughly adept in all dismounted 
duties”, but cautioned that such tactics had a time and a place, and that over-reliance upon them would 
fatally erode cavalry morale and make them vulnerable to more aggressive enemy horsemen.55  The 
‘Old School’ pointed towards Elandslaagte and Klip Drift as examples of traditional cavalry 
employment, arguing that the failure to carry out more successful charges was primarily due to the 
poor condition of the horses rather than any inherent tactical weaknesses.56  Despite the limitations 
imposed by exhausted mounts, French argued that the cavalry had been able to drive off Boers on a 
number of occasions by boldly advancing against them, even if a physical charge was out of the 
question and the men had only been able to get their speed up by flogging their horses with the flat of 
the sword.57  While the ‘Old School’ had common ground with Roberts and his supporters in 
acknowledging the value of the firearm, French and his fellow cavalry officers argued strongly for the 
principal focus to remain upon usage of the arme blanche.58   
However, the initially subtle difference in emphasis became a sore point that gradually forced the two 
camps further apart.  While these competing theories struggled for prominence throughout the period, 
it was initially Roberts and his ‘New School’ that held the advantage.  Roberts was in place as 
Commander in Chief of the British Army and had the prestige earned in South Africa to give weight 
to his policies.  Emphasising his belief in the value of dismounted firepower, Roberts had been 
considering the complete removal of the lance as a combat weapon in 1901, and made the policy 
official in March 1903, retaining it only for ceremonial duties and potentially for use against tribal 
foes.59  Roberts acknowledged that the weapon had some positive attributes, including inducing terror 
in the enemy when used in pursuit such as at Elandslaagte, but argued that unless the foe was in an 
unprecedented state of disorder any pursuing cavalry would be better served by cutting off the retreat 
with dismounted action as at Koodoosrand.60  The lance was also held to offer some advantages in a 
charge against enemy cavalry, where it could potentially bring down the entire front rank on impact, 
but this was a theoretical aim that had never been achieved in actual warfare.61  Conversely, Roberts 
argued that the lance was an easily spotted encumbrance when scouting and crucially was a positive 
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hindrance when fighting in a dismounted action.62  With opportunities for shock action likely to be 
limited in the future, Roberts saw no value in retaining the awkward weapon, relying instead upon the 
sword should a charge become necessary. 
Roberts also made clear that future cavalry tactics must depend on the rifle as their principal arm in 
Cavalry Training 1904, the first cavalry manual to be issued following the Boer War.  The volume 
was relatively moderate in tone, approving of the use of both dismounted fire and shock charges.  
However, Lord Roberts was unsatisfied with the manual as it stood, and took the unprecedented step 
of adding a preface expressing his own belief in the rifle and highlighting its importance in future 
tactics.  Explaining what the improvements in rifle technology entailed for the cavalry, Roberts 
argued: 
...the sword must henceforth be an adjunct to the rifle; and that cavalry soldiers must become 
expert rifle shots and be constantly trained to act dismounted... I should consider that a leader 
who failed to take advantage of an opportunity for employing shock tactics when required to 
close with the enemy was unfit for his position.  But I cannot agree with those military 
experts who hold that, in future wars, cavalry shock tactics will form as prominent a feature 
as heretofore.  I think the improvement in firearms will give the victory to the side which can 
first dismount on ground less favourable to a charge than an open plain...63 
The removal of the lance and insertion of the preface to Cavalry Training 1904 marked the high water 
mark of Roberts’s influence and created a storm of controversy amongst the cavalry.  The existence of 
the preface was highly irregular, with no other training manual possessing such an introduction.  This 
anomaly caused the Army Council to have serious misgivings about its publication, only issuing it 
with the note that the manual was ‘Provisional’.64  Many cavalrymen felt that the preface was a direct 
attack upon their arm, and the Inspector General of Forces noted that cavalry officers of all ranks were 
solidly united against the inclusion of the preface and wished to see it withdrawn.65  While Roberts 
rejected such critics as reactionary ‘Old School’ officers, they represented a broader consensus 
including genuine cavalry reformers.66  Ironically, the creation of the controversial preface was to be 
one of the final acts of Lord Roberts in an official capacity.  Soon after its issue, the recommendations 
of the Esher Committee unceremoniously swept the position of Commander in Chief away to be 
replaced with a General Staff headed by Neville Lyttelton.  Removed from his position of authority, 
Lord Roberts’s influence on the debate declined considerably, although for the rest of his life he 
remained vociferous on the need for the cavalry to improve its capacity to fight dismounted.  
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However, his role in discussions of cavalry tactics was now marginal, and the controversial preface 
was dropped from a reprint of Cavalry Training 1904 issued in January 1905.  The removal of the 
preface also meant that the Army Council dropped the ‘Provisional’ tag from the reprinted manual. 
Although the Roberts era was relatively short, its influence on the cavalry reform debate was 
considerable.  As Stephen Badsey has argued, constant criticism from the press and the ‘New School’ 
thinkers directed against regular army cavalry had caused considerable demoralisation in the arm.67  
Declining morale amongst the cavalry was a matter of official concern, especially as it resulted in a 
large number of resignations and a consequent shortage of officers.68   An Army Council discussion in 
1905 on the lack of cavalry officers noted unhappily that “There is a general agreement that the press 
and public opinion have disheartened cavalry officers by attacking and abusing them...”69  In April 
1905, the Inspector General of Cavalry called for the creation of a journal for the cavalry branch, 
feeling that there was “...special necessity for it at present owing to the feeling of discouragement 
which...exists at present amongst our cavalry officers.”70  Even members of the ‘New School’ such as 
Ian Hamilton expressed concerns over the demoralisation that had been produced amongst the 
mounted troops, noting that cavalry in Southern Command in 1906 were showing a tendency to be 
overly cautious and reluctant to engage unless the opportunities were ideal.  Hamilton called for a 
renewal of offensive cavalry spirit, and made the suggestion that over emphasis in training on the 
casualties that would be suffered at the hands of rifle fire may have been the root cause.71  Although 
tactical training at brigade level and below demonstrated considerable improvement over the period, 
the ongoing debate between Roberts and the ‘Old School’ had the effect of creating doubt about 
overall cavalry doctrine.72  In 1905 the Duke of Connaught praised the professionalism and keenness 
of cavalry officers in both mounted and dismounted work, but cautioned that an overall direction for 
training needed to be agreed upon, writing “We have yet to learn the precise role of Cavalry under 
recent changes, and to what end to shape our training...”73 
The departure of Lord Roberts coincided with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in the Far East, 
and an opportunity to draw fresh examples to fuel the cavalry debate.  As with the infantry and 
artillery, the cavalry of the British Army took a keen interest in this clash between two modern forces 
organised on European lines.  However, in terms of mounted troops, the two opposing armies were 
somewhat unique.  The Japanese had poor horse breeding stock and thus deployed relatively few 
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horsemen into the field, but followed a German inspired tactical model emphasising shock action.  
Conversely, the Russians had a very large number of Cossacks armed with carbines and trained in 
dismounted work, but possessed only a handful of regular army cavalry units that arrived  late in the 
war.  On paper therefore, the conflict seemed to provide a potential guide between the relative values 
of dismounted work against shock action.  However, in reality a variety of factors meant that drawing 
useful cavalry lessons proved harder than anticipated.  The widespread use of entrenchments and 
obstacles combined with difficult and often mountainous terrain to curtail the activities of the 
mounted arm.  Despite their enormous numerical superiority, the Cossacks performed poorly and 
were universally condemned by critics.74  One British observer summed them up as “pretty well 
useless for war purposes” and thought the cavalry of any European country were superior to them 
both mounted and dismounted.75  Although ostensibly trained in dismounted work, critics pointed to 
the fact that Cossack marksmanship was abysmal and seriously limited their ability to fight on foot.76  
Although echoing the criticism of the Cossacks, senior British observer Ian Hamilton felt that the war 
in Manchuria had been full of opportunities for effective dismounted work but complained that they 
were rarely taken.77  Conversely, those who favoured shock tactics looked upon the dismal 
performance of the Cossacks as proof that an over emphasis on dismounted firepower detracted from 
cavalry spirit and left the soldiers “emasculated.”78  While the Japanese cavalry had achieved little of 
note, their preference for shock action and the fact they were on the winning side was offered as proof 
of the superiority of their tactics.79  However, there were few examples of successful cavalry actions 
from which to draw future lessons.  Indeed, the tiny Japanese cavalry force was so peripheral to the 
main struggle that at the Battle of Liao-Ying in September 1904, Japanese cavalrymen were assigned 
to carry and cook rations for the infantry.80  Overall, the Russo-Japanese War offered little fresh to the 
existing debates within the British cavalry and gave no clear direction for future reform.  Lacking 
useful combat examples, participants in the debate tended to use the experience to confirm pre-
existing views.  For example, Ian Hamilton confessed to feeling a “malicious satisfaction” that 
cavalry had achieved little success in shock action, feeling it helped prove the correctness of his 
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earlier deductions from the Boer War, while Michael Rimington felt the conflict merely proved that 
the Russian cavalry had been “...trained and organised for twenty years on wrong principles...”81 
Although the Russo-Japanese War offered few hints for future tactics, the need to decide on a tactical 
direction in the cavalry remained.  A combination of factors, including the departure of Lord Roberts, 
continuing doubts about the future direction for cavalry tactics, and the declining morale of the arm all 
gave added impetus to the ‘Old School’ theorists such as French and Haig.  Both of these men held 
greater influence in the absence of Lord Roberts and could reshape cavalry along their own ideas, 
placing renewed emphasis on cold steel.  For example, French had never approved of the removal of 
the lance as a weapon, ignoring the order to discard it and turning a blind eye to its continued use at 
Aldershot.  His continued support for the weapon ultimately led to the Army Council reinstating the 
lance for lancer regiments in 1909.82  Perhaps more importantly, cavalry tactics were changed to 
reflect the ideas of the ‘Old School’, and Cavalry Training 1907 therefore represented a departure 
from the 1904 edition, acknowledging dismounted work but placing much greater emphasis on the 
value of shock action and not even listing the word ‘rifle’ in the index.83  Gerard De Groot has been 
critical of this manual and termed the period as an era of “Cavalry Counter Reformation”, but Stephen 
Badsey has argued that Cavalry Training 1907 was a more subtle work that intentionally placed an 
overt emphasis on the charge as a means of restoring the dented pride of the mounted arm.84  An 
infamous passage in the 1907 manual referred to the rifle being unable to match “...the speed of the 
horse, the magnetism of the charge and the terror of cold steel”, but as Stephen Badsey and Richard 
Holmes have noted, taken within the context of the time this was not a desperate reaction against 
modern conditions, but in fact a passage based on practical combat experience in South Africa and the 
desire to restore cavalry confidence.85  In this latter respect, Cavalry Training 1907 had some success.  
For example, in 1908, Ian Hamilton was pleased to find his cavalry had recovered much of the vigour 
they had lacked two years earlier, noting that they now “took their full share of the fighting.”86  The 
exaltation of shock tactics found in the 1907 manual was not continued in later editions, lending 
weight to the idea suggested by Stephen Badsey that it represented something of a temporary 
expedient to provide direction to a confused and demoralised cavalry arm.  By the time of Field 
Service Regulations 1909, the tone was considerably more moderate, with emphasis being placed 
upon tactical flexibility and the independence granted to cavalry by their rifle armament.87  The trend 
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was continued in Cavalry Training 1912, which saw opportunities for combining both fire and shock 
to good effect, drawing upon the support of rifles, machine guns and horse artillery where possible.88 
Indeed, it was not dedication to either shock or fire, but the idea of combining both tactics to create a 
hybrid approach that came to dominate the cavalry debate in the years prior to the First World War.  
Although Cavalry Training 1907 strongly favoured shock as a means of restoring cavalry pride, at a 
tactical level there was still great interest in the use of firepower and dismounted work.  Few in 
Britain saw opportunities for charges against enemy infantry unless the foe was surprised or 
disordered, and instead the main target for shock attacks was to be enemy horsemen.  Shock action 
was seen as being of primary importance during the opening of a European conflict, when there was 
an almost universal assumption, both in Britain and on the continent, that the war would begin with a 
vast cavalry engagement that would determine which side would hold the upper hand in 
reconnaissance. 89  This specific duty was seen as the most likely opportunity for shock action.  
Charles Repington summed up the attitude in an article published in the first issue of the Cavalry 
Journal when he wrote “Shock tactics in these days refer to the shock of cavalry against cavalry.”90  
For the job of destroying enemy cavalry, firepower was regarded as being too slow and potentially 
unreliable.  Although in 1904 Lord Dundonald had felt dismounted troopers could kill far more 
enemy cavalry with the rifle than the sword, by 1912 ex-Mounted Infantry officer Henry DeLisle 
argued that such tactics would lead to indecisive long distance shooting and a mutual standoff, 
preventing effective reconnaissance.91  Indeed, it was felt by some that the cavalry had achieved a 
tactical advantage if it could somehow compel the enemy to dismount through either fire or 
manoeuvre, thus depriving it of its mobility.92  Furthermore, electing to dismount against aggressive, 
mounted cavalry carried with it a risk of being swept away by an enemy charge before it could be 
stopped.  The Boer War was cited as a potential example of this situation, particularly the fact that 
untrained burghers on small ponies had been able to cross fire swept zones and deliver surprisingly 
effective charges, with one officer noting that experiences in South Africa suggested that even his best 
marksmen were often intimidated by the sight of an enemy charging towards him, losing accuracy as 
a result.93  Nevertheless, although shock action against cavalry was favoured, emphasis remained on 
flexibility, particularly making the best use of the ground and immediate tactical situation.  For 
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example, following an inspection of the Cavalry Division in 1909, Douglas Haig complained that not 
enough attention was paid to the use of the ground in determining cavalry tactics, writing; 
The principles which should determine the choice between mounted and dismounted action 
require to be more thoroughly considered... squadrons have been seen to remain mounted in 
enclosed country when under fire at close range from dismounted men.94  
The flexible combination of both fire and shock was also emphasised in engaging enemy infantry.  
While the initial priority was considered to be targeting enemy mounted troops, once the opposing 
horsemen had been defeated or at least driven off it was assumed the cavalry would have more tactical 
freedom to engage the infantry.  Although officers saw the potential for successful charges against 
enemy infantry if conditions were favourable, it was recognised that such opportunities would be very 
rare.95  To successfully charge enemy infantry, it was considered necessary to either achieve local 
surprise or for the enemy to be in a state of disorder and unable to resist effectively.  Some officers 
thought that modern war made these circumstances more likely, with wide battlefronts giving the 
cavalry more room for manoeuvre, extended infantry formations lacking cohesion and discipline, and 
long, intense battles leaving troops exhausted and thus prone to panic at the sight of charging 
horsemen, a concept that was endorsed by Cavalry Training 1907.96  Nevertheless, training exercises 
emphasised that cavalry should avoid reckless, headlong charges against infantry when dismounted 
action could serve them better.97  This idea was highlighted in Cavalry Training 1912, with the focus 
resting upon using dismounted fire and shock action in combination to overwhelm enemy formations, 
the manual arguing that such tactics “present the greatest chance of success.”98  Armed with machine 
guns and horse artillery, and possessing a high standard of individual musketry, it was also anticipated 
that British cavalry could hold their own against enemy infantry formations, even to the point of 
concealing their ‘led horses’ and deceiving the foe into thinking he was facing a genuine infantry 
formation.99  The ‘hybrid’ cavalryman that emerged in the years preceding the First World War was a 
compromise yet practical solution to the New School versus Old School debate that had followed the 
Boer War.  Dismounted training ensured the cavalry could fight effectively in difficult terrain, while 
retaining shock action meant it would be capable of seizing sudden opportunities to charge such as 
occurred at Elandslaagte, as well as maintaining the morale and cavalry spirit that had been in decline 
during the Roberts era. 
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However, the hybrid concept did not draw universal admiration and was savaged in the notorious 
1910 work War and the Arme Blanche by Erskine Childers.  Childers was a civilian who had served 
as a volunteer artilleryman in the Boer War, but his criticisms were given considerable weight by the 
fact Lord Roberts provided a supportive preface.  Childers argued that shock action “had been 
consigned to complete oblivion in South Africa”, while Roberts supported the idea, suggesting the 
Klip Drift operation was not a genuine cavalry charge, but instead “a rapid advance of fighting 
men.”100  The work called for the abolition of cold steel weapons, feeling a true hybrid soldier skilled 
in both rifle and sword was an unattainable goal, and instead suggested that purely rifle armed cavalry 
would be far more effective.101  Childers has drawn praise from Brian Bond who felt his argument 
possessed “devastating logic.”102  However, several of his tactical suggestions were of doubtful value.  
For example, Childers still believed cavalry could charge, albeit using the rifle instead of the sword or 
lance.  His work argued that rather than charging into contact with the enemy, the cavalry could rush 
forward and then dismount at close range, overwhelming the foe with firepower.103  While this had 
worked for the Boers in South Africa, particularly against low quality troops such as the 2nd 
contingent of Yeomanry, there were serious doubts about its value in a European conflict against 
regular soldiers.  British officers were quick to point out that closing with the enemy and then trying 
to dismount invited a crushing counter charge from opposing cavalry using cold steel, as well as 
risking heavy casualties from enemy fire.104  While Childers stirred controversy with War and the 
Arme Blanche and a follow up volume entitled German Influence Upon British Cavalry, in reality his 
more moderate tactical views were not as divergent from the cavalry’s own as first appeared.  An 
article from the General Staff in response to the book argued that in many aspects, “...the difference in 
opinion between Mr. Childers and our Training Manuals is by no means so great as he seems to think 
it is” and noted that both War and the Arme Blanche and British official works placed emphasis on 
mobility, firepower and aggression as the keys to cavalry success.105  In some ways, existing tactical 
thinking was more advanced.  The General Staff criticised Childers for placing too much faith in the 
sheer speed of the horseman to cross fireswept zones unharmed, arguing that for a successful charge it 
was instead imperative that the cavalry had either the advantage of surprise, superior numbers or local 
fire superiority.106 
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Although Roberts and Childers continued to complain the cavalry had regressed to pre-Boer War 
standards, by the later years of the period much of the heat had left the debate as both New School and 
Old School became relatively reconciled in favour of the hybrid cavalry tactics discussed earlier.  In 
1908, firepower advocate Ian Hamilton expressed satisfaction that cavalry in Southern Command 
were demonstrating flexibility in both mounted and dismounted methods, and noted “There is reason, 
then, for hope that the heated controversies of the past few years as to the respective merits of shock 
and fire tactics are at last cooling down into the sensible conclusion that there may be room on the 
battlefield for either or for both.”107  Cavalry officers expressed similar views on the usefulness of the 
hybrid model and the value of a compromise tactical solution.  John French warned the debate on 
cavalry tactics risked producing extreme solutions, noting “One amateur Centaur would dash the 
sword and lance entirely out of the cavalryman’s hand.  Another fanatic (‘Beau Sabeur’) would throw 
the horseman’s splendid fire-arm to the wind” and instead advocated a balanced approach.108  Future 
commander of the B.E.F. cavalry division Edmund Allenby was blunter with regard to cavalry tactics, 
stating “We want to kill.  When we are in enclosed country we must use the rifle; if we are in open 
country we ought to be able to use both the rifle and the sword.”109  While there was continued 
emphasis on the value of shock action, it was moderated by the need to be highly proficient in 
dismounted work. M.F. Rimington argued that the cavalry ideal should always be shock charges, but 
tempered his arguments by noting that fire action would be employed nine times out of ten.110 Perhaps 
the neatest summary of the attitude towards cavalry tactics following the departure of Lord Roberts 
was offered in 1910, when one officer surmised “The desire to use the sabre or lance should be 
predominant, but it must be held in restraint by a thorough knowledge of the power of the firearm.”111 
The successful adoption of hybrid tactics put the cavalry of the British Army considerably in advance 
of mounted forces on the continent.  As the largest army of Europe, the German cavalry had been a 
model to follow for most of the pre-Boer War period, and strong interest in their tactics remained in 
the Edwardian era.  However, British and German cavalry methods became increasingly divergent as 
the years passed by, and although the determination of the German cavalry to charge home was 
admired, they had little else to teach the horsemen of the future B.E.F.  Drawing upon conscripts with 
a limited period of enlistment rather than long service volunteers meant that continental forces lacked 
the time to train their men effectively in both mounted and dismounted work, and therefore focussed 
on shock action to a greater extent than the British.112  There was some anxiety, particularly in 
Germany, that modern warfare would require more dismounted work, but the limitations of training 
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meant that little was done to make their cavalry more effective in this regard.  Instead, the Germans 
preferred to add light infantry Jaeger battalions to their cavalry to provide fire power when necessary, 
although there were concerns that the Jaegers would not be able to keep up during fast moving 
actions.113  The cavalry of France was even weaker when it came to dismounted action, taking little 
interest in the subject and maintaining, in the words of one British officer, a “...robust and perhaps 
fanatical faith in the importance of shock tactics.”114  Attempts to reform the French mounted arm 
achieved little in the pre-war period, despite the best efforts of a few determined officers.  In 1908, 
General de Negrier had lambasted the “dreaming” French cavalry in a searing article in Revue des 
deux Mondes, laying out a full translation of the controversial preface from Cavalry Training 1904 as 
an example to follow.115  However, these efforts produced few significant results and the French 
cavalry remained backward compared to the British and even the German forces in terms of 
dismounted work.  Both French and German cavalry continued to carry the carbine, weapons that 
were as poor in comparison with the British rifle as the carbine had been to the Mauser in South 
Africa. 
The acid test of the stormy period of cavalry reform came in the opening months of 1914, when the 
vastly outnumbered B.E.F. cavalry division faced five cavalry divisions drawn from German I and II 
Corps.116  Although the British 2nd Brigade controversially blundered into a reckless and failed charge 
at Audregnies on 24th August 1914, the majority of clashes with German horsemen ended with 
distinct tactical successes.  The action at Cerizy 28th August 1914 represented an almost ideal 
combination of fire and shock, with dismounted fire from rifles and machine guns forcing German 
cavalry to dismount, shelling from horse artillery causing their ‘led horses’ to stampede, and finally a 
cold steel charge by the 12th Lancers sweeping into the enemy and routing them.117  In the critical 
battles around Ypres in October 1914, the British cavalry dismounted and held a portion of the line 
against the attacks of an entire German Army Corps, a clear testament to the quality of their pre-war 
training in this regard.118  Conversely, German cavalry found their pre-war tactics were flawed on the 
Western Front.  Unable to break through opposing cavalry, the cumulative effect of local defeats 
eroded the morale of the German horsemen, leaving them reluctant to engage and meaning they did 
not place any real pressure upon the British during the retreat from Mons.119  The weakness of 
German pre-war training was given expression in September 1914, when Eric von Falkenhayn 
announced that “The dismounted cavalryman should be able to fight exactly as an infantryman; 
                                                     
113
 Lt. General von Pelet-Narbonne, “Primary Conditions for Success of Cavalry in the Next European War”, in 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 50(1), 1906, p.333 
114
 Quoted in Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p.215 
115
 Childers, War and the Arme Blanche, p.353 
116
 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p.243 
117
 Holmes, Riding the Retreat, pp.213-219 
118
 Beckett, I.F.W., Ypres: The First Battle 1914, (Harlow, Pearson/Longman, 2006) pp.100, 158-159 
119
 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p.243 
158 
 
cavalry charges no longer play any part in warfare.”120  The cavalry of the B.E.F. held clear 
advantages in these critical opening battles before trench deadlock had stifled mobility, providing a 
testament to the effectiveness of their tactics and training. 
The performance of the vastly outnumbered British cavalry in the opening months of the First World 
War demonstrated that the difficult and controversial period of reform in the aftermath of the Boer 
War had not been in vain.  The need for skill when fighting on foot and the use of rifles rather than 
carbines in South Africa gave the British cavalry a head start in future tactics.  By 1914 the British 
cavalry possessed an extremely high standard of marksmanship and an ability to fight dismounted that 
was considerably in advance of continental armies, with the German army only acknowledging the 
importance of such roles after a month of fighting in the First World War. Shock charges remained a 
feature of British tactics, giving the cavalry the aggression and confidence that was in danger of being 
lost in 1904, but these methods were seen as being one part of a hybrid system that emphasised 
flexibility dependent on situation and terrain.  The contention of Edward Spiers that the British 
cavalry went to war in 1914 as dedicated to shock tactics as it had been in 1899 is incorrect.  In fact, 
the cavalry learned from its experiences in South Africa, emerging as an effective hybrid force that 
was capable of fighting both mounted and dismounted when the tactical situation demanded it.  
Although the firepower versus steel debate produced strong opinions and controversial statements that 
sometimes bordered on the polemical, it resulted in tactical reform that ultimately produced a highly 
trained and tactically astute cavalry force that performed well in the critical opening battles of 1914.   
Mounted Infantry 
A curious adjunct to the firepower versus shock debate was the existence of the regular Mounted 
Infantry.121  Comprised of infantry temporarily mounted on horses, this arm showed some of the value 
of mobile troops who were able to fight dismounted.  The British Army was unique amongst the 
major powers of Europe in maintaining Mounted Infantry as an adjunct to and sometimes replacement 
for the cavalry.122  The Mounted Infantry owed their origins to the demands of colonial warfare.  
Small British forces stationed in distant corners of the Empire often had need of mounted troops but 
lacked local cavalry support.  In circumstances such as these, Mounted Infantry were a handy, albeit 
improvised, solution.  Although they were not trained to carry out shock charges, the Mounted 
Infantry were valuable in colonial warfare in scouting and screening roles, while their ability to fight 
dismounted as infantry made them useful mobile fire support for small forces.  Furthermore, Mounted 
Infantry could provide dismounted support for cavalry, making use of their infantry rifles that were 
superior to the cavalry carbines of the pre-Boer War era. 
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On paper it seemed as if the war in South Africa was an ideal theatre for the Mounted Infantry to 
demonstrate their capabilities.  The vast geography of theatre, the mobility of the Boers and the 
numerical weakness of British cavalry meant that there was a great need for mounted troops, with 
Mounted Infantry seeming to represent a perfect solution.   In theory, these troops were a good match 
for the Boers, able to deploy rapidly and then dismount and take advantage of their infantry training 
and rifles to win the subsequent fire fight.  With cavalry finding limited opportunities for shock action 
and dismounted fighting more common than expected, some felt that MI represented the tactics of the 
future.  In 1900 Howard Vincent commented that while the days of charging cavalry seemed to be 
over, there was still a great need for “...mounted infantry, capable of quick movement on horse easy to 
mount, and of foot work in the fire zone.”123  Lord Roberts was a particular advocate of using MI in 
South Africa.  Upon assuming command, Roberts ordered every British infantry battalion in or 
arriving in South Africa to muster one company of Mounted Infantry each in order to create eight new 
battalions consisting purely of MI.124   
Unfortunately, this unprecedented expansion starkly revealed the improvised nature of Mounted 
Infantry.  The troops detached to join the MI received rudimentary training in riding, often lasting 3 
weeks or less, and were then rushed to the front.125  Poorly trained in mounted work and almost 
entirely ignorant of horsemanship and care for the animals, the early results were farcical.  
Artilleryman and author of the treatise Small Wars, Charles Callwell, remembered seeing MI in action 
during a small scale engagement in Cape Colony.  After a burst of firing, Callwell witnessed a crowd 
of riderless horses and men on foot running towards his guns, and assumed that they had been driven 
back by a Boer attack with heavy casualties.  Upon stopping one of the soldiers, the man related the 
cause of the apparent rout: 
Them Boers they gets comin’ nearer tho’ we was shooting grand, and the Captain says 
‘Mount boys’ and some as gets up they falls off, and some falls off as they gets up, and my 
d____ horse shoves up ‘is d____ head...126 
Callwell went on to write of Mounted Infantry, “They do not fall off in the drill book, or if they do it 
does not say so.”127  The tactical handling of MI was made difficult due to such poor horsemanship.  
For example, the day after the Klip Drift charge, an advancing column of Mounted Infantry 
inexplicably came to a halt in the open within rifle range of the Boers, giving the burghers time to 
bring up artillery and a pom-pom gun.  The fire of these heavier pieces caused a large number of 
British horses to bolt, carrying the helpless riders with them, many of the animals falling off a steep 
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bank and ending up in the Modder River.128  As well as being vulnerable in battle, lack of experience 
and training made the early MI appalling horsemasters.  The attrition of horses in some MI formations 
was truly staggering.  The 1st Mounted Infantry was completely re-horsed almost four times over the 
course of just 14 months, yet of its total animal losses of 1,031, just 50 were killed in action, while 10 
were killed by lightning.129  Brief training had done little to teach the men the details of horse care.  
M.F. Rimington recalled being asked by one of his troopers whether he should feed his horse beef or 
mutton, while William Robertson ruminated that “No more unfortunate animal ever lived than the 
horse of the mounted infantryman during the early period of the march from the Modder to 
Pretoria.”130   
Nevertheless, despite their poor start, Mounted Infantry remained an important component of British 
forces in South Africa, especially in the guerrilla stage of the war when mobility was crucial.  
Experience in the field gradually improved the MI from its dismal early condition, and by the latter 
stages of the war both horsemastery and tactics had improved.131  For example, in March 1902 an 
advance guard of MI pursuing a force under De La Rey marched 30 miles to reach the area and then 
pursued the Boers “at speed” for around 8 miles, a considerable improvement from the early actions 
of 1900.132  The improved quality of the Mounted Infantry won the branch praise at the end of the 
war, with MI commander Edward Hutton feeling “...the successful issue of the South African War 
was very largely due to the principles of mounted infantry being thoroughly recognised and carried 
into effect.”133   
A number of officers saw a key role for Mounted Infantry in the post-war British Army.  A relatively 
common assumption existed in the years immediately following the Boer War that future conflicts 
would be dominated by mobility, suggesting the need for greater numbers of mounted troops.134  For 
example, in a prize winning essay published in 1901, Major E.G. Nicolls argued “It does not then 
seem unreasonable to assume that war operations in the future will consist of a series of running 
fights, or minor actions, carried on by the mounted mobile troops on each side, and will culminate in 
one side being driven into a position where they must either fight a decisive action or surrender.”135  
Financial stringency meant that it was unlikely there would be enough cavalry to meet the potential 
demands of such a conflict, and instead it was suggested by a number of officers that Mounted 
Infantry could provide a substitute on more mundane duties such as screening and scouting, allowing 
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cavalry to remain fresh for decisive battlefield action.136  Developing on this idea, some officers felt 
the Mounted Infantry could provide dismounted fire support for the cavalry, allowing the cavalry to 
remain mounted and deliver shock charges when the opportunity arose.137  A few supporters of MI 
went even further, most notably Erskine Childers, who felt that cavalry should become purely 
mounted riflemen inspired by the success of the Boers in South Africa, but such views were on the 
fringes of the debate.138  Although the debate about its precise usage continued, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Boer War the Mounted Infantry branch appeared to have a promising future ahead of 
it.  In 1903, the Elgin Commission recommended the provision of “a considerable force of mounted 
riflemen” in addition to regular cavalry.139  An inspection of Mounted Infantry at Aldershot in 1905 
drew praise, with John French considering their performance “far beyond his expectations” and 
feeling “The importance of the part they have to play cannot be impressed too strongly upon MI 
officers of all ranks.”140  Indeed, Edward Spiers has suggested that Mounted Infantry held the 
potential to be a genuine alternative to cavalry in this period, and has been critical of the failure to 
take full advantage of the arm.141 
However, the Mounted Infantry was far from universally popular within the British Army.  Its risible 
performance in the early part of the Boer War had left many observers with a decidedly negative view 
of the arm.  Opinions presented to the Elgin Commission were often highly critical of the MI.  
Michael Rimington felt that one cavalryman was worth three mounted infantrymen, while Lord 
Methuen lambasted the arm for being poor at reconnaissance and possessing horsemastery that was 
“beneath contempt.”142  Douglas Haig acknowledged that the MI had improved over time, but still felt 
that “...few ever became good enough riders to be fit for scouting work.”143  Furthermore, it had been 
noted that on several occasions during Boer War, Mounted Infantry had improvised a mounted 
weapon, usually by fixing a bayonet on the end of the rifle to create a makeshift lance, and then 
launched charges against Boers.144  Rimington thought this was a “splendid thing”, but other officers 
were concerned at the possibility that such examples would encourage Mounted Infantry to shed its 
infantry characteristics and become bad cavalry instead.145  There were also serious doubts about the 
capacity of Mounted Infantry to survive a battle against trained European horsemen.  The Boers had 
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been able to cause considerable panic and disorder amongst the MI with rifle and artillery fire, and 
there was a fear that if European cavalry was able to charge Mounted Infantry with cold steel, the 
result would be a complete slaughter.146  Given that many pro-MI officers saw their ideal role as 
screening and scouting in place of cavalry, duties that would likely bring them into contact with 
enemy horsemen, this was a grave weakness.  These flaws made determining a doctrine for the future 
employment of the MI difficult.  Although they were still useful as an improvised force in colonial 
actions, doubts remained over their role and viability in a European conflict.147   
While these were valid criticisms, perhaps the greatest problem facing the Mounted Infantry was 
structural rather than tactical.  The key problem was that MI had no permanent organisation.  Instead, 
infantry were detached from their own formations, given a brief course in riding and MI duties, and 
then returned to their parent battalions ready to be improvised as and when required.  The perils of 
using such a system on a large scale had been starkly revealed in the early stages of the Boer War 
where the ad hoc MI had performed very poorly, and following the end of the conflict suggestions 
were made to establish the arm on a permanent basis.148  However, this policy was rejected on 
grounds of cost and also because of the opposition of MI officers, who preferred to return to their 
original infantry formations rather than become a new and separate branch.149  Edward Spiers has 
been critical of this attitude, accusing MI officers of “meek subservience” to the cavalry rather than 
pressing for independence, but as Stephen Badsey has argued, it seems more likely that these men 
simply wished to return to the familiar institutions of their home battalions.150  The result was that the 
organisation of the MI remained largely unchanged from the pre-Boer War structure.  Infantry was 
taken from a parent battalion, trained for two months, and then returned to its original formation, 
leaving a system satisfied no-one.  The infantry battalion lost a company of men and officers, limiting 
its own training, while the MI themselves received brief and inadequate instruction.151  Relative lack 
of interest from Mounted Infantry officers meant that the arm had no true patrons to argue its case for 
reform on more permanent lines, and so the inadequate organisation continued unchecked. 
A combination of unresolved tactical flaws and structural weaknesses led to the decline of the 
Mounted Infantry over the course of the Edwardian period.  As the cavalry improved its dismounted 
skills and took firepower more seriously, the need for Mounted Infantry to carry out these duties 
declined, reducing their principal role.  Under the Haldane reforms, the MI was instead given the duty 
of screening and reconnaissance for the B.E.F. infantry divisions, but doubts about the ability of these 
loosely trained formations to face European cavalry remained.  The ad hoc nature of the arm and the 
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lack of interest from MI officers who saw their posting as temporary meant that addressing these 
tactical weaknesses proved nearly impossible.  While the arm still had potential value in colonial 
actions, the emergence of Germany as the principal threat to Britain meant that maintaining the force 
became harder to justify, especially as Mounted Infantry cost almost as much as regular cavalry but 
was considered tactically inferior.  In 1912, the return of cavalry regiments from overseas postings 
saw the final end of the MI, with the formation being disbanded and regular cavalry being substituted 
as divisional troops for the B.E.F. infantry.152  Edward Spiers has been critical of the failure to 
develop the Mounted Infantry into a successor to regular cavalry, but given the unresolved structural 
and tactical weaknesses that existed in the arm, it seems unlikely the idea was ever taken seriously 
within the British Army.  Instead, successful cavalry reform based on both firepower and shock action 
sounded the effective death knell for the Mounted Infantry.  While the MI was barely changed from 
its pre-Boer War roots, the cavalry underwent considerable reform and emerged as a genuine and 
highly effective hybrid force.  The MI had been a useful source of fire support to the cavalry in the 
days of the carbine, but by the eve of the First World War this role was far less important and it was 
difficult to justify their expense.  Inadequately organised for European conflict, hampered by the 
tactical weaknesses that had been exposed in South Africa and equalled in dismounted work by the 
cavalry it was intended to support, there was little reason to maintain the Mounted Infantry beyond 
this point, a fact recognised even by supporters of the arm.153   
Reconnaissance and Horsemastery 
Although the arguments over the relative merits of firepower as opposed to the arme blanche 
dominated much of the cavalry reform debate, the Boer War had also demonstrated the difficulty and 
the critical importance of effective reconnaissance on a modern battlefield.  Smokeless powder and 
well concealed trenches made the job of reconnaissance harder than ever before and placed great 
demands upon the cavalry, who were already struggling with the challenge of developing new combat 
methods, and suffering from serious horse attrition.  Inadequate maps and the relative invisibility of 
Boer positions made the job even harder, but the consequences of insufficient reconnaissance were 
disastrous.  On several occasions during the war, British forces failed to discover Boer positions until 
it was too late, stumbling into previously concealed fire zones and suffering heavy casualties as a 
result.  Faulty reconnaissance played a critical role in the triple defeats of ‘Black Week’, particularly 
at Magersfontein and Colenso, where the true locations of the Boer trenches were only revealed when 
the burghers opened fire and took the British by surprise. Redvers Buller ruminated over the issue in 
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1900, noting “I suppose our officers will someday learn the value of scouting, but at present our men 
always seem to blunder into the very midst of the enemy.”154  
In addition to the difficult conditions imposed by smokeless weapons and the absence of useful maps, 
effective reconnaissance was hampered by the lack of training and interest that had been taken in the 
duty by the pre-war British cavalry.  Although it was regarded as a critically important role, there was 
a dangerous assumption that reconnaissance would not be possible until the enemy cavalry had been 
destroyed, causing practical training in scouting against active opposition to become neglected.155  
John French complained in 1895 that just 3 or 4 days a year were dedicated to reconnaissance work as 
compared to 27 days in the French army, while an anonymous cavalryman bemoaned in 1899 that 
“...the art of patrolling is almost unknown in our cavalry.”156  Reconnaissance was not taken seriously 
at peace time manoeuvres, where the confined areas made true scouting difficult to practice and it was 
not uncommon “...to see cavalry scouts approach openly to within 500 yards of infantry firing at 
them, and often closer.”157  Training during the pre-war years instead focussed on formation cohesion 
and riding ability, failing to nurture the level of individual initiative that was needed in hazardous 
reconnaissance missions in unfamiliar country.158 
An additional restriction upon scouting duties was the weak condition of cavalry horses throughout 
the campaign.  Horses initially sent out to South Africa were heavy and strong, but such mounts 
demanded a great amount of forage that proved impossible to supply, and were further limited by the 
fact that they travelled from a Northern hemisphere winter to a Southern hemisphere summer without 
being given time to fully acclimatize.  Furthermore, the horse was expected to carry a large amount of 
weight, giving greater impact in the charge but proving a serious problem in the more mobile, long 
distance operations that were common in South Africa.  Jay Stone has suggested that a fully loaded 
cavalry horse could be expected to carry as much as 400 pounds in weight, including the rider, his 
weapons and various other items of kit.159  These factors posed serious health problems for the 
animals, and such difficulties were compounded by the poor horsemastery prevalent amongst the 
cavalry.  Lack of training meant that although the British cavalry were considered good riders, they 
were not accustomed to long distance riding or extended operations in the field.  Instead, rider and 
horse generally only spent a few hours per day together outside the stables, leading John French to 
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admit after the war that; “They [the cavalry] understood stable management better than the care of 
horses in the field”, while Leo Amery was more scathing when he complained that the average British 
cavalryman was “...hardly more conscious of their horse than of their boots.”160    This lack of 
experience in horsemastery meant that a number of bad habits were prevalent amongst the mounted 
forces, such as failing to allow a horse to graze when the opportunity arose, and remaining mounted 
even when at a halt.161  This latter error tired the horse needlessly and risked causing a sore back, 
making it impossible for the animal to wear a saddle and thus effectively rendering it a casualty.  
Michael Rimington, generally considered the best horsemaster in the British Army, felt that remaining 
mounted unnecessarily was perhaps the greatest cause of horse losses in the entire war.162  The issue 
was addressed in the ‘Notes for Guidance’ issued by Lord Roberts on assuming command in January 
1900, urging that men should dismount whenever possible and even lead their horses on foot when the 
opportunity arose.163  Strenuous efforts were also made to reduce the weight carried by the animal, 
with official memos urging the removal of unnecessary kit whenever possible.164 
Not all the problems with the health of the horses were the result of individual negligence.  The length 
of supply lines and their vulnerability to Boer raids meant that providing the vast quantity of forage 
required for the horses was a tremendous difficulty.  Initially, horse rations were 12 pounds of oats a 
day, which would be reduced if hay or grazing was available.165  By the time Lord Roberts took 
command in January 1900, the figure had dropped to 10 pounds of oats a day, but in the midst of 
active operations even this figure often proved impossible to provide.  For example, during the 
advance to relieve Kimberley, the horses of the cavalry division went without feed for two days from 
17th February to the 19th, and then received just six pounds of oats per horse for the next four days.166  
Called upon to undertake strenuous work on such short rations, the horses suffered terrible casualties, 
rendering the division virtually immobile for want of animals by April 1900.167  The British made 
great efforts to bring replacement animals to South Africa, but the quality of these horses varied 
enormously.  In April 1900, Douglas Haig was frustrated to find that “only wretched beasts of 
Argentine ponies are arriving and very few of them.”168  Even when fresh animals were available, 
they were given little time to acclimatize and the difficult conditions often rendered them casualties 
within a matter of days.  Michael Rimington described the process of bringing new animals to the 
front;  
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..thirty days’ voyage, followed by a five or six days’ railway journey, then semi-starvation at 
the end of a line of communication, then some quick work followed by two or three days’ 
total starvation, then more work, and so on.169 
As the British gained greater control over South Africa the supply situation became more stable and 
the horses received more regular rations, and additionally officers and men learned how to make 
better use of whatever forage was at hand.170  However, the limitations of supply during campaign 
exacerbated the difficulties of keeping horses fit and healthy in the unfamiliar climate of the veldt, and 
the rate of horse attrition remained shockingly high throughout the conflict. 
The poor condition of mounts in South Africa seriously limited cavalry tactics.  Most obviously, weak 
horses were unable to gain sufficient speed to carry out a shock charge, but the state of the mounts 
also had a negative influence upon the ability to reconnoitre effectively.  Initially, reconnaissance was 
carried out by detached patrols under the command of officers or N.C.Os, who would range ahead of 
the rest of the squadron.171  However, the feeble condition of horses meant that these patrols were at 
risk of being cut off or overtaken by the Boers, lacking the speed to escape the fast moving 
commandos.172  This caused the scouts to lose confidence and encouraged timid movement, with the 
patrols rarely advancing more than a quarter of a mile from the supporting squadron.173  Gradually, 
the patrol system was phased out in many regiments in favour of forming a long line of scouts from an 
entire squadron, spacing them out over several hundred yards and performing a sweep of the 
countryside.174  Although this allowed the scouts to push further forward and ensured the Boers could 
not ambush individuals, it was not an efficient system for gathering information, being highly 
conspicuous and encouraging the men “...to trust to their neighbour instead of using their own 
eyes.”175  While the system was flawed, practice and experience meant that cavalry reconnaissance 
was beginning to show signs of improvement by the later stages of the war, with scouts ranging 
further and being able to report back more useful information.176  Nevertheless, at the end of the 
conflict there was an almost universal call for improvements to be made in reconnaissance training 
and the related subject of horsemastery under campaign conditions.177   
Fortunately for the reformers, the issue of reconnaissance training was not caught up in the furious 
debate between the ‘New School’ and ‘Old School’, allowing quiet improvements in training and 
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organisation to develop.  The new emphasis on scouting also marked something of a doctrinal change 
for the horsemen.  In the aftermath of the Boer War, several writers had complained that cavalry had 
been ‘reduced’ to scouting and that this marked a perversion of the true combat role of the mounted 
arm.178  However, by the later years of the Edwardian period it was seen as a crucial duty and the 
cavalry were criticised in strong terms if they were not up to the required standard.  Inspired by the 
urging of Inspector General of Cavalry Robert Baden-Powell, picked men were taken from the 
squadrons to become trained scouts.  Reform aimed at training at least 4 scouts per squadron, with a 
further 12 scouts at regimental level underneath a specially trained officer.179  This was the first time 
the cavalry had possessed an organisation at regimental level for the purposes of reconnaissance, and 
although it took time to develop its full potential, it marked a distinct advance from the haphazard 
organisation that had existed in the pre-Boer War army.180  Supplementing the scouts was the 
institution of a group system, with a section of 8 men under the command of an NCO becoming a 
permanent unit and encouraging “intelligence and initiative” when on detached and reconnaissance 
duties.181  Although these changes represented substantial improvements, there were calls for even 
more to be done.  Initially, scoutmasters were noted to be highly enthusiastic but often lacking in 
practical knowledge, with one anonymous cavalryman complaining that they mainly consisted of 2nd 
Lieutenants who knew “little or nothing.”182  Addressing the problem, minor tactics in the art of 
reconnaissance became part of the Cavalry School syllabus in 1906, while John French suggested 
assigning regimental scouts on a permanent basis rather than training them year by year, feeling 
“Scouts should be made much of and given every reasonable privilege.”183   The process of reform 
was not without problems, and in 1910 Edmund Allenby commented severely upon casual errors in 
reconnaissance which “ought by now to be impossible.”184  Nevertheless, reconnaissance training was 
beginning to bear fruit by the later years of the Edwardian period, with superior use of the ground and 
all round improvements noticeable.185   
Allied to the reform of reconnaissance was a new emphasis on improving horsemastery.  Drawing 
from an ever more urbanized population, the cavalry could not count on prior knowledge of animal 
handling, making efficient and realistic training in horse handling important.186  Long distance riding 
was introduced into the training syllabus, alongside specific manoeuvre schemes that aimed to 
recreate service conditions by putting scouts into the field for extended periods against active 
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opposition.  These exercises were progressive, initially aiming to train individual scouts, but later 
progressing to include the movement of friendly troops that were dependent on the reports received 
from the scouting forces.187  The exercises were not without fault.  It was noted cavalry map reading 
was poor, with the soldiers often having to ask for directions, while in one case the ‘enemy’ that was 
the target of the reconnaissance was carrying out a pre-planned ceremonial march with bands 
playing.188  However, these schemes marked a distinct improvement in training for combat compared 
to pre-war work.  Whereas prior to the Boer War one cavalryman noted that the average cavalry horse 
spent 20 hours out of 24 in the stables, the new exercises lasted several days without interruption, 
forcing officers and men to handle supplies and horse care in a more realistic fashion.189  Experience 
of horse care in the Boer War encouraged other simple reforms, such as dismounting and leading the 
animals whenever possible and removing excess weight on improved saddles.190 
The British cavalry made steady and important improvements in reconnaissance and horsemastery 
throughout the Edwardian period, although it was often overshadowed by the prominent and 
acrimonious fire versus sword debate.  For example, Lord Roberts was still expressing concern in 
August 1914 that cavalrymen never chose to dismount unless ordered to do so, even though walking 
with the horses had been standard practice for several years.191  In fact, by 1914 the British cavalry 
had emerged as perhaps the best horsemasters in Europe.  The value of the experience gained in South 
Africa was most clearly revealed in comparison with European cavalries of the era.  In the Russo-
Japanese War, the Russian cavalry proved so abysmal in scouting duties in the early part of the war 
that even accurate reports were ignored by the time of the Battle of Mukden in Feburary 1905, and 
reliance was instead placed on local spies.192   In 1914 the superiority of British horsemastery over 
that in the French and German armies was considerable, with B.E.F. horses remaining fit even in the 
midst of active campaigning.193  Conversely, German horses were overburdened and worked to the 
point of exhaustion, while the bad habit of staying mounted while marching on hard roads caused 
huge numbers of horses to become lame.194  A British liaison officer found the French cavalry in an 
equally poor state, with many horses suffering from sore backs caused by the men remaining mounted 
at all times, noting that as a result the smell of some squadrons was “painful”.195  Furthermore, when 
the anticipated initial clash of massed cavalry divisions failed to occur, the ability of the British 
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cavalry to fight dismounted gave them an edge in action against enemy screening forces.  It had long 
been expected that the final stages of the reconnaissance would be carried out dismounted, and the 
British cavalry were well prepared for this role.196  Conversely, the German cavalry placed 
considerable reliance on their Jaeger infantry for fire support, causing critical delays while stalled 
horsemen waited for the infantry to catch up.197  In combination with rapidly rising horse attrition, this 
limited the potential of the German cavalry in a reconnaissance role to the point where it has been 
suggested that it caused Alexander von Kluck, commander of German 1st Army, to operate in a 
“partial intelligence vacuum” in the opening months of the war.198  Conversely, British cavalry 
reconnaissance had helped identify the looming threat of the powerful German advance prior to the 
Battle of Mons, albeit only to have it rejected by GHQ.199  The cavalry also helped screen the retreat 
of the B.E.F. after the battles of Mons and Le Cateau, keeping German cavalry at bay and ensuring a 
potentially hazardous withdrawal proceeded with surprising smoothness.  Following the Battle of the 
Marne, British cavalry was able to maintain contact with retreating German forces before the ‘Race to 
the Sea’ brought mobile operations on the Western Front to a virtual halt. 
The reform of reconnaissance and horse mastery in the 1902 – 1914 period was a quiet success story 
for the British cavalry.  Due to the short period of mobile warfare in 1914 the value of this 
development has sometimes been overlooked in favour of a focus upon the shock versus fire debate, 
but this is to neglect an important advance drawn from the painful experiences on the veldt.  In the 
opening weeks of the First World War, German and French cavalry suffered from many of the same 
problems that had afflicted the British mounted arm in South Africa.  Conversely, the British had 
learned from their experiences, maintaining healthy horses and thus retaining their mobility right up 
until trench deadlock set in during late 1914.  Whereas prior to the Boer War such mundane duties as 
scouting and care of horses had received little attention, by the time of the First World War they were 
an integral and valuable part of training, giving the British cavalry a critical edge in the mobile 
operations of August and September 1914.  
Conclusions 
The tactical debates and reforms that surrounded the mounted arm in the pre-First World War British 
Army, and the extent to which they changed the nature of the cavalry have long been a contentious 
and difficult subject.  Looking back and surveying the trench deadlock of the Western Front, it is easy 
to be overly critical of what Gervase Phillips has termed the “scapegoat arm”.200  Furthermore, the 
role of cavalrymen John French and Douglas Haig as commanders of the B.E.F. has drawn much 
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comment and criticism, with some historians using the fact they were cavalry officers to criticise the 
entire ethos of the arm itself.201  With the benefit of hindsight it is tempting to argue that any reform 
of the cavalry was essentially irrelevant in the face of modern weapons, but as recent scholarship has 
pointed out, cavalry did not become extinct in the First World War, achieving a number of notable 
successes, particularly in the Middle East.202   
The reform of the cavalry was a difficult process in which fierce passions were aroused, and 
polemical positions were sometimes taken, both by ‘New School’ and ‘Old School’.  However, the 
two sides of the debate were ultimately reconciled with the creation of an effective blend of both 
mounted action and dismounted firepower, leading to the creation of a hybrid cavalryman capable of 
performing multiple roles.  By the time of Cavalry Training 1912, the focus lay on tactical flexibility, 
using firepower, movement and shock action in concert to overwhelm the enemy.203  Emphasis 
remained on delivering the charge as the ultimate aim of any attack, but officers were almost 
unanimous in the view that dismounted action would compromise the vast majority of the cavalry’s 
work.  Furthermore, as Gervase Phillips has argued, there is a dangerous perception amongst military 
historians that a cavalry charge must inevitably be a tactically crude and anachronistic manoeuvre.204  
However, as demonstrated by Cavalry Training 1912, the British cavalry had a flexible and well 
considered approach to delivering shock action, emphasising surprise and fire support as pre-
requisites for anything other than small scale actions.205 
The vociferous and often public debate between ‘New School’ and ‘Old School’ sometimes disguised 
the quiet work of reform that was progressing amongst the cavalry, in terms of training, tactics and 
equipment.  Drawing upon the hard lessons learned in South Africa, the cavalry undertook less 
glamorous reforms that have sometimes been ignored in favour of the prominent firepower versus 
shock debate.  The complete overhaul of reconnaissance and horsemastery training took time to bear 
fruit, but ultimately proved its worth in the opening months of the First World War.  The German and 
French horses suffered terrible attrition within a matter of weeks, often caused by simple and needless 
errors such as remaining mounted at all times, but the British cavalry had learned from their Boer War 
experience and were able to keep their animals fed and healthy for far longer.  Superior skills in 
dismounted action and improved training in reconnaissance also gave the British the edge over the 
German horsemen, who were forced to rely on Jaeger formations for fire support.  While not every 
action ended in automatic victory, the string of small scale clashes between the British cavalry and 
numerical superior German mounted arm clearly demonstrated the tactical superiority of the B.E.F. 
horsemen.  Armed with the superb Lee-Enfield rifle and highly trained in marksmanship, the British 
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cavalry was indeed a “new element in tactics” as described by Douglas Haig, being far in advance of 
French, German and Russian rivals.  While the ability of the cavalry to achieve success dismounted 
had been demonstrated in the Boer War in actions such as Koodoosrand, training in the pre-First 
World War period had built on these foundations and produced cavalry capable of improvising as 
infantry when necessary.  For example, at the First Battle of Ypres, British cavalry was capable of 
holding portions of trench on the Messines Ridge against German attacks during a critical period of 
the battle.  This tactical flexibility stood in stark contrast to the German cavalry, which found itself 
being lambasted for its over reliance on mounted charges. 
The British cavalry was still capable of tactical errors, as was demonstrated by the failed charge of 2nd 
Brigade at Audregnies, but for the most part the arm demonstrated its skill and flexibility in the 
opening months of 1914.  Improvements in training, equipment and tactics in the wake of the Boer 
War helped to create an elite force of mounted troops that were able to perform well despite being 
vastly outnumbered in the opening months of the conflict.  Although the cavalry found itself short of 
opportunities once the trench deadlock began, during the mobile months of the war it demonstrated 
considerable tactical skill that confounded its German opponents.   
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Conclusions 
 
The performance of the British Expeditionary during the desperate battles of 1914 has given the ‘Old 
Contemptibles’ lasting fame. 1  Outnumbered and in a dangerous strategic position, the army 
demonstrated skill and tenacity in delaying the German advance and retreating in good order.  The 
early actions of 1914 stand in particular contrast to the opening of the Boer War in 1899, especially 
the triple defeats of ‘Black Week’, seeming to suggest that the British Army had developed a great 
deal in the intervening years.  However, while historians have generally agreed that the B.E.F. was 
particularly well trained, the importance of the Boer War in developing tactics and training in the 
intervening years has sometimes been neglected.  For example, in the most recent study of the 
B.E.F.’s performance in 1914, the importance of the South African experience in shaping tactical 
handling is only referred to in passing, and the force is criticised for remaining a “Victorian Army”.2  
Other historians have argued that the influence of the war was diffuse or even negative.  Ian Beckett 
has suggested that the ambiguous nature of the conflict made extracting useful lessons difficult, 
meaning that the overall influence of the conflict was not great.3  The greatest critic of the Boer War’s 
influence has been G.R. Searle, who has argued that the struggle produced lessons that were to prove 
“...irrelevant, if not positively harmful” for the British Army during the First World War.4   
However, as this thesis has demonstrated, the Boer War was the catalyst for a wide variety of tactical 
reforms that shaped the B.E.F. of 1914.  Not all of the lessons that emerged from the struggle proved 
useful and some were neglected in the pre-First World War era, but the core training and tactics of the 
B.E.F. were rooted in the experience of combat on the veldt.  Contrary to the opinion of G.R. Searle, 
the improved tactics that were apparent amongst all service arms in 1914 were directly influenced by 
the experience of South Africa, not only in terms of providing combat examples for future 
employment, but also in reforming attitudes toward training and the profession as a whole.  
Professionalism amongst the officer corps was encouraged, while the men were expected to 
demonstrate high levels of skill and initiative rather than the simple obedience of earlier times.  While 
social prejudice and budgetary constraints sometimes prevented the reforms being carried further, the 
dramatic change to the training ethos remained a huge step forward for the British Army.  Although 
not all the tactical lessons of the Boer War survived the process of reform, the overall impact of the 
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conflict in changing training and tactics was fundamental to the success of the B.E.F. in 1914.  
However, the curious nature of the Boer War and the unique colonial policing duties of the British 
Army combined to create to a somewhat skewed process of development in the 1902 – 1914 period.  
The South African conflict held many useful tactical lessons that were to prove of value in 1914, but 
the short length of the conventional period of the war meant that it taught little about large scale 
operational handling.   
The Boer War provided a crucial catalyst for reorganisation and tactical reappraisal.  The Victorian 
era army had possessed great flexibility and had performed well in numerous ‘small wars’ against 
poorly armed opposition, but the diverse nature of its colonial duties and an inability to disseminate 
useful lessons across the British Army as a whole meant that its quality varied widely, with some 
units benefiting from valuable combat experience and advanced training, while others were content 
with impractical, outdated drill that stressed obedience and steadiness over all over considerations.  
The shock of early defeats in the Boer War revealed that many tactical ideas prevalent in the army 
were now dangerously out of date, especially when employed against a skilful enemy possessing 
modern weaponry.  The setbacks of ‘Black Week’ contributed to a process of in-theatre learning that 
ultimately led to a tactical reappraisal, emphasising extensions and individuality rather than linear 
formations and rigid control.  Combined with a vast troop build up, these changes were successful in 
defeating the Boers, albeit only after a long and bitter guerrilla war.  However, in the aftermath of the 
conflict, the British Army was forced to assess its approach to both tactics and training, taking what 
was useful from the South African conflict and discarding lessons that had been theatre specific.  This 
process of reform was far from straightforward, and the entire Edwardian period was marked by 
ongoing tactical debates across all service arms of the British Army.   
However, despite the peculiarity of the Boer War and the difficulty of assimilating the lessons from 
the conflict, the army did reach a consensus on the importance of several critical points.  Three 
important lessons emerged for the infantry, who underwent the most striking change of all the combat 
arms.  The skills necessary for victory in the Boer War, namely marksmanship, widely extended 
infantry formations and use of cover, became the cornerstones of infantry training in the aftermath of 
the South African conflict.  Poor British marksmanship and the use of outdated volleys had 
characterised much of the early fighting in South Africa, and strenuous efforts were made to correct 
these glaring weaknesses.  It has been suggested by James Edmonds in the British official history of 
the First World War that the tremendous rate of fire produced by British infantry in 1914 came about 
as a training response instituted in 1909 to compensate for a lack of machine guns, and this assertion 
has been repeated by subsequent historians such as Martin Samuels.5  However, while there was a 
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greater emphasis on rapid fire in the years prior to the First World War, the roots of British 
marksmanship training emerged immediately after the Boer War.  Following the South African 
experience, musketry training underwent wholesale reform, with far greater allowances of practice 
ammunition being provided and firing at unknown distances becoming a feature of target shooting.  
Drawing upon combat examples from South Africa, musketry training emphasised accurate ‘snap 
shooting’ at 600 yards and under rather than precision at extreme ranges.  The emphasis on accuracy 
and judging distances introduced in 1902 provided a crucial skill base, allowing the course to be made 
more demanding in 1909 with greater focus being placed on rapidity.  In 1914 the improvements 
made to British marksmanship proved their worth.  It was soon discovered that British infantry were 
capable of stopping German attacks in the 400 – 600 yards range that had been identified as critical 
during the Boer War, while one British veteran even recalled that his unit made use of local fire 
tactics that had been taught to him by “Brother Boer” in the earlier conflict.6   
The British infantry also adopted the skirmish skills of the Boers.  Widely dispersed and loose 
formations had become a vital element of British tactical success in South Africa, reducing casualties 
and allowing individual men to make the most of cover.  As a result, close order was rejected except 
for conflict against ‘savages’ and wide extensions became a keynote of infantry tactics.  The debate 
around extensions ebbed and flowed prior to the First World War, and while by 1914 the level of 
dispersion was reduced from that used against the Boers, it still remained larger than any other 
contemporary army.   
In addition to presenting smaller targets, wide spacing amongst the men allowed greater use of local 
cover during combat.  Whereas in the Boer War, troops had been poor at taking shelter and had 
suffered as a result, changes in training introduced as a result led to the creation of skilful skirmishing 
infantry that could move from point to point, taking advantage of local terrain.  Although the widely 
extended formations that had been prevalent in South Africa were somewhat less appropriate for the 
crowded conditions of Europe, the ability of regular British infantry to take advantage of cover and 
fight in dispersed formation stood in contrast to German units that were seen to advance in close order 
at Mons and Le Cateau.   
The influence of the Boer War was also felt in the artillery.  For the Royal Artillery, the conflict had 
been the first opportunity to fight against a similarly armed enemy for over fifty years, and although 
the role of the gunners declined once the conventional stage of the war had come to a close, the 
experience of combat in the early part of the war created controversy and left a profound impression.  
The potential of long range fire, the value of concealment and the importance of co-operation between 
guns and infantry were all important lessons of the Boer War.  Long range fire caught the attention of 
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the public during the war, and while it was quickly noted by military authorities that its physical 
effects were often limited, it could still cause considerable panic and fear amongst troops 
unaccustomed to it.  Furthermore, the increase in small arms ranges had the effect of forcing guns 
away from the front line, rendering old close range tactics inappropriate.  The British reacted by 
emphasising precision accuracy, with new weapons and range tables vastly increasing the range at 
which the guns could fight.  Additionally, the introduction of a heavy piece in the form of the 60-
pounder added a new element to British artillery tactics.  While the gun has been criticised for basing 
its design purely upon South African experience, in 1914 it was the only gun with the range capable 
of engaging the heaviest German weapons.  Problems stemmed from its limited numbers rather than 
any inherent design flaws, and its accuracy at great distances was the source of considerable 
admiration from the French in 1914. 
Concealment and cover were more controversial factors for the artillery.  Although the Boers had 
proved the incredible survivability of hidden guns, even when vastly outnumbered, some British 
gunners disliked the concept and felt that it offered diminished effectiveness compared to firing in the 
open.  Under the leadership of Lord Roberts, cover and accuracy became the linchpins of Royal 
Artillery tactics following the Boer War, but the example of the dashing French rafale artillery system 
remained a seductive one for several years and was widely admired by the British.  However, after a 
brief flirtation with French tactics, by the end of the Edwardian period the desirability of concealment 
was once again becoming predominant.  The Boer War had initially demonstrated the value of hidden 
weapons, and the Russo-Japanese War had shown that to expose artillery to hostile guns invited 
almost certain destruction.  Furthermore, various field trials ultimately proved that the British 18-
pounder was technically incapable of mimicking French rafale tactics.  The flexible culture of the 
British army meant that the ultimate decision on whether to fight in the open or behind cover 
remained with the local officers, but the value of concealment was recognised and the Royal Artillery 
did not become wedded to reckless tactics such as those of the French. 
Co-operation between artillery and infantry had been crucial to British success in Natal and would 
later become the critical element for victory in the First World War.  While the British demonstrated 
their capacity for in-theatre learning in achieving good co-operation between the arms in South 
Africa, the lessons became endangered following the conflict.  It took the influence of the Russo-
Japanese War to highlight the importance of co-operation and cause the British to recall their South 
African experiences.  Debate flourished around the subject and improvements were made in training, 
with practical combat experience giving the British a head start in some tactical aspects, particularly 
regarding how long the guns should engage a target before the risk of friendly fire to attacking troops 
became too great.  However, while useful work was done in this regard, the small size of the British 
Army and its culture of flexibility prevented there being any real systematic system of artillery 
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support.  This was to become a weakness in the First World War where the vast scale of attacks meant 
that careful fire plans and thorough preparation were crucial. 
Robert Scales has been critical of the reform of the Royal Artillery during this period, arguing that the 
Boer War kept the British gunners in a ‘small war’ mindset that compared unfavourably with the 
German army.7  In particular, Scales has been critical of the 60-pounder, arguing its South African 
inspired design was flawed for the conditions of the First World War in comparison with the powerful 
heavy German howitzers.  However, such a comparison is unfair.  The British 60-pounder was 
predominantly seen as a long range ‘man killer’ and counter battery weapon, not intended to fulfil the 
role of assigned to howitzers, and thus the comparison to German heavy howitzers that were designed 
to breach fortifications is not entirely valid.  Scales cites the deployment of 5th Division’s guns at Le 
Cateau as ultimate proof of the flawed nature of British artillery tactics, but as discussed in earlier 
chapters, this controversial deployment was a local decision and not followed by the guns of the 
remaining divisions.  In 1914, it was not faulty British tactics, but the numerical preponderance of 
German guns that was the critical problem.  For example, at Le Cateau, the Royal Artillery were 
outgunned by a ratio of more than 2:1, with a total of 228 British pieces engaged against at least 550 
German weapons.8  Furthermore, although the Royal Artillery suffered heavy casualties during the 
struggle, the battle ended in a British victory that proved crucial to the survival of the B.E.F. as a 
whole.9 
The cavalry also experienced reforms and rearmament in the aftermath of the Boer War.  Two 
valuable lessons were derived from South Africa.  These were firstly, the value of a combination of 
fire and shock, and secondly, the importance of reconnaissance and its associated skill of 
horsemastery.  The fire and shock debate was perhaps the most famous of all the discussions arising 
from the Boer War, but the acrimonious nature of the arguments regarding the direction of reform has 
sometimes disguised the actual quality of the results.  While there had been a growing appreciation of 
dismounted fire prior to the Boer War, the struggle in South Africa conclusively proved its value, 
particularly during the holding action at Koodoosrand which led to the siege and eventual capture of 
Cronje’s laager.  However, the war also offered evidence of the value of mounted troops in a more 
traditional role.  The cavalry had mounted a brutally effective charge at Elandslaagte and used speed 
to break through a Boer line at Klip Drift.  Steel weapons were withdrawn in mid-1900 to lighten the 
load on overburdened horses depriving the cavalry of a shock weapon and preventing further 
successful charges.  However, in the guerrilla phase of the war the Boers adopted more aggressive 
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tactics, charging directly against British formations and winning a number of victories in the process, 
providing evidence that a mounted charges remained viable. 
Critics argued about the precise implications of the Boer War for cavalry tactics, noting the success of 
both fire and shock tactics.  Although certain extreme views were put forward from both sides, the 
debate remained relatively narrow, with the focus on the level of emphasis to be given to each duty 
rather than abolishing either rifles or swords entirely.  Indeed, after several years of acrimony a hybrid 
model that advocated equal skill with cold steel and rifle emerged, largely settling the debate.  The 
process of reform, particularly in the early years, was painful and touched upon raw nerves, but by 
1914 it had created unique cavalry tactics that were far in advance of either French or German rivals.  
The quality of British dismounted work was perhaps most clearly illustrated at the 1st Battle of Ypres 
in 1914, when cavalry were able to occupy positions on the Messines Ridge and defend it against 
German infantry assaults.  The British also had success against German horsemen.  German cavalry 
was forced to rely upon light infantry for fire support, slowing them down and discouraging bold 
moves.  Despite possessing five cavalry divisions compared to a single B.E.F. cavalry division, the 
German horsemen were unable to make their numbers count and suffered stinging defeats in several 
small engagements.10  Historians have often been critical of the British cavalry in this period, arguing 
that it failed to reform and remained dedicated to shock tactics.11  In fact, while the process of reform 
was marked with controversy, it ultimately produced a useful tactical hybrid that was far in advance 
of continental cavalry tactics.   
The clashes between British and German cavalry in 1914 also revealed the success of reforms aimed 
at improving cavalry reconnaissance.  The duty had not been taken seriously by British cavalry prior 
to the South African conflict, with the result that reconnaissance often proved risible in the Boer War, 
with British attacks blundering into concealed Boer positions and suffering heavy losses as a result.  
Furthermore, the demands of long range reconnaissance riding had contributed to appalling horse 
attrition on the veldt.  In the aftermath of the conflict, reconnaissance work was given renewed 
emphasis.  Specially trained scouts were attached to each cavalry formation and more realistic training 
exercises were introduced.  Additionally, simple practical lessons drawn from the Boer War became 
standard practice, such as dismounting and walking alongside the horse whenever possible.  In 
combination with superior British tactics, this improved training in reconnaissance and horsemastery 
gave a crucial edge over the German cavalry in the early months of the First World War.  German 
cavalry proved poor in a reconnaissance role, leaving commanders bereft of crucial intelligence, and 
within a matter of weeks bad horsemastery habits had taken a serious toll on their animals.12  
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Conversely, British reconnaissance and screening proved far more effective, with horses remaining fit 
in the field.13  
However, although the Boer War provided several crucial and lasting tactical lessons, the process of 
reform following the conflict was not entirely smooth.  Some lessons faded from memory, while 
others were influenced and reshaped by other factors such the Russo-Japanese War.  Furthermore, 
despite their modern weapons, the Boers were unique opposition and South Africa a peculiar theatre 
of war, meaning that direct parallels between the Boer War and a European conflict were potentially 
misleading.  For example, although the Boers possessed a handful of modern artillery pieces, they 
were massively outgunned by the Royal Artillery.  With the exception of the Battle of Spion Kop, 
Boer artillery fire tended to be of nuisance value and taught the British little about the potential 
dangers of facing heavy shell fire.  Inexperience in facing enemy artillery meant that in the early part 
of the First World War, British infantry tended to site their trenches with a view to acquiring the best 
possible field of rifle fire, neglecting the fact that this often exposed the position to crushing German 
bombardments.  Additionally, although Boer trenches had been excellent and served as a model for 
the British in the years following the war, over time there was a distinct decline in interest in the 
subject.  The tedium of digging trenches in peacetime and a fall in the number of veteran troops who 
appreciated their full value were important factors in the deterioration of entrenchment training.  
Thus, although entrenchment remained a key military skill, the quality of training in the subject fell 
noticeably in the years prior to the First World War. 
A second misleading Boer War lesson concerned the employment of machine guns.  The machine gun 
performed poorly in South Africa, with the unwieldy weapons making perfect targets for Boer 
artillery and riflemen.  Jams and breakdowns were extremely common, and even when they were able 
to get into action the use of cover and trenches by the Boers meant that they rarely had a good target 
to engage.  The disappointing results meant that in the aftermath of the war, the weapons were 
neglected by the army as a whole, with just a handful of adherents arguing for greater employment.  
Ultimately, although financial considerations were the key element in preventing an increase in their 
numbers prior to 1914, the fact the weapon had performed so poorly against a ‘civilised’ opponent in 
the Boer War did little to improve the reputation of the machine gun as anything greater than a 
“weapon of opportunity”, or encourage its further development.   
The Boer War may have provided the catalyst for change in 1902, but it was not the only source of 
tactical ideas during the pre-First World War period, and the influence of continental thought and the 
Russo-Japanese War became important factors in the latter years of the Edwardian era.  The 
Manchurian conflict in particular caught the eye, with the British Army despatching a record number 
of observers to study the war.  The struggle between Japan and Russia seemed to offer certain 
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contradictions to the tactical assumptions regarding firepower that had emerged during the Boer War.  
The Japanese success in pressing frontal attacks against entrenched Russian defenders posed a 
counterpoint to post-Boer War British ideas that direct attacks against modern weapons would be 
virtually impossible.  The occurrence of bayonet fighting on a surprisingly regular basis in the Far 
East also suggested that firepower was not the only consideration in battle, and that courage and 
willpower could still carry the attackers into the enemy position.  Such examples were particularly 
appealing to continental thinkers, who had generally been contemptuous of British tactics and combat 
performance in the Boer War, and who often saw Japanese successes as a vindication of their earlier 
ideas.  Furthermore, the Russo-Japanese War was seen as being more relevant to European warfare 
than the South African war, being waged between two genuine powers with continental style tactics 
and equipment.  While it is clear with the benefit of hindsight that the Russo-Japanese War showed 
the dominance of firepower and the value of entrenchment, at the time such conclusions were less 
common.  Indeed, a virtual consensus emerged upon the continent that the war demonstrated the 
continuing power of the attack over passive defence, and that while firepower had undoubtedly 
developed, courage and an acceptance of casualties would still ultimately ensure success.14  Analysis 
of this consensus by subsequent historians has generally argued that due to the ambiguity surrounding 
some of the lessons of the war, European militaries tended to use them to confirm existing ideas rather 
than create new tactical concepts.15   
Fortunately, in the case of the British Army, many of the more valuable examples that emerged from 
the Russo-Japanese War were already part of existing tactical thought developed from the Boer War.  
For example, the value of concealing field guns and the need for close co-operation between infantry 
and artillery were concepts that had been clearly demonstrated in South Africa, and their importance 
in Manchuria served as a timely reminder for the Royal Artillery.  While other lessons of the conflict 
contributed to ongoing debates within the service arms, their long term influence was often limited.  
In common with other European armies, elements in Britain were impressed by Japanese assaults and 
advocated a reduction of infantry extensions in the attack.  Allied to this idea, parts of the British 
Army rejected the cautious attitude that had been adopted towards the offensive in the aftermath of 
the Boer War, instead echoing European opinion and extolling the virtues of willpower in overcoming 
superior firepower.  However, in contrast to European forces such as the French, these ideas were 
never entirely accepted by the British in the pre-First World War period.  While extensions were 
reduced from the scale used in the Boer War, they still remained wider than those used by the 
Japanese during the final stages of the Manchurian conflict.  Equally, although the concept grew in 
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popularity, the belief in offensive tactics never became a cult for the British and had limited influence 
at tactical level, although the virtues of the offensive were often extolled at higher levels.16   
In the most thorough analysis of the influence of the Russo-Japanese War upon the British Army, 
Phillip Towle has argued that while the war was an important influence upon the Royal Artillery, its 
effect upon infantry and cavalry was limited and temporary.17  Instead, tactical ideas drawn from the 
Boer War remained the core principles of British training, with the Far Eastern struggle reinforcing 
the importance of such concepts as extension, concealment and co-operation rather than proving their 
inefficiency.  The Russo-Japanese War did not cause a fundamental overhaul of tactics in the way that 
the Boer War had done, instead contributing to ongoing tactical debates that were still rooted in South 
African experience.   The Manchurian conflict showed that many of the tactical lessons of the earlier 
war had been largely correct, particularly regarding the use of field artillery, but offered 
comparatively little that was entirely new to British tactics, which remained based firmly upon the 
experience gained in the Boer War.  Its most important influence was to encourage a greater belief in 
the offensive, an interpretation that seemed to run contrary to the tactical lessons of the war, but one 
which became popular at an operational level amongst armies across Europe, including Britain.  
However, in terms of driving tactical reform in the British Army, the Boer War was of greater 
importance than the Manchurian conflict. 
Firmly based on the Boer War, but also shaped by the Russo-Japanese War and examples from 
continental thinkers, the learning process undertaken by the British Army in the 1902 - 1914 was not 
straightforward, but was instead set against a background of political and economic shifts, with 
regular changes at the War Office causing confusion in the early part of the period, and the constant 
need to keep the Army Estimates low providing a limiting factor during the Haldane years.  While 
initially the tactical experiences of the Boer War were dominant in driving reform, their influence 
declined somewhat as the conflict faded from memory.  The fact that not all the Boer War lessons 
prevailed by 1914 has been cited as evidence for the fact the war had limited tactical impact, while 
others have argued that those that did prevail were actually fallacies that were to prove irrelevant in 
the First World War.18  Even positive assessments of the army of the period have concluded that a 
number of the reforms introduced following the Boer War suffered from incomplete 
implementation.19  The harshest critics of the British Army in this period have been Martin Samuels 
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and Tim Travers.20  Both authors paint a negative picture of an anachronistic army, with Travers in 
particular emphasising resistance to modern ideas from an officer corps that was divided by rivalry 
and jealousies.  Samuels treads similar ground, arguing that at operational level the culture of 
flexibility was positively harmful, leading to unnecessary defeats and abdication of command 
responsibilities.  Both conclude that the British Army was not prepared for the First World War, with 
Samuels going further, arguing that it failed to improve much during the 1914 – 1918 period. 
However, such negative interpretations are largely based on an analysis of the British Army at an 
operational rather than tactical level.  The influences of the Boer War were felt most keenly at low 
level, where the lessons derived from combat experience could be put in to practice.  Conversely, the 
short duration of the conventional stage of the war meant that, despite the number of British and 
Empire troops committed to South Africa, there was little to be learned about handling formations at 
divisional level and above in a continental style war.  In combination with the colonial policing role of 
the British Army, this contributed to an unusual developmental direction, which emphasised tactical 
excellence and high levels of flexibility while operational level work was assigned a lower priority.  
However, although Travers and Samuels have valid criticisms regarding the operational development 
of the British Army, they marginalise the quality of low level tactics that had emerged following the 
Boer War.  Samuels in particular is quick to criticise British military performance compared to that of 
the German army, but ignores the fact that in the crucial battles of 1914, the Germans were unable to 
defeat the B.E.F. despite possessing a vast numerical advantage and a well developed operational 
doctrine.  In these confused ‘soldier’s battles’, the advanced low level tactics of the professional 
British Army proved superior to those of her opponent.  In 1914, the quality of B.E.F. low level 
tactics proved to be critical to both survival and victory, and the operational weaknesses of the British 
Army would only begin to be seriously exposed when called upon to undertake demanding offensives 
in 1915.   
The difficulties experienced by the British from 1915 onwards have sometimes led to criticism of the 
B.E.F. in 1914.  In the most recent study of the regular B.E.F., Robin Neillands has concluded that the 
army was “far too small and quite inadequately equipped” for a continental struggle.21  Yet it is 
important to remember that European militaries and governments all anticipated a short, sharp war 
that would be over in a matter of months.22  The British Army was expected to play a relatively minor 
role on the left flank of the French, while the decisive offensive blow fell on the right flank against 
Alsace-Lorraine.    Based on the anticipation of a limited role in a short continental war, the B.E.F. 
was by no means as ill-equipped as Neillands asserts.  Furthermore, despite its weaknesses, the 
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flexibility and professionalism of the B.E.F. meant that it was surprisingly well suited for the chaotic 
and hard fought battles that marked the opening months of the war.  Placed in the path of the German 
onslaught in 1914, the B.E.F. proved its tactical adaptability and although it suffered severe casualties, 
it played a critical role in halting the offensive, particularly at 1st Ypres.   
However, the cost was high and the old regular army was effectively destroyed by the end of 1914.  
Nevertheless, many of the tactical principles that were key notes of the regular B.E.F., particularly 
skilful infantry tactics, close artillery co-operation with infantry and a respect for firepower were to 
become crucial to the ultimate success of the British Army in the later stages of the First World War.  
Unfortunately, the small size of the regular army and the failure to codify a formal written doctrine 
meant that once the old B.E.F. was destroyed, the New Armies were forced to learn largely from 
scratch, repeating mistakes that had been identified in the Boer War and enduring a number of bitter 
setbacks before were able to combine both tactical skill with strong operational handling.  Faced with 
the challenge of adapting to a modern war, it was not until 1917 that the British Army was able to 
emerge from its colonial army roots and develop into a skilful and ultimately war-winning force.   
By the end of the 1902 – 1914 period, the armies of Europe had been forced to adapt themselves to a 
variety of technical and tactical changes.  The success of the process of adaptation would only be 
revealed in the acid test of combat.  The B.E.F. which deployed in the opening months of the First 
World War was a small colonial police force that stood in contrast to the mass armies of the continent.  
However, the British Army had benefited from the influence of the Boer War, which had been the 
predominant factor in the tactical reforms that led to the creation of the highly trained B.E.F.  Not all 
of the lessons of the Boer War had endured and some ideas were inapplicable to a European conflict, 
but key tactical principles learned on the veldt had prevailed in infantry, cavalry and artillery, 
contributing to the creation of a small but skilful army.  Combat experience against well armed 
opponents in the Boer War gave the British a head start on numerous tactical problems that were to 
become apparent in 1914, including concealment, extensions and use of firepower.  The process of 
development had not been smooth, with the army struggling against continuous budget cuts and also a 
variety of duties that no other army in the world had to face.  This contributed to a development path 
that largely ignored operational doctrine and did little to prepare the B.E.F. for deployment in 
anything greater than divisional strength, but at the same time encouraged flexibility and strong tactics 
at low levels.  Like all armies in the First World War, the British made both tactical and operational 
errors in the opening months of the conflict.  However, despite its colonial background and 
operational limitations, it was able to win critical battles against a numerically superior army that was 
widely regarded as the finest in Europe.  The success of the B.E.F. in these early clashes was 
principally due to the fact that the British Army had been able to learn and absorb the combat lessons 
of the Boer War.  Despite the existence of numerous competing ideas and examples, the South 
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African experience remained the foundation of British tactical reform in 1902 – 1914, giving the 
B.E.F. the skills that proved so important in August 1914. 
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